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Abstract 
 
This thesis is concerned with the regulation of artisanal and small-scale mining in Portovelo-
Zaruma (P-Z) in the South-Western corner of Ecuador. With the use of political ecology and 
an ethnographic approach I argue that there are substantial shortcomings to the existent 
apolitical research on this context and the governmental regulation that is informed by the 
latter. The thesis analyses the historical trajectory of mining activity in Porto and how it 
evolved into its current composition. It is argued that the co-existence of different forms of 
mining is the bedrock for a highly complex situation which governmental regulations struggle 
to acknowledge and effectively confront. The thesis follows this complexity with a focus on 
the enforcement of regulation and the responses it creates in the local setting. I argue that 
current governmental regulations are: 1) problematically affiliated with natural science 
blaming artisanal miners for the environmental degradation, and 2) representative for a 
rationality of corporate social responsibility. The outcome of this leads regulators away from 
acknowledging internal power relations and the political dimension in which this resource 
governance is embedded. Accordingly, I expose these relations and situate their respective 
claims and dynamics in divergent epistemological traditions. My objective in this thesis is 
three-folded: 1) to confront and complement the dominance of apolitical research that obscure 
the socio-political complexity of the field, 2) to expand on the theory of interlegality in 
contexts of artisanal and small-scale mining, and 3) to highlight and recognize the importance 
of situated perspectives in the tradition of political ecology   
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I love the smell of Napalm in the morning 
- Lieutenant Kilgore in Apocalypse Now 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
During the morning hours we visited a mineral processing plant that was closed down some 
weeks before due to an observation of poor membranes in the tailings ponds. This was fixed 
by now, the pools were safe with new membranes, and the only minor critic was that they 
were not properly fenced. The young man representing the owners of the plant told us that the 
plastic banners, required as fencing, had been consumed by the sun and the wind. And yes, we 
could see the leftovers all around. He assured us though, that he had bought new ones and was 
going to set them up the next morning. ¨No problem¨, said Juan, the young ARCOM 
(Ecuadorian Agency of Regulation and Control of Mining) inspector that I accompanied on 
this occasion. This comment saying ¨no problem¨ was important for the man representing the 
owners of the plant. In fact, the re-opening of the plant was entirely dependent on ARCOM´s 
approval that measures had been taken to improve the tailings ponds and, generally speaking, 
that the plant was reported as appropriate to operate. So far the inspection seemed promising. 
 The problem on this occasion however, was not the processing plant we visited, but its 
neighbour. They were both located on the riverbeds of Rio Puyango along with a number of 
processing plants, yet poorly delimited into separate areas. Without any real enclosing, our 
visit included an overview to the neighbouring plants. Accordingly, when we reached the 
river and paused for a minute to look at some excavators digging beside and inside the 
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riverbed, the three of us noticed a pipe releasing greyish water from the neighbouring plant. 
The three of us knew that any dumping of tailings into the river, either liquids or solids, was 
illegal and one of the activities that had been subjected to the strongest attention from the 
authorities. The reasons for this are multiple, but essentially and logically related to the well-
being of downstream communities that depend on this water. This water has been reported to 
contain methylmercury, sodium cyanide, lead, arsenic and several contaminating properties 
for decades. Moreover, as the Puyango River eventually enters Peruvian territories, where it 
provides the Tumbes region with crucial fresh water on its way to the Pacific Ocean, the 
contamination of its headwaters has created a geo-political tension between Ecuador and 
Peru.  
It took about ten seconds before we reacted. Juan, the ARCOM inspector, picked up 
his camera and went straight towards the pipe releasing wastewater. Meanwhile, I and the 
young man were in the middle of a conversation, yet upon noticing Juan approaching the pipe 
to take pictures, he immediately grabbed my arm and directed me some steps away from the 
site. ¨Come over here ¨ (Vente por acá), he said a bit worried. ¨That is illegal you know and… 
the boys will take me for a snitch¨1, he said referring to the possibility that workers from the 
neighbouring plants might observe him here with ARCOM and, in the case of a sanction, add 
two and two together. He then continued to explain to me: 
Look brother I´ll tell you how things are run down here… Here most of the mining is informal and illegal…I 
have at least six or seven friends who work without any permissions and…that’s how things have always been 
around here. Now, currently ARCOM is messing around with this, and, well, we have to do things according to 
the law, but regardless of that I do not want to be taken for a snitch…2 
We continued to talk about the current state of affairs surrounding the mining activity, 
maintaining an informal conversation until and after the ARCOM inspector returned from 
taking his pictures. After that, the observation of the pipeline releasing tailings/wastewater 
was not discussed. We all knew what it meant and also the potential consequences for the 
responsible processing plant (immediate closure). The young man continued in his jovial tone 
and redirected the attention to the improvements in his processing plant, once again assuring 																																																								1	Es	que	después	me	cogen	por	sapo…no	ves	que	esa	nota	es	ilegal…	2	Mira	yo	te	cuento	como	es	la	cosa	aquí	hermano…aquí	la	mayoría	de	la	minería	es	ilegal	e	informal…yo	
tengo	seis-siete	amigos	que	trabajan	en	minas	sin	permiso	y	así	siempre	ha	sido	la	vida	aquí.	Ahora	ARCOM	
esta	que	jode	con	esto	y	ya	pues	hay	que	cumplir	con	la	ley,	pero	tampoco	quiero	quedar	como	sapo…  	
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the ARCOM inspector that he would put up the plastic ¨WARNING¨ banners around the 
tailings pools first thing in the morning. 
Once back in the car, the controversial observation was discussed among Juan and the 
chauffeur. The chauffeur asked him (in a tone of logic-causality) if he was not going to enter 
the neighbouring plant and confront the responsible administration with his observation. Juan 
was clearly hesitant and with good reasons. First of all, any confrontation with this kind of 
observations justifies an immediate closure of the plant. A closure means loss of income not 
only for the owner(s) and partners of the plant, but also for the workers. Thus the stakes were, 
if not extremely high, at least considerable, and required confident authority on behalf of the 
person(s) that confront the responsible actors. In fact, discharge of wastewater into the river is 
considered a crime, which may lead to a prison sentence for the responsible individual(s). 
Another reason for the hesitation was the formal procedure of acting upon this observation. In 
theory, this kind of illegal activity is formally under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of 
Environment (MAE). Accordingly, the procedure is that ARCOM reports to the local 
representative of the Ministry of Environment who subsequently acts upon this report. The 
practical problem related to this is that the Ministry of Environment only has one person in 
situ in the whole area of Portovelo-Zaruma. In contrast, the local ARCOM office contains 
about 16 employees, of which 12 regularly do field inspections. Correspondingly, ARCOM 
has the mandate to take action on these occasions, but preferably in company with the 
Environmental Ministry. It should be emphasized, to Juan’s defence, that ARCOM seldom, 
probably almost never, conduce inspections with only one official. On all other occasions 
they were at least two. Seemingly, this inspection was merely considered as a formality, and it 
was, if it had not been for the observation of the discharging pipeline.  
After two minutes of hesitation, Juan decided to return to the office and commanded 
the chauffeur to take us there. Once there, he shared the observation and photographs with his 
colleagues and thus redistributed the responsibility to act or not to act. In this case, at least 
accounting for this particular day, ARCOM officials decided to temporarily ignore this 
observation. It was reported for sure, but no immediate actions were taken. Instead, Juan, 
along with another colleague and the curious observer (me) went to visit a mine in the 
outskirts of Portovelo.   
 
	 4	
Problem statement, aim and scope 
Artisanal and small-scale gold mining (hereafter ASGMi) have received increased attention 
from scholars, activists and the public during the last decade. This attention correlates with 
increased gold prices that peaked in mid-2011, when a gram of gold was valued at almost 60 
dollarsii. The general picture of ASGM, as described in its adherent literature, is that it 
involves mining carried out in remote areas with few resources, and that it is a dangerous 
activity causing severe environmental contamination, in particular through the release of 
mercury and sodium cyanide used in the process (Hentschel 2002, Sinding 2005). It is 
estimated that ASGM employs 16 million miners in the world (Seccatore et al 2014). This 
supports 100 million people (de Theije et al 2014:130). Although ASGM only produce 
between 380 and 450 tons of gold, which accounts for 10-15% of total annual gold 
production, the environmental impact is disproportionately large, particularly since it 
contaminates many river systems throughout the world (Miserendino et al 2013). A major 
obstacle to effective control and regulation is attributed to its informal character as a form of 
poverty alleviation representing a significant economic opportunity for people in 
impoverished regions.   
 Leaving a long and general history of mineral mining in Latin America apart, ASGM 
especially in the form of alluvial mining, has taken place long before both the arrival of white 
men and even before the rulings of the Incan empire in the 15th century. However, the oldest 
and largest ASGM district in Ecuador is located in its South-Western corner in an aptly 
named province, El Oro (English: The Gold). Here, in the mountains around the towns of 
Portovelo and Zaruma (hereafter P-Z), gold mining has been carried out for more than six 
centuries. This legacy of mining is carried by contemporary miners who, faced with increased 
state regulations and fluctuating gold prices, struggle to maintain their source of livelihood. 
Accordingly, the opening story presented above captures an essence that I will 
elaborate on and explore in this thesis. This essence deals with the relationship between 
mining practice and mining regulation and illustrates a contemporary environmental conflict. 
Yet ultimately, as highlighted in the tradition of political ecology, this essence is also about 
how humans and the environment co-exist. My main research question throughout the process 
of working with this material has been:  
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How does current regulation impact and influence on artisanal and small-scale gold mining 
in Portovelo-Zaruma, El Oro, Ecuador? 
Analytically it is possible to delineate the answer to this question in two. The first part lies in 
explaining and analysing what constitute regulation and artisanal and small-scale mining in 
their context, and their inherent links to external conditions. Thus, in this part I aim to answer: 
How and why has ASGM developed into its current composition and organization? How does 
government regulation impose itself as a normative scheme amid other regulating structures?   
The second part is an analysis of the political and economic dynamics between the 
stakeholders that comprise the context. As the opening story briefly indicates, the relationship 
between government regulations and mining operations is contingent upon its enforcement, 
which again is contingent upon a number of contextual issues (e.g. personal characteristics of 
regulators and miners, power relations, situational conditions). Here I aim to answer: What 
characterizes the relationship between miners and regulators? How do these actors legitimize 
their respective claims and actions? By conceptualizing national mining legislation through 
the perspective of its enforcement, I argue that this becomes part of a process of interlegality 
(see below) reflecting divergent rationalities and epistemologies co-existing in continuous 
negotiations between actors’ normative schemes.  
In a historical perspective, official laws and legislations are themselves highly 
dynamic and only one bundle of several structures that regulate the mining sector. For 
instance, the history of gold mining in P-Z, illustrates how mining has been consolidated as an 
economic activity, and how current mining practices among artisanal miners are essentially 
the same as 400 years ago. Practice, knowledge, experience, place-making and an orientation 
towards gold through more than six centuries have created norms and institutions that have 
¨naturalized¨ gold mining as part and parcel of the region. Through the classic social theories 
of Bourdieu, this long-standing orientation can be conceived as a habitus of informal mining, 
meaning embodied and internalized structures and dispositions that are being reproduced 
through everyday praxis (1977: 72). This helps conceiving, to some extent, how mining praxis 
is embedded in local identity.  
Other examples of regulating structures are: the gold market, the co-existence of 
different scales of mining operations (entailing different and parallel economies), the political 
economy of the sector, and power relations that permeates all of this. I will discuss these 
dimensions throughout the thesis, yet for now, I mention them to accentuate the concept of 
interlegality (Simon Thomas 2009, de Theije et al 2014) in my analytical framework. De 
	 6	
Theije et al (2014:129-46) discuss this through what they call ¨engaging legal systems¨. Here, 
the writers conceptualize ASGM as an activity occurring in a situation of legal pluralism 
where state legislation is but one of several ¨laws¨ (customary/local laws, community 
regulations) organizing the sector. They make two important distinctions when treating the 
term legal pluralism (ibid.: 131-2). The first is the distinction between de jure and de facto, 
where the former is the legal pluralism reflected in official national law, while the latter is the 
social-normative legal pluralism that can be identified empirically in site. This leads to forms 
of interlegality (Simon Thomas 2009), which is, I would argue, a much more ¨down to earth¨, 
and realistic conceptualization of any given ASGM site. Second, they make a distinction 
between illegal and illicit practices where the former refers to de jure illegality at odds with 
national law, while the latter refers to practices that are socially unacceptable, de facto. 
Compared to a narrow and dichotomizing perspective where national law is the dominant 
point of reference (in media, public statements and ¨apolitical¨ research), this perspective 
correlates much more with the informal character of ASGM. 
Taken together, the above-mentioned roughly indicates the locus of this thesis. My 
working research question provided for a fruitful approach into the discrepancy between 
legislation and its implementation, which in term resonated strongly with the tradition of 
political ecology. And although political ecology is hard to delimit and define, this thesis will 
give credence to a critical approach in a case of environmental conflict that ¨highlight[s] the 
importance of situated perspectives¨ (Le Billion 2015: 604). There are two main empirical 
reasons to apply this view. The first stems from the observation that the mining community of 
P-Z finds itself entangled in a process of environmental degradation and social 
marginalization, which is a major theme within the literature of political ecology (cf. Robbins 
2012: 157-75; Benjaminsen 2015). The second reason comes from the observation that the 
existing literature on the context is dominated by natural sciences on toxicity and technical 
features of the local mining. I critically examine this research and illustrate its apolitical 
dimension which, despite its scientific thoroughness and diligence, contains a problematic 
dimension due to its positivist assumptions. Moreover, in the contexts of ASGM in PZ, it is 
indeed politically authoritative and supportive of Hardin´s thesis of ¨The Tragedy of the 
Commons¨ (1968). Accordingly, there is a need to engage critically with this scientific 
discourse and conceive it as a constituent of the local politics of mining.  
Regarding the political situation, the absence of critical voices that address more than 
immediate complaints (miners moaning about ¨too strict regulations¨ or, from the regulatory 
side; ¨miners don´t comply¨) is striking. There are no NGOs working in the region, nor any 
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environmental justice movement or versions of this. There are occasional critics, especially 
among agriculturists, teachers and local historians, but no organized opposition to mining. 
Simply put: the mining community in P-Z and the regulations of the sector is dominantly pro-
mining. This lack of resistance is curious given that P-Z is, at least historically, the most 
renowned case of mining in Ecuador. Among other things, this indicates that the case of P-Z 
does not ¨fit¨ the campaigns of environmental activists. Analytically, however, this situation 
makes up for a very different dynamic compared to contexts of large-scale mining where 
(indigenous) resistance and state expropriation of land are common features. In P-Z, the only 
people who confront miners with their mining practice are the governmental institutions of 
ARCOM (Agency of Control and Regulation of Mining), MAE (Ministry of Environment), 
INIGEMM (Institute of Metallurgical Mining Geological Research) and the Ministry of 
Work. This confrontation however, is exclusively instrumental, meaning that it only addresses 
the mining practices at odds with national legislation (essentially the use of mercury, tailings 
treatment, certifications/licences and security measures) and largely ignores a deeper 
exploration into the whys that make up for this practice. Instead, the explanations applied are 
versions of Hardin´s tragedy – ¨artisanal miners pollute because they can´t invest in better 
equipment, and larger companies pollute because it’s cheaper than complying with 
environmental legislation¨. What they ignore, quite out loud as I will argue, are two major 
observations:  
1) Marginalization of artisanal and small-scale miners. As I will show in the 
historical passage, this reflects a continuity of marginalizing politics towards 
artisanal miners working at the margin of larger mining operation. Nevertheless, 
and despite the efforts to recognize the particularity of ASGM in Ecuadorian 
mining legislation, this process of marginalization continues, largely through a 
governmental preference for larger mining operations, which are, presumably, 
easier to control and regulate. Consequently, this process of marginalization leads 
to local resentment towards the State (in its multiple representations), a 
problematic climate for negotiations, which taken together, create an incentive for 
engagement in illegal mining practice. 
2) Internal power relations, hierarchies of exploitation, corruption, and a vast illegal 
practice. This is essentially the corollary of the political-economic situation that 
conditions the sector today, as well as historically. Some of these features are 
responses of adaptive character, while others also include opportunistic qualities.   
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Without taking these dimensions into account, two important outcomes emerge: 1) the 
environmental and social problems are maintained as technical issues across a legal/illegal 
axe (cf. Scott 2010: 25), and 2) someone is making a lot of money while others barely make a 
living. Thus, a key argument which I will sustain throughout the thesis is that the 
governmental bias for the largest mining companies, which can be discerned historically as 
well as through the current government’s aim to drastically expand large-scale mineral 
mining, has several and complex socio-political effects which I will illustrate throughout the 
thesis.  
My analytical perspective emphasizes the ethnographic story with a focus on politics 
and power. Nonetheless, it will be necessary to examine how mining in P-Z has evolved to 
become what it is today. For instance, local history illustrates how the colonial imagination 
involved a very different vision of the world compared to the one prevailing in P-Z today. 
And although world-views and epistemologies appear as abstract concepts, they are highly 
normative and their manifestations and articulations are very real, material and often violent – 
suffice to consider the colonial exploitation of indigenous manpower. Likewise, on a 
horizontal axe, colliding epistemologies (e.g. external scientific episteme vs. local practical 
knowledge) challenge assumptions of stability or objectivity regarding the morality of mining 
and reveal it as a process rather than something static. I argue that the complexity arising from 
this is important in order to understand the rationale of different stakeholders and their 
respective points of dispute.  
 Thus, in an attempt to condense this analytical framework, I reiterate that the locus of 
investigation here is the dynamics between mining practice and mining regulations. In 
contrast to other scholars examining processes of decision-making and democratic 
participation related to resource governance, my interest is on the governmental regulation 
and the tension that is created through its enforcement. As already mentioned, I approach this 
by acknowledging the existence of legal pluralism in which control and regulation of mining 
practice is a process of negotiations, confronted with local traditions, norms and values. 
Furthermore, this framework is embedded within the characteristics of political ecology and 
what Robbins suggests as ¨a community of practice united around a certain kind of text¨ 
(2012: 20, italics in original). These ¨texts¨, he continues: 
…can be understood as to address the condition and change of social/environmental systems, with explicit 
consideration of relations of power. Political ecology, moreover, explores these social and environmental 
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changes with an understanding that there are better, less coercive, less exploitative, and more sustainable ways of 
doing things. (ibid.) 
The quote emphasizes what Robbins terms ¨the hatchet and the seed¨ (98-100), where the 
hatchet is political ecology criticizing dominant narratives or dominant approaches to 
environmental conflicts, while the seed is political ecology’s work to envision and advocate 
for alternative and more sustainable solutions. In this perspective, the thesis at hand is 
foremost a hatchet into the existing conditions and the existing research in P-Z. And the seed? 
First of all, there is no point trying to plant that seed without doing a proper job with the 
hatchet. Second, this thesis is foremost an exploration into the current state of affairs aiming 
to inform the existing descriptions and conceptualizations on dimensions that have barely 
been touched upon. Hence, I aim to confront and expand current research on ASGM both in 
P-Z and generally, towards constructing a theory of interlegality. 
Fundamentally, the critical attitude applied here resonates with the Marxist roots of 
political ecology and an insistence of capitalism and neo-liberalism as detrimental to human 
existence. Well aware that this may appear like a cliché to the reader, I will nonetheless argue 
that there are good reasons to maintain this attitude. Not only is it a sound critique towards an 
economic system that continues to produce increased human inequalities (cf. Piketty 2014) at 
the cost of the environment (cf. Klein 2015), but also because the dominance of capitalism 
hides other ways to envision the world. In P-Z, this articulates in several ways, but especially 
as a consequence of a prolonged relation to global markets resulting in a deep (historical) 
commodification of nature. The outcome, as already mentioned, is a dominant pro-mining 
culture which is furthermore consolidated through governmental incentives to scale-up 
production. In other words, neo-liberalism can be seen as a long continuity, picking up 
momentum with Spanish colonization and a mercantilist economic regime, passing on to the 
first independent, republican governments attempting to exploit the mines, before reaching a 
decisive consolidation with the early industrialization by foreign companies in late 19th 
century. Despite several progressive efforts by alternating Ecuadorian governments (including 
the current administration), this orientation towards mining in P-Z has been sustained and has 
accordingly shaped the meaning of mining in the neo-liberal doctrine. I will return to this and 
nuance on its socio-political effects. 
Before I continue to elaborate on this analytical scope in relation to theory, including 
some important limitations, I wish to briefly introduce the reader to the current development 
of mineral mining in Ecuador, and the place (P-Z) from which the empirical observations 
	 10	
stems. As will be clear, the development of large-scale mining currently has a strong 
momentum in Ecuador and is basically a whole different story compared with ASGM in P-Z. 
Still, while mining legislation is accommodated to fit the development of large mining 
projects, it is of course, very influential to the politics of mining in P-Z as well. Hence, I 
suggest that we must conceptualize ASGM (in Ecuador) in relation to the bourgeoning 
development of large-scale mining projects by foreign companies and capital.  
 
Mineral Mining in Ecuador 
On the annual PDACiii
 
2015 convention held in Toronto in the beginning of March, the 
Ecuadorian Minister and Coordinator of strategic sectors, Rafael Poveda, declared that 
Ecuador was aiming to attract 5 000 million dollars of foreign investments to its mining sector 
in the next five years. His justification was that this would lead to ¨the income of 2 000 
million dollars in mineral exportations and generate 10 000 jobs in the country¨iv. Poveda’s 
meetings during the convention apparently attracted great interest from international mining 
companies. Although he was unwilling to reveal details from these meetings, he said that he 
was optimistic upon his return to Ecuador. 
At this year’s PDAC convention (March 2016), Rafael Poveda was substituted by 
Javier Cordoba, the Minister of the Ecuador’s newly formed Ministry of Mining. And while 
Ecuador attracted interest the previous year, this time the interest was so great that Cordoba 
apparently spent his days celebrating in Canadav. Yet, the Minister was sober enough to 
understate that the profits from this development must, above all, benefit the local 
communities in the areas of exploitation. His general message on the other hand, was an open 
invitation to international mining corporations. And in huge contrast to its neighbours in Peru, 
Colombia, Chile and Bolivia, Ecuador is just about to start its career as a mineral mining 
producer. Until now, Ecuador has foremost relied on oil extraction from the Amazon since 
late 1960s (see Larrea Maldonado 2006: 91-104 on the initial steps of this development), 
while large-scale mineral mining has never proliferated. Today however, there are ambitious 
plans in motion, epitomized by large-scale projects in the Southern-Amazonian region, more 
concretely in the shape of El Mirador (open-pit copper mine) and Fruta del Norte 
(underground gold mine) in the province of Zamora Chinchipevi. The development of these 
projects, especially the former, have created extensive indigenous resistance and substantially 
questioned the foundations of democratic participation and deliberate democracies (see for 
instance: Falleti & Riofrancos 2014).  
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Several authors have critically commented upon the neo-liberal character inherent to 
this development (Sacher & Acosta 2012; Bustamante & Lara 2010; see also Machado et al 
2012). Unsurprisingly, the critic highlights the contradictions between this recent 
development and the social-environmentalist paradigm which served as the political 
foundation for the Correa administration in its beginning, that is, when President Correa 
opposed the logics of ¨the long and sad neo-liberal night¨ at the General Assembly of the 
United Nations in 2007vii. The emergent problem, it seems, has been to finance the rhetorical 
attacks on neo-liberalism. And increasingly so after the recent drop in oil prices, which in 
praxis has resulted in more Chinese loans to sustain an Ecuadorian economy with a heavy 
reliance on oil revenues. Henceforth, mineral mining, or mega-mining, as the above-
mentioned critical authors phrase it, is increasingly promoted by the current Ecuadorian 
government. I will touch upon this in the passing, but not extensively as this is another focus 
for study. The relevance here is that the expansive development of large scale mining in 
Ecuador comprises the contextual background for the regulation of mining, which also 
includes ASGM in P-Z.   
 
The Place 
Zaruma and Portovelo are two neighbouring towns in the South-Western corner of Ecuador. 
They are located in the interior of the province named El Oro. The name indicates the 
historical position of P-Z as the first gold mining centre in Ecuador. Today however, the 
province is more renowned for its banana production in the lowlands. Machala, the province 
capital located at the coast, is often referred to as the banana capital of the world, with large 
fields of banana plants stretching out and surrounding the city. The banana boom commenced 
shortly after the end of the Second World War (Larrea Maldonado 2006:62-66). Despite ups 
and downs in correlation with market fluctuations, but also pest and plagues, it established as 
the key economic activity of the province and a cornerstone of Ecuadorian exports. A similar 
yet more recent phenomenon occurred with the boom in shrimp farming along the southern 
coasts of Ecuador. This aquaculture production commenced during the 1970s, but accelerated 
during the 80s and 90s, before it was struck with a serious plague around the turn of the 
millennium (Romero Salgado 2014). Still, it maintains itself, along with banana production, 
as the most important industries of El Oro. 
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Figure 1 (retrieved from Miserendino et al 2013): shows P-Z in its geographical context. It shows that P-Z is 
situated amid the tributary rivers (Calera and Amarillo) of the Puyango River that eventually flows into Peru. 
 
Both banana and shrimp farming take place in the lowlands and mangrove coasts. If we move 
east towards the Andes massif, a contrasting, hilly landscape emerges. Cloud forests - 
abundantly green all year around - cover this scenery with scattered towns, small-scale coffee 
and cacao fields as well as occasional pastures for cattle. Rivers run through this landscape, 
growing in size during the rainy season from December to May, and still used for recreation 
although some people claim that the water is not as crystalline as in the past. This observation 
is affirmed when one descends from the town of Piñas towards Portovelo and Zaruma. Here, 
one encounters the Calera River running through the most contaminated industrial site in El 
Oro province. This is home to the processing plants (small factories) that process the minerals 
from both local and faraway mountains. And why are the plants placed along the river? 
Essentially to make use of the water in the process and to get rid of the toxic tailings by 
dumping it in the river. Once arriving in this narrow valley called El Pache, the smell of 
cyanide sodium is hard to ignore, although difficult to distinguish unless one is familiar with 
this chemical. At any rate, there is a strong chemical smell, and according to some of the 
locals I met during fieldwork, it is the smell of coming home. 
 There is a disjunction in El Pache: arriving in car from Machala about an hour and a 
half away, one can either go straightforward and ascend to Zaruma or turn right towards 
Portovelo. Zaruma is located at 1200 meters above sea level with a beautiful view towards the 
Loja province in the south, while Portovelo is situated at 600 meters above sea level in a 
valley, a five minutes’ drive from the infamous El Pache. Although it only takes about ten 
minutes or so to ascend from Portovelo to Zaruma by car, the difference in altitude and 
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location makes up for two contrasting climates, where the latter is noticeably fresher than the 
former. This geographical hierarchy resonates with several contrasts between the two towns: 
Zaruma has a picturesque colonial architecture that is only awaiting UNESCO’s approval to 
be embedded in the World Cultural Heritage list, while Portovelo undoubtedly has a much 
rougher, worn-out, industrial working class atmosphere to it.  
 According to the latest censusviii in Ecuador (2010), the canton of Portovelo has 12200 
inhabitants, while the canton of Zaruma has 24097 inhabitants. These population numbers 
have been stabile the last thirty years. Most people live in the urban centres of their respective 
cantons, but there are also numerous small towns and settlements, in which people live off the 
land and the minerals underneath. In particular, the hillsides between and underneath 
Portovelo and Zaruma are typically called ¨a Swiss cheese¨, by local people. The local 
population is essentially mestizos with long roots to the place. There has been both migration 
and immigration, much in correlation with the level of activity in the mining sector. With 
notable exceptions consisting in workers coming from Peru and other parts of Ecuador, the 
population in P-Z is largely composed of families coming from the same or adjacent districts.  
 To an outsider’s eye, Zaruma in particular appears as a very nice place. The same 
applies to its surroundings and neighbouring small towns, for instance following the road to 
Paccha (not to be confused with El Pache). The landscape, although partly lacking the 
characteristic tree cover of cloud forests not too far away, gives a pleasant and green 
impression. Likewise, people are welcoming and famously friendly. The general atmosphere 
is nice and calm, accompanied by good, local coffee and delicious traditional food. As 
mentioned, Portovelo is a bit rougher, but without any apparent misery or extreme poverty. 
There are houses that appear quite fragile and poor, but nothing that contrasts sharply to other 
small towns throughout the Republic of Ecuador. The most visible example of poverty 
combined with mining activity are the new settlements (invasiones) in the lower parts of 
Portovelo, where shacks and rudimentary dwellings are placed in immediate proximity to 
processing plants and their respective tailings ponds.  
 Yet, in general, and I wish to make this point already here, the region that includes the 
cantons of Portovelo, Zaruma, Atahualpa, and Piñas, which taken together is referred to as 
¨the highlands¨ (la parte alta), is nice and hospitable. The climate is warm (at times a bit too 
warm in the case of Portovelo), land is still relatively good for agriculture, food is cheap and 
people seem to manage quite well. Indeed, there are scars in the landscape and what I will 
later refer to as sacrifice zones (cf. Scott 2010), but far from the scales and dimensions as 
reported from ASGM districts like La Rinconada in Peru (Wade 2013) or Antioquia in 
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Colombia (Cordy et al 2011). Similar remarks may be applied to the history of mining in P-Z. 
Indeed, the colonial exploitation of indigenous manpower was both cruel and inhuman, and 
only to be followed by a harsh industrial mining regime during the hegemony of the South 
American Development Company in the first half of the 20th century. Yet, compared to the 
prolonged abuse and structural, human exploitation described in classics like June Nash’ 
(1993) We Eat the Mines and the Mines Eat Us, or more recently, the environmental disasters 
and tremendous impact on indigenous people caused by copper mining in Papua New Guinea 
(Kirsch 2014), P-Z is simply not that bad. Of course, this depends on the point of comparison, 
and there may be valid objections here, but the ¨degree of degradation¨ in P-Z is for instance 
moderate compared to the other two major ASGM districts in Ecuador. The latter, which are 
the mining districts of Ponze Enriquez/Bella Rica (Azuay province) and Nambija (Zamora 
province), are much more representative for the classic contexts of accelerated (and more 
recent) exploitation conducted without any planning or regulation. Subsequently, these sites, 
especially Ponze Enriquez, have been characterized by a poor environmental state where 
social problems, including crime and high rates of HIV is commonly known.  
 As mentioned, there have been waves of migration from this region, particularly 
towards Spain, Italy and the US after the last financial crisis in Ecuador in 1999. Today 
however, many migrants have returned as things got tough in Europe/US and the economy 
improved back home. Still, a significant demographic movement during the last decades has 
been towards the urban centres of Machala, Guayaquil, Cuenca and Loja. Young people who 
can afford it go to study in these cities, while others go to find work. Especially Machala, 
which is the closest large city (approx. 250 000 inhabitants), has largely been populated by 
people from these highlands. Hence ¨everyone¨ has relatives down in the lowlands or in one 
of the mentioned cities. These relatives typically maintain much of their local identity and 
dialect of ¨la parte alta¨ while living somewhere else. Moreover, they frequently return to P-Z 
during vacations and family gatherings and, in accordance with local customs, always give a 
helping hand to locals who wish to try their luck in these urban centres. It is relevant to 
highlight this demographic dynamic because it shows that the local population, which is 
currently and historically highly dependent on gold mining, has feasible alternative 
livelihoods not too far away. Here I have mentioned the banana and shrimp industries, but this 
should be conceptualized on top of a general trend of rural populations gravitating towards 
urban areas in Ecuador, as in the world at large. Local people in P-Z who do not engage in 
mining, go to the cities either for studies or work, and uncommonly return to live in their 
place of origin, except for holidays and retirement. 
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The ASGM sector of P-Z directly employs between 6000 (Miserendino et al 2013: 
713) and 10 000 miners (Veiga et al 2014: 541) depending on the estimates used. Although 
there is a modest agricultural sector (primarily coffee and cattle) in the region, mining 
indirectly sustains the whole local economy with an annual production of nine tons of goldix
 
(ibid.) and roughly three times this in silver. As I will emphasize in chapter two, the 
complexity in terms of composition and organization of this mining district is vast. Here it 
suffices to say that there are mining operations of considerable size (at least within an ASGM 
context) where the largest company, ELIPE Ltd., has a plant capacity to process 2400 tons of 
ore a day. On the other end, there are numerous artisanal miners engaging in small operations 
ranging from occasional alluvial mining in local rivers and streams to simple and shallow 
tunnels into the mountains. These latter operations are conducted with minor investments on 
an individual or small-group basis which typically entail a prolonged period of mining, and an 
accumulation of mineral ore which is finally carried to a processing plant where the gold is 
extracted. In between the largest and smallest scales of mining, there is a whole array of 
different operations taking place. Additionally, the processing plants in P-Z also process ore 
from other parts of the country (particularly Ponze Enriquez and Nambija) and Northern Peru.  
With this in mind we can return to some theoretical considerations that will inform the 
analysis and interpretation at hand. 
 
Theorizing artisanal and small-scale gold mining 
In her book about uranium mining in Navajo lands in USA, Voyles (2015) coins the term 
wastelanding. Wastlanding, she argues, is a colonial project in which places, spaces and 
bodies are rendered pollutable. It is colonial because it conquers the indigenous meanings 
attributed to the landscapes, re-shaping it with the use of capitalist narratives, into a place that 
is worth sacrificing for the exploitation of resources, i.e. ¨development¨. This is a well-known 
phenomenon in political ecology literature in cases where a place/space is re-constructed by 
colonial powers, neo-liberal capital interests, conservationists or ¨developers¨ of some kind 
(Perrault et al 2015). The story is essentially that powerful actors create a new dominant, 
political narrative of the place – often as some kind of empty, useless or ¨dead¨ space or on 
the other side; an abundantly rich wilderness practically devoid of people. This is done in 
order to legitimize an action (either exploitation or conservation) that corresponds to this 
narrative. Voyles’ approach to this is marked by sympathy towards the environmental justice 
movement that refuses to accept that the problem of contamination is merely a question of the 
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presence and distribution of toxic elements. Rather, what she and this movement is more 
deeply concerned about (undoubtedly shared among many political ecologists) are the 
structures of power and the institutions that produce environmental injustice. To Voyles the 
phenomenon of environmental injustice is closely affiliated with racism, colonialism and 
capitalism. Accordingly, she says: 
Thus, the distribution of toxins is merely the signifier of the foundational, enabling modalities of modernity: 
¨capitalism, colonialism, and white supremacy. To ask for ¨just¨ distribution of industrial pollution, waste sites, 
mines, unsustainable and toxic labor, and so on, is not to ask for redistribution but rather to ask for modernity to 
throw up its hands and dismantle itself. (Voyles 2015:25) 
In part, the quote echoes Marx’s famously saying: ¨…all progress in capitalist agriculture is a 
progress in the art, not only of robbing the worker, but of robbing the soil¨ (1990: 638, cited 
in Robbins 2012:58). But, what if measures are taken to improve both environmental and 
health conditions in a given context? What if the State struggles to avoid capitalist schemes of 
exploitation? What if the State has a system that effectively distributes wealth from its natural 
resources to its marginalized populations? I am not saying that the current government of 
Ecuador does all this, but there have been substantial political changes with the Correa 
administration, changes that hampers a straightforward Marxist analysis of extractive 
industries in Ecuador.  
Nevertheless, there are traits that might belong to a Marxist (inspired) critique of the 
government’s double discourse of environmentalism and ¨responsible extractivism¨. This has 
sparked a wide discussion within the field of political ecology in Latin America, which I will 
briefly review below. While this is a side-track to the theories that guide my analysis, is is a 
side-track that I will return to discuss, especially towards the end of the thesis. My concern 
here is two-folded:  
1) Academics and activists, often with first hand experiences of the problem they 
analyse and loaded with a critical mind set towards social and environmental 
marginalization/degradation, sometimes fail to acknowledge the structural efforts towards 
improving the conditions (see chapter 3) and the internal power dynamics that may obliterate 
progressive improvements.  
2) Although these academics may be stunningly accurate and point to real inherent 
problems that do relate back to a deep, global injustice, the eagerness to blame the ever 
existing actors (most often governments and multinational corporations), make them blind to 
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the sheer difficulty of regulating an extractive industry that produces complex and 
inconsistent social and environmental effects. 
The problem for the environmental movement here, and partly also for political 
ecologists, is that they largely rely on producing a convincing and coherent narrative where 
protagonists, antagonists and victims are clearly defined. Thus they risk replicating, albeit in a 
much more elaborate way, the narrative creation (by governments and capitalists) they 
criticize. Evidently, protagonists and victims may be the same, but what if, to use the case of 
Voyles, Navajos would organize to establish their own mining companies to exploit uranium 
using Afro-Americans as work force? Would it suffice to say that they were forced into this 
situation by their historical marginalization, which they simply reproduced by the act of 
learning? My short answer to this is no. And my short answer to some of the things produced 
in the intersection of environmentalism and political ecology, is that yes, it is legitimate to 
remark that the world is skewed and deeply unjust, and although I agree that it is important to 
maintain this critique and fight for change, this should not hide a nuanced view on stories of 
social marginalization and environmental degradation. Clearly, this is an act of balance, and 
while the major problem for political ecologists may be to influence decision-making at all, 
my choice here is to present a complex story with a narrative plot that do not merely render 
the local population as innocent victims. I do so at the risk of obscuring a coherent and clear 
argument, but I argue that this corresponds to my ethnographic account and I intend to let this 
guide me throughout the thesisx (for a similar argument see: Johansen et al 2015). With this 
clarification in mind, I return to theories that shape my analytical scope. 
As Voyles points out, we need to complement the perspective on the signifier (i.e. 
pollution) with a critical view on the power structures that produce the conditions that makes 
pollution take place exactly where it can be observed. This is fundamental, and without the 
latter part, we would merely be descriptive in our accounts, failing to address the reasons 
behind. Not too far away from the scenes of Voyles’ ¨Wastelanding¨ book, an innovative 
exploitation of natural resources is taking place. Mountain Top Removal (MTR) in the 
Appalachian coalfields (West Virgina) is the concern of Rebecca Scott in her book from 
2010. The book has several common grounds with Voyles’ book (besides the geography), and 
seeks to understand extractive practice through discourses such as race, gender, sexuality and 
region (Scott 2010: 220). Both Voyles and Scott share a sympathy with the environmental 
justice movement and accordingly use this as a moral anchor when they explore the meanings 
of mining in their respective contexts. Likewise, both address the formation of ¨sacrifice 
zones¨ in USA and its national discourse of progress and development. If we think of sacrifice 
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zones in a comparative perspective however, it is clear that this is a global phenomenon (with 
abundant examples from virtually all nation-states). This is applicable to P-Z as well, 
especially to waste and tailings deposits, as I will return to comment on in chapter two. 
Meanwhile, there are several insights from Scott´s book about coal that are useful to the 
analysis of gold mining in P-Z. 
 First of all, there are commonalities between her discussion of MTR and the 
discussions of ASGM. Although they imply qualitatively different forms of extractive 
regimes and the former is more of a technique compared to all the fuzziness of the latter, there 
are important similarities. For instance, Scott conceives MTR as a practice that involves an 
¨excess of meaning¨ (2010:20) when she remarks that: ¨The practice is enmeshed in 
contradictory national discourses of hierarchical differences, progress and citizenship¨ (ibid.). 
Accordingly, to remove the top of a mountain, much more than its technical feature is an act 
that epitomizes the capitalist discourse of progress and development at the cost of virtually 
anything. It requires ¨…the colonial imagination of the land as empty, useless and waiting to 
be improved¨ (210), which Scott leaning on Lefebvre (1991) conceives as ¨the abstract 
space…intrinsic to capitalism¨. Her point is that this practice is based upon a naturalization of 
economic development as a benevolent and inevitable process. Not only is this part of the 
American dream, but essentially something that is made possible by a traditional white middle 
class orientation where ¨nature¨ is detached from modern life to represent ¨wilderness¨ 
somewhere else. In this case local place-making has rendered ¨nature¨ into a coalfield and 
thus, ¨nature¨ to be replaced with the economic relationship to the market (Scott 2010:211-2). 
 Despite its differences, much of what Scott describes here is applicable to P-Z. The 
commodification of nature is as true for the Appalachian coalfields as it is for the gold mines 
of P-Z. The ¨colonial imagination¨ imposed a legacy that has prevailed ever since. Not only 
did the Spaniards reduce nature to a question of market potential, but they also engaged in an 
inhuman exploitation of indigenous manpowerxi. In terms of explicit racism this legacy has 
been modified, but the past is not very far away, and can be found in new forms like the 
frequent use of immigrant workers from Peru or poor regions of Ecuador. Another, yet 
slightly different example is the issue of child labor only recently subjected to large 
governmental campaigns. Many miners I met had started their mining careers at the age of 11-
12 years and reflecting Scott’s remarks about a dominating capitalist rationality, these miners, 
instead of lamenting about a lost childhood (or something like that), brawled about how much 
money they made already as youngsters. However, the legacy and formation of mining 
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identities and the answer to the question of why to become a miner is both complex and 
relevant for how regulations are negotiated. I will return to this in chapter three. 
 Chapter three is essentially about the particularities involved in the enforcement of 
national mining legislation and the reactions it creates. Recalling how Voyles observed how 
places, spaces and bodies were rendered pollutable by dominating narratives, Tania Murray 
Li (2007), in a similar vein, discusses how places/spaces are rendered technical. Li explores 
how governmental programs are constructed and applied as interventions to improve the 
¨efficiency¨ of agriculture and livelihoods in Central Sulawesi highlands (123-55). Likewise, 
the interventions in the context of Papua New Guinea also relied heavily on the creation of a 
dominating narrative of the constituents of the place and space. Furthermore, a central theme 
for Murray Li is that the act of ¨rendering technical¨ is intimately linked with 
¨problematization, that is, identifying deficiencies that need to be rectified¨ (7). These acts, 
she argues, are characteristically non-political (or apolitical) and based on ¨experts¨ 
evaluations (ibid.)xii. In the context of P-Z, this resembles very much the dominating 
discourse created by ¨apolitical¨ natural science on the toxicity of mining, which again 
constitute the major fundament for governmental decision-making. I will return to address 
these matters in both chapter two and four.  
 Murray Li´s book is explicitly a treatise in Michel Foucault’s theories of power. More 
precisely, it builds upon his concept of governmentality, in which ¨government is the attempt 
to shape human conduct by calculated means¨ (Murray Li 2007:5). Rather than consisting in a 
one-to-one convincement of individuals, this form of power operates at a distance by shaping 
people’s desires and aspirations. Above, I already mentioned Pierre Bourdieu´s theories of 
habitus (1977) and while both Foucault and Bourdieu include an understanding of power to 
operate unconsciously among the actors, the difference between them in this regard is that 
Foucault refers to a kind of power that has a clear and radical element of intentionality to it 
(someone is consciously manipulating someone). Bourdieu on the other hand, at least through 
his theories of habitus and doxa, draws an image of power that is devoid of intentionality, not 
as to exclude its possibility, but more generally to illustrate that power works to naturalize 
political conditions and bodily practices. Hence, I do not conceive these perspectives as 
opposing each other, but rather as complementary and as relevant to understand how miners, 
in varying degrees, are carriers of a long legacy of mining while simultaneously subjected to 
governmentality, or to use Murray Li’s words: a (governmental) will to improve. Meanwhile, 
miners do not simply subjugate to this governmentality, but quite on the contrary, respond to 
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it in multiple ways. I situate and conceive the dynamics of regulation and contestation as the 
process of interlegality, outlined in my analytical framework above.  
 The examination of power relations is unquestionably relevant to this perspective, and 
alongside Murray Li’s interpretation of Foucault, I turn to Stephen Lukes’ (2005) theories on 
power. I return to address power most explicitly in chapter five. For now, it is worth noticing 
how Lukes categorizes power into three dimensions and how he conceives power in the 
context of interests: 
In general, talk of interests provides a licence for the making of normative judgments of a moral and political 
character. So it is not surprising that different conceptions of what interests are are associated with different 
moral and political positions (…) Extremely crudely; liberal (one-dimensional view of power), reformist (two-
dimensional view) and radicals (three-dimensional view). The latter: ¨maintains that people´s wants may 
themselves be a product of a system which works against their interests, and, in such cases, relates the latter to 
what they would want and prefer, were they able to make a choice. (2005:37-8) 
In my view, although the relationships are notoriously empirical and complex, Lukes’ last 
sentence here, which is a characterization of his three-dimensional view on power, is fairly 
descriptive of the situation in P-Z. Many actors (external and internal) are interested in the 
gold that can be extracted from the mountains in P-Z. Bluntly put, no one opposes it, but 
everyone wants (the largest share of) it. And what creates this want? Essentially, it is the 
capitalist dogma of material growth as a benevolent thing, but also a fundamental human need 
for subsistence. The latter is a valid argument while the former is a product of an idea at odds 
with both human and environmental well-being. The problem is that they are mixed together 
in the orientation towards gold. The need for subsistence becomes an incentive that develops 
progressively towards an enhanced want for gold that can be converted into material wealth. 
Along with the powerful narrative of capitalism, the legacy and insistence on mining, 
capitalist accumulation of wealth becomes the aspiration for miners that deliberately expose 
themselves to numerous risks and hazards by working in the mines and processing plants.  
This is roughly the logic behind the mining, but as I will emphasize in chapter two, the 
degree of dependence and the degree of capitalist motivation varies widely among miners. In 
the context of power and power relations I have identified two major structures that I will 
scrutinize. The first is the process of marginalization towards artisanal miners, which involves 
an asymmetrical relation of power/authority between these miners and the government in 
alliance with the largest mining companies. The second relates to the notion of 
responsibilityxiii in the sense that while we can admit that the environmental and social 
consequences of mining in P-Z are effects of long, complex and intricate relations and 
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practices, some actors are clearly more to blame than others. Not only are they to blame 
according to their acts or decisions, but equally through their inactivity or non-decisions (cf. 
Lukes 2005:40). Hence, I will analyse the relations, activity or non-activity of central actors 
such as ARCOM, INIGEMM, APROPLASMIN (Association of Processing Plant Owners) 
and ELIPE Ltd. Yet, this being said, a key point is that the task of enforcing national 
legislation on this environmental conflict is profoundly delicate and tricky. While I am critical 
to several aspects of the government’s ¨will to improve¨ the conditions of mining, I therefore 
acknowledge and illustrate the difficulties of law enforcement throughout the thesis. 
In general, as the reader may have discerned by now, there is an anthropological 
flavour to this thesis (including my version of political ecology), especially regarding the 
social theory I make use of. I do engage with the natural sciences involved in the literature on 
ASGM, but instead of attempting to follow this at length, I let it inform the thesis on 
processes and consequences of mining. At the same time, I critically address its effects. In the 
tradition of political ecology, this double bind reflects what Robbins terms as the 
uncomfortable juxtaposition between a realist (positivist) and a social constructivist approach 
in relation to claims of nature (Robbins 2012:97). And, indeed this may be a tricky stance, 
especially in the light of explorations into ontological pluralism where there seems to be solid 
evidence that humans conceive reality qualitatively different (cf. Law 2011). Yet, I think it is 
possible to say something meaningful about this case of resource governance/environmental 
degradation anyway. In fact, I consider this ambivalence between positivism and social 
constructivism as an ingenuity of political ecology, one that enables it to speak across 
scholarly boundaries instead of an academic tendency towards merely creating internal 
(disciplinary) discussions, as may be the case in other disciplines. Yet, this has some 
consequences that I will return to address in chapter four. 
 
Limitations 
As touched upon in relation to the development of large-scale mining in Ecuador, critical 
assessments have been highlighted in a prolonged discussion about resource extractivism 
within political ecology in Latin America. In particular, the discussion has revolved around 
political contradictions, inconsistencies and ambiguities related to development after the so-
called Left Turn (e.g. Bebbington et al 2008; Escobar 2010; Lang & Mokrani 2011; Escribano 
2013; Bavinck et al 2014; Pellegrini et al 2014; Ulloa 2015). Accordingly, questions 
regarding multiple ontologies, i.e. different ways to conceive of ¨reality¨ and relate to the 
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environment, are at the heart of current political ecology approaches in Latin America. Much 
of this stems from acknowledging that ¨other worlds are (already) possible¨ (Escobar 2005), 
that is, based on empirical evidence from, but not necessarily restricted to, indigenous and 
Afro-American communities within Latin America. In essence, this discussion works towards 
de-naturalizing the hegemonic ontology of capitalism that is profoundly contingent on the 
idea of humans as separated from, and masters of, nature. One of my limitations in this thesis 
however, is not to engage too much with this discussion. There are two main reasons for this. 
First of all, and bluntly put: all my informants are mestizos representing a mainstream 
Ecuadorian ontology much in line with legislative authorities. Although it would be 
interesting to explore this case as an environmental conflict in a context of less radical 
ontological differences (compared to contexts/conflicts involving indigenous, Afro-American 
communities and/or environmental movements) between the actors, at this stage I simply do 
not have the empirical data required to do so. Second, by venturing into this discussion I 
would open up for a long debate on the human/nature dichotomy that, despite its relevancy, 
would alter my analytical scope and redirect it towards legislation and its links to government 
ideology. Hence, while avoiding to ¨throw the baby out with the bath school¨ (Callon and 
Latour 1992), I acknowledge that an exploration into ontological claims is of political 
importance (cf. Law 2011), yet limit myself to an exploration of epistemological claims in 
chapter four and how this relates to power relations in chapter fivexiv. 
 Another major limitation to this analysis relates to the subject of gender and gender 
relations. I agree with scholars like Scott (2010) and Ferguson (1999) when they suggest that 
masculinity play a pivotal role in extractive industries. Hence, I realize that this account is 
also a gendered story where the male miner and the male law enforcer play the roles as 
protagonists. Accordingly, the reader should assume that this is an important complementary 
dimension to my analysis although I do not elaborate extensively on this here. My excuse for 
not taking this dimension into account, rests on a need to limit my analytics.  
 A related limitation to the following analysis is that I do not elaborate extensively on 
the issue of class struggle in P-Z, despite my observation of hierarchies of labor exploitation. 
Rather, I illustrate how the community unites to oppose regulation and external interference, 
despite the asymmetrical power relations, and how governmental authorities consolidate the 
internal hierarchy. I assume that there is more complexity to this, i.e. that artisanal miners 
may occasionally be in conflict with more powerful miners and owners of processing plants, 
but I do not have sufficient empirical data to follow this thoroughly.  
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 A final limitation concerns my choice of theory to support the analysis. On this point, 
the list is potentially very long, but the most relevant, at least in my own eyes, is that I avoid 
any thorough engagement with institutional economic theory. Indeed, there are insights from 
scholars such as Elinor Ostrom (e.g. 1990), Joan Martinez-Alier (e.g. 2013), and Arild Vatn 
(e.g. 2005) with a potential to inform this thesis, but it would, presumably, altered the 
direction of my study away from its ethnographic scope. 
 
Methods 
How did I obtain my information? How much data have I in fact been able to extract? And is 
it enough? I asked myself these questions as my first round of fieldwork was coming to an 
end. A bit worried and bewildered perhaps, I had my last lunch at a local restaurant in 
Zaruma. I sat by the window at my regular table and picked up my notebook to scribble down 
some thoughts and ideas. ¨How can I possibly measure and seize what I have learned during 
the last three months?¨, I asked myself while looking through the window. Then I got an idea 
or a thought, or a mix of both: the view I was contemplating was exactly the same as the view 
I curiously approached having lunch at the exact same restaurant at the exact same table, three 
months earlier. Back then I had asked the owner of the restaurant a number of questions:  
- What is that big installation with the large pool down there at that hilltop? 
- That´s ELIPE’s processing plant with its tailings pond, he answered.  
- And that river over there? 
- That is the Calera River that unites with the Amarillo River further down. They 
eventually form the Puyango River that runs into Peru, he said.  
- And what about those houses down there in the valley?  
- That is Portovelo, he answered before serving me the soup of the day.  
I was so eager back then that I struggled to balance my curiosity with a minimal amount of 
politeness. Yet I soon got to know the restaurant owner and his wife and we had both short 
and long conversations about the view and the place throughout my fieldwork.  
The point is that while I was waiting for my last lunch in Zaruma before heading back 
to Norway, I was looking at the panorama from this restaurant window with new eyes. I 
looked at Portovelo down in the valley and a number of people and places immediately 
emerged to my consciousness. I looked at the Calera River and thought about the illegal 
dumping of tailings in the river, but also about friendly conversations with the workers of the 
processing plants. I saw ELIPE’s big installation called ¨Golden Valley¨, and lamented that I 
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had not been able to visit it. In the direction of Piñas, I saw the big open scar in the mountain 
and knew very well that it was a quarry that does not contain valuable minerals, but stony 
material for construction. Further south I saw the landfills and scars on the hilly plateau called 
El Tablón where the communal tailings deposit is located. I remembered walking around 
there with a gas mask strapped around my mouth and how much paperwork I had to put into 
being granted a visit. In short, I looked at this view and figured out that what I had learned 
during fieldwork could essentially be recapitalized in my new pair of eyes. 
 Without being too metaphorical about it, my method of data collection in this project 
can be summarized the following way: First of all, I did two rounds of fieldwork: the first 
from late June until mid-September 2015, the second consisting in a short, but intense stay for 
three weeks in January 2016. In essence and by all means, my orientation has been 
qualitative. I have conducted numerous semi-structured interviews, some of them formal 
recorded on video and/or audio, but most of them as informal conversations. Still, there is a 
difference between an interview as an informal conversation, i.e. with a minimal amount of 
coordination, and the informal conversation that take place spontaneously. The outcome may 
be relatively similar, but methodologically speaking, the former is, equally informal, but more 
focused and planned. However, as I am trained in ethnographic methods, I relied heavily on 
informal settings and opted for as much participation as possible. I did a lot of paperwork in 
order to obtain permission to accompany ARCOM on their inspections to mines and 
processing plants. I joined them once a week for a month, and two more days during my 
second fieldwork. Although I agree that this is very meagre, especially according to 
anthropological standards, these field experiences were fruitful to me and I attempt to give 
credence to them in this thesis.  
 The kind of interaction-based data collection I got through joining ARCOM on their 
inspections was, in essence, what I struggled to get all the time. I got in touch with people 
who were involved in mining and managed to visit several sites with local miners as my 
guides. This was important as a sort of baseline to understand how people worked and to 
witness the variety of mining operations. The same goes for the processing plants. I visited 
them alone to do interviews with workers, I visited them on several occasions with ARCOM 
and I visited them, in a combination with these to variants, with my photographer friend to 
take pictures and learn about the processes. 
 Jose Luis Maldonado Quintero, a friend and a photographer from Ecuador (currently 
residing in Oslo, Norway) was actually a crucial ingredient to my last round of fieldwork. We 
had planned for this and eventually managed to join up for a ten days stay in Zaruma together 
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with his wife, Kjersti. I arrived some days in advance and organized a working agenda 
together with a local guide that had experience working with both foreign researchers and 
tourists. Our plan was to do a photo documentary of the current mining activity and combine 
this with my fieldwork approach. This was a methodological success (time will tell if the 
result – a photo book and exhibitions – lives up to this) in two important ways. First of all, it 
was very useful to return to the field to gather more data and adjust my earlier observations. 
Secondly, the presence of Jose Luis and our project of doing a photo documentary was more 
tangible and familiar to the informants compared to ¨research for a thesis in International 
Environmental Studies at the Norwegian University of Life Science¨. Put differently, the fact 
that I was doing a thesis in Environmental Studies, did create a couple of incidents where I 
had to talk myself out of informants’ assumptions and prejudices. The alternative would be to 
avoid saying where I came from, which would have been ethically challenging, at least in 
formal settings. At any rate, to do a photo documentary with an Ecuadorian photographer with 
his origins in Machala, provided me with a different methodological approach that very 
effectively ¨broke the ice¨ if there was one. Obviously, I explained my academic purpose as 
well, and brought along consent forms for the informants to sign. We visited several mines 
and processing plants of varied size and scales, we joined ARCOM on inspections, we visited 
the communal tailings deposit, and we did portraits and interviews of miners, workers, 
administrators, regulators and several in-depth interviews with old people in both Zaruma and 
Portovelo. Additionally, and this applies in general to both fieldworks, I talked to people (lay 
people, researchers, local bureaucrats, historians, friends and relatives in Machala and 
Guayaquil) about the issues of mining and regulations constantly and exhaustively. I 
addressed these people with general thoughts, my doubts, rumours and gossip, what I 
apprehended as contradictions and inconsistencies, and perhaps too many, questions.  
 The above-mentioned is roughly an outline of my empirical fieldwork. Besides that, I 
have reviewed the existing research and literature on the ASGM in P-Z. As this is the oldest 
mining centre in Ecuador and quite well known, there is by now, a considerable amount of 
research from this place, especially on the engineering properties of the mining cycle and its 
toxic and biological characteristics. This gave me a point of departure to develop a more 
critical analytical framework, yet it also gave me knowledge about the natural sciences 
involved. The same, albeit qualitatively different, can be said about the literature on the local 
history, which is reviewed in chapter one. In technical words, both these two camps (local 
history and natural science on ASGM) along with national statistics and official documents of 
laws and legislation provided necessary references to triangulate my empirical data.  
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As can be discerned from this, my main method was participant observation in an 
ethnographic sense. Regarding the importance of securing data validity, Stewart (1998:17) 
outlines three central notions:  
1. Veracity, meaning inherent validity or plausibility. Fortified by: long-term 
fieldwork, a search for discomforting observations, good relations regarding position and role, 
attention towards context (and its influence) and variation in collecting data (interviews, 
observations, interaction etc.)  
2. Objectivity, meaning reliability or logic consistency. Fortified by: being explicit on 
your doings and beings during fieldwork, feedback from informants, feedback from external 
colleges.  
3. Perspicacity, meaning generalization or external validity. Fortified by: intense 
examination and systematization of data collected, search for comparative, internal 
dimensions, reorientation, return to the field.  
Despite the briefness of my fieldworks, Stewart’s points were valuable as an ethnographic 
checklist. And although this project is clearly of inductive character, I travelled to the field 
with a set of assumptions and an explicit working research question (see ¨problem statement¨ 
above). With these three points, however, Stewart reminded me of the importance of 
¨discomforting observations¨, ¨feedback from informants¨ and ¨reorientation¨ in the fieldwork 
context as pivotal to producing a reliable story in the end. 
Methodologically speaking, this thesis can be seen as a case study, which includes a 
¨detailed and intensive analysis of a single case¨ (Bryman 2008: 52), that is, regulation of 
ASGM in P-Z. Nevertheless, the analysis exceeds its empirical specificities in the sense that it 
contextualizes regulation in its national framework and also draws on comparative 
perspectives with other ASGM sites (within and outside Ecuador), as well as other contexts of 
resource extractivism. In this regard, it emphasizes the open-endedness of ethnography as 
captured by Ferguson’s reflections on Marcel Mauss’ analogy of ethnography with fishing: 
¨all you need is a net to swing, and you can be sure you’ll catch something¨ (Ferguson 1999: 
17). Although I disagree that ethnography, at least my attempts on it, is as arbitrary as this, I 
agree with Ferguson’s accentuation of the lack of control on behalf of the ethnographer (18). 
The ethnographic method is tricky and highly contingent upon the relation the ethnographer 
obtains with informants. This points back to the importance of prolonged fieldwork in the 
anthropological tradition, and although I admit that my study would have profited on more 
time spent in the field, this was, at least to some extent, compensated for given my familiarity 
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with the context (see below).   
Regarding ethics, I refer, once again (cf. Frækaland Vangsnes 2010:13-4), to Knauft 
(1996:48-50) and what he terms a ¨critical humanist sensibility¨. This ethical stance relies on 
two principles: 1) ¨to document and valorize the richness and diversity of human ways of life¨ 
and 2) ¨to expose, analyze, and critique human inequality and domination¨ (ibid.). In practice, 
this may equally be difficult in a given situation. Still, Knauft’s position indicates a 
moral/ethical essence that highlights values I find important, not only in a fieldwork context, 
but also in general terms. More technically, ethics are also about securing the personal 
integrity of informants. The issue of informed consent clearly relates to this. Accordingly, I 
got written consents from many informants, but also oral consents saying that I could use their 
statements in this thesis. While some informants were more eager about me using their 
statements, including their names, I was careful about this as I knew that people could have 
second thoughts in other settings. Subsequently, I re-approached them to inform them more 
about my project and to ask if it was okay to use their opinions. Most people said yes, but a 
very few said no, because of fear that it might compromise their professional integrity. 
Regarding state officials (e.g. informants from ARCOM or the Ministry of Environment), the 
process to obtain access was more bureaucratic, and although I could have wished for more 
access, I am grateful for what I got. In fact, I regard my ethnographic accounts on the work of 
ARCOM as a unique window into their difficult mandate of enforcing mining legislation. In 
this context, I additionally got signed consents forms from ARCOM staff.  
In general, all names of particular persons (except public officials such as ministers, 
presidents or local historians) are pseudonyms. Two persons, who we will get to know in 
chapter four, explicitly and repeatedly said they wished to be paraphrased with original names 
and I respected that. An important point in this regard however, is that the people I invoke 
throughout the thesis are hardly representative for their personal biographies. My fieldworks 
were short and intensive with a clear focus on mining. Hence, I use opinions, practice and 
statements from people related to their affiliation with my focus. Accordingly, if and when I 
am critical to these things, I am not targeting people on a personal level, but rather as 
representations of divergent views, perspectives and opinions as I encountered them during 
fieldwork.  
 Apart from triangulationxv between empirical data, media coverage, natural/social 
science on ASGM/extractivism, mining legislation, and Ecuadorian tax statistics, which I 
prefer to conceive as juggling, there is a personal story to this as well. Briefly outlined, my 
first visit to Zaruma was in 2000 when I was an exchange student living in Machala. A couple 
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of years later I returned to Machala and Guayaquil, where I stayed for prolonged periods of 
time (approximately five years taken together) before and after I married my wife from 
Machala in 2006. We have frequented Zaruma and its surroundings ever since, but usually 
only for short trips. Accordingly, I had heard stories of gold and gold mining up there in the 
highlands, but never really got a firm grip of what was going on. So, eventually, after 
discussing project ideas with my supervisor, I ended up doing what I have done. Concerning 
this personal familiarity with Ecuador, it is also relevant to mention that I speak Spanish and 
that I did three months of fieldwork on San Cristobal, Galapagos in 2009. This fieldwork 
served as empirical data collection to elaborate a master thesis in social anthropology 
featuring, without going into specifics, a cultural analysis of masculinity (Frækaland 
Vangsnes 2010).  
 I am not being too exhaustive on the issue of methodology here. I hope to compensate 
for this by presenting several empirical accounts that reflect the way I have obtained my data. 
These accounts, like the one in the beginning of this introduction, are meant to bring the 
reader closer to the social reality as experienced by miners and regulators in P-Z. In line with 
Ferguson (1999: 21), the accounts are not meant to get the whole picture, but to provide the 
reader with some relevant anecdotes for interpretation. Once again by concurring with 
Ferguson, these accounts are meant to ¨exceed[s] the argument and in some sense bypass it to 
speak more directly to the reader¨ (23). Yet, of course, the interpretations are mine and, while 
I struggle to contextualize them sufficiently, they are subjective and suggestive rather than 
objective. 
          
The thesis 
The thesis is roughly divided into two parts in which chapter one and two comprise the first, 
and the last three chapters, the second part. As could be seen above, I use pictures to provide 
for some illustrations before and after the manuscript, but also in between part one and two. 
Chapter one accounts for the historical trajectory of gold mining in P-Z. It illustrates 
how mining has developed from the Incan rulings in the 15th century up to the present and 
highlights the different governmental regimes conditioning the activity. This is of relevance to 
conceptualize how the place and the activity have nurtured one another, and to see how the 
colonial hegemony had the effect of naturalizing the commodification of nature.  
 Chapter two picks up on the end of the previous chapter and contextualize ASGM in 
its current situation. The emphasis here is to account for complexity and to review mining 
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legislation, processing techniques and the economy. Here, I attempt to convey complexity of 
different dimensions rather than going into depth on one of them. I argue for the importance 
of conceiving these dimensions together and to acknowledge their interdependencies, an 
approach that, to my knowledge, has not previously been undertaken.  
 While chapter one and two comprise an analytical construction that could serve as a 
foundation for different further elaborations, chapter three takes us to the core of my 
analytical scope, namely the enforcement of Ecuadorian mining legislation. Here, I present 
accounts of ARCOM on their field inspections into mines of different sizes and the 
encounters with different miners.  
 Chapter four considers the epistemological foundations of the main stakeholders 
engaged in the politics of ASGM in P-Z. Here, we are introduced to informal miners and their 
praxis and beliefs, but also to how the mining community opposes governmental regulation. I 
also illustrate how governmental regulation is implemented through capacitation programs, 
and the challenges related to this. In sum, this chapter accounts for the politics of mining with 
an emphasis on different kinds of knowledge schemes.  
 Chapter five is reaching towards a conclusion. Here, I theorize on issues of power 
related to the empirical observations and attempt to expand on the theory of interlegality. 
Lastly, I also reflect critically on the political ecologist approach. 
 In the very end I present a brief epilogue that includes some suggestions for further 
research.  
 Figures are mine if nothing else is indicated. Spanish original quotations are put as 
footnotes on the same page, yet left in parenthesis if very short. That being said, I am not 
totally consistent in providing original Spanish quotations. I mainly do it where it seems 
appropriate and where the English translation obscures or alter emic meaning. Endnotes are 
provided for each chapter, including online references to newspaper articles and other online 
sources. All other references are to be found in the very end. All pictures are taken by Jose 
Luis Maldonado Quintero in P-Z during January 2016. 
 
 
 
Notes 																																																								i	There	is	a	problem	of	definition	of	both	artisanal	and	small-scale	mining	and	the	distinction	between		them	(see	Veiga	et	al	2015:1).	The	Ecuadorian	Mining	Act,	however,	follow	a	definition	that	highlights	the	volume	of	production	as	the	determining	factor,	although	it	also	mentions	what	kind	of	machinery	can	be	
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																																																																																																																																																																													used	in	artisanal	exploitation	(Art.	134).	Nevertheless,	the	concepts	of	artisanal	and	small	scale	are	employed	inconsistently	among	miners	as	well	as	scholars	writing	about	them.	ii	Currently	(May	2016)	the	gold	price	is	approximately	40	US	dollars	a	gram.	iii	Prospectors	and	developers’	association	of	Canada.	This	annual	convention	is	regarded	as	the	major	event	for	the	global	mining	industry	with	over	100	nations	represented.	It	is	sponsored	by	global	mining	corporations,	but	notably	also	by	ENAMI	EP	(Ecuador’s	national	mining	company).	iv	Online	article	(my	translation),	retrieved	from:	http://www.ecuadorinmediato.com/index.php?module=Noticias&func=news_user_view&id=2818777215&umt		v	For	a	brief	résumé	on	behalf	of	the	Ecuadorian	Ministry	of	Mining	see:	http://www.mineria.gob.ec/principales-empresas-mineras-interesadas-en-ecuador		vi	For	a	general	overview	on	the	largest	mining	projects	in	Ecuador	see:	http://www.mineria.gob.ec				The	Chinese-owned	Ecuacorriente	is	the	proprietor	of	El	Mirador,	see:	http://www.reuters.com/article/ecuador-mining-idUSL2E8E5D4M20120306.		The	Canadian/Swedish	corporation	Lundin	Gold	Inc.	is	the	proprietor	of	Fruta	del	Norte,	see:	http://finance.yahoo.com/news/lundin-gold-inc-announces-agreement		vii	Speech	retrieved	1st	of	May	2016:	http://www.presidencia.gob.ec/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2013/10/2007-09-25-Discurso-del-Presidente-en-la-62-Asamblea-General-de-las-Naciones-Unidas.pdf.	See	also	Acosta	(2012)	for	an	interesting	reflection	on	these	matters.		viii	See:	http://www.inec.gob.ec/cpv		ix	There	is	reason	to	believe	that	this	amount	is	very	low	since	it	is	based	on	the	estimates	of	APROPLASMIN	(Owners	of	the	processing	plants)	that	potentially	share	an	interest	in	under-reporting	to	avoid	increased	taxation.	For	instance,	Astudillo	(2007)	estimated	an	annual	production	of	15	tons	of	gold,	almost	ten	years	ago.	x	In	analogy	with	climate	sceptics	referring	to	research	that	is	critical	towards	a	popularized	representation	of	climate	warming	(cf.	Al	Gore´s	An	Inconvenient	Truth),	I	admit	that	this	can	be	used	in	a	reactionary	way.	Still,	I	consider	it	more	important	to	remain	true	to	a	critical	and	empirical	approach	than	to	propose	a	partly	false	argument	only	because	it	may	appeal	to	a	larger	audience.	Methodologically,	I	consider	this	as	the	major	point,	along	with	the	notion	of	self-reflexivity,	which	separates	critical	research	from	mainstream	environmentalism,	media	and	¨apolitical¨	research.				xi	There	are	reasons	to	suggest	that	the	Incan	empire	was	equally	cruel,	or	even	worse,	when	it	came	to	manpower	and	labor	exploitation,	but	I	leave	this	and	most	pre-Hispanic	contextualization	out	in	this	thesis.	xii	Li	(2007:287)	conceives	Arturo	Escobar´s	Encountering	Development	as	a	book	that	develops	this	argument	(rendering	places/spaces	technical)	to	apply	for	the	powers	that	construct,	intervene	and	develop	the	¨third	world¨.	However,	she	is	critical	towards	elements	of	conspiracy	in	Escobar´s	presentation	and	likewise	critical	of	Ferguson	neglecting	the	possibility	of	local	agency	in	his	Anti-politics	
Machine.		xiii	Lukes	discusses	the	relationship	between	power	and	responsibility	in	which	he	views	the	relation	of	structure	and	agency	is	an	inherent	part	(2005:	66-8).	xiv	This	also	means	that	I	circumvent	Actor	Network	Theory	and	the	nascent	literature	on	the	Anthropocene	(e.g.	Steffen	et	al	2007;	Ogden	et	al	2013).	xv	On	the	importance	of	triangulation	see:	Berg	&	Lune	(2011:	6-8).	
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Man has a history because he transforms nature. 
- Maurice Godelier 1986 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1: History lessons 
At the age of 81 years, or ¨81 Christmas´s¨, as he put it, Don Lucho had recently discovered 
the richest gold ore in his lifetime. He found it in the proximities of Portovelo using old 
exploration coordinates from the South American Development Company (SADCO), a North 
American mining company we will soon hear more about. However, the coordinates had been 
wrong concerning the direction of the ore, leaving him to wander around and not getting it 
right. Only after he adjusted his search to a north-south direction (as is the conventional ore 
direction in this region), he was able to follow this promising ore.  
By the time I met him, Don Lucho was a happy man, very happy indeed. He had 
managed to buy the property and finally found reliable companions to exploit the minerals 
(essentially gold and silver) of his recent discovery. This was his second attempt, after having 
associated with some ¨buenas ratas¨ (¨rats¨) who had cheated him the first time. He had soon 
noticed, dismissed the work and managed to keep the rats from the site. His main problem on 
this occasion, he said, was that he did not own the land and that this kept him from exploiting 
the ore. 
At the time we went to visit the site however, the property was his and he and his 
companions had just begun to work with an excavator at surface level. What was peculiar 
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about this discovery, said Don Lucho, was that the ore was situated in a geological fault zone, 
and that he had found it at surface level. Primary tests of the ore had indicated very promising 
quantities of gold. In fact, according to Don Lucho, it contained seven and a half ounces of 
gold per ton of rock material. Seven and a half ounces is about 200 grams of gold. Today, 
most mining companies in P-Z regard material that contains more than five grams per ton, as 
profitable. The gold price during my fieldworks was approximately 35 dollars a gram, while 
currently (May 2016) around 40 dollars. Correspondingly, one does not have to be a 
mathematician to understand the glimpse in the eyes of Don Lucho. However, after fifty years 
in this business, he was calm and humble about it. He knew that there was still a lot of work 
to do and that the ore did not necessarily contain such high amounts of gold in all directions.  
At the same time, he was enthusiastic and joyful about the prospect of exploiting the 
gold. ¨I do not yearn constantly for gold nor do I have great ambitions when it comes to gold. 
The thing is, in my case, that I like it a lot, and that is something that has fastened to my 
blood…I like to see it (the gold)¨3, he explained while he scratched the hillside, removing 
particles of clay and dirt to make visible the rusty layers of silver indicating the ore. When I 
questioned him about the role gold has played in his life, he responded quickly: ¨it has been 
my source for work, for education, everything for my children…¨4, and continued to say that 
¨around here we don´t have…well I really shouldn’t say that this land is bad. This soil is good 
for agriculture, but since gold represents a profitable work, we have to look for it, and as there 
is gold here, even at the surface, are we going to let it trifle away? I don´t think so...¨5 Don 
Lucho continued to tell me how he had left Piñas, a neighboring town, to search for gold in 
and around Portovelo in his early days. It was simple, he told me, ¨you just hiked around with 
a pan and a stick until you found a promising site where you panned the material and 
eventually there it was, (the gold)¨6. Then, he said, he knew that he had obtained both food 
and shelter for himself and his family.  
The absence of mining regulation and control in Don Lucho’s early years reflects the 
state of affairs until recent times. The principal limitations on mining back then was the lack 
of capital to invest and, as always, the fluctuating gold prices. These limitations continue as 																																																								3	Yo	por	mi	lado,	al	oro	no	lo	ambiciono,	sino	que	es	algo	que	me	gusta	bastante,	algo	que	se	me	ha	pegado	ya	
en	la	sangre	que…me	gusta	verlo.	4	Mi	fuente	de	trabajo	para	educación,	todo	para	mis	hijos,	es	el	oro.	5	No	tenemos	aquí	por	ejemplo…bueno	tampoco	voy	a	decir	que	las	tierras	no	valen	aquí,	las	tierras	para	
agricultura	son	buenas,	pero	como	el	oro	es	un	trabajo	rentable	hay	que	buscarlo,	y	como	hay	oro,	y	lo	vamos	
a	dejar	desperdiciar?...creo	que	no.	6	Te	cogías	un	platón	y	una	palita	y	te	venias	a	mirar	a	joder	por	ahí,	y	dabas	un	poco,	veías	que	habías	
encontrado	una	falla,	aquí	fue,	y	platoneabas	y	ya	está	(el	oro).	
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important regulating structures, but are increasingly accompanied by the governmental efforts 
to control and regulate the sector. Still, this does not mean that the sector was an anarchy 
during Don Lucho’s youth. Mining concessions and mining titles were distributed and, at 
least in theory, controlled by the Ecuadorian State since its foundation in 1830. Yet, informal 
mining has always co-existed with formal and industrial mining regimes. Hence, in the 
absence of control and regulation, mining activity in P-Z has largely organized itself by 
adapting, opposing or ignoring the different governmental structures contextualizing its 
continuity. 
In his article on the concept of interlegality in Ecuador, Simon Thomas (2009) defines 
this to be ¨the interpenetration of different normative orders, mostly between national law and 
customary law¨ (165). He goes on to say that this requires ¨a situation of legal pluralism¨ 
(ibid.), i.e. the existence of more than one legal order. His article relies on a case that involves 
the co-existence of indigenous customary law and national laws where the former is currently 
(albeit with limited legal potency) acknowledged as a legal order, consolidated through 
Ecuador´s ratification of international conventions on indigenous rights. The norms of mining 
in P-Z hardly have the same legal status as indigenous customary laws, nor do they represent 
a whole set of cosmological beliefs as in the latter case. Rather, norms of mining have 
developed in response to the conditions of mining activity (colonialism, republicanism, 
industrialization and capitalism) and the dominant mining regimes taking place. Currently, 
these norms are notoriously at odds with national mining legislation, but tend to win out since 
the practical obstacles of enforcing the latter is overwhelming. Simon Thomas, leaning on 
Hoekema’s use of the term ¨semi-autonomous social fields¨ (2004), says that:  
the process of interlegality is influenced by dominant (top down) national laws, as well as by local (bottom up) 
pressure (…) a distinction is made between a situation of real, or factual (de facto) legal pluralism, and official, 
or formal (de jure) legal pluralism. In the latter case, so called ´internal conflict rules´ will guide the process of 
interlegality, in order to provide more legal certainty¨ (Simon Thomas 2009:165)  
The distinction of de facto and de jure legal pluralism is also remarked by de Theije et al 
(2014) when they apply the concept of interlegality on ASGM contexts. I will return to how 
this relates to current enforcement on mining legislation in following chapters. However, I 
wish to invoke this concept already here because it is useful to keep in mind when reviewing 
the historical formation of how P-Z became a place and how mining was constituent in this 
process. Importantly, in the context of P-Z, I interpret legal pluralism to indicate local norms, 
rules and rationalities that guide the mining operations regardless of, albeit influenced by, 
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formal legislation. It is a dialectic relation, but uncertain in the sense that enforcement creates 
opposition as much as compliance. Hence, in the above-mentioned framework, ASGM in P-Z 
involves de facto legal pluralism, i.e. local norms are hardly acknowledged by governmental 
authorities as a legal structure de jure, but are nonetheless highly instructive for the praxis of 
mining. Furthermore, no ¨internal conflict rules¨ have been formalized. These mediating rules 
can rather be conceived as continuous negotiations between the actors involved in mining 
activities. And as we shall see, there has been quite a lot of negotiations on several governing 
levels throughout the history of mining in P-Z.    
As this chapter will illustrate, both Zaruma and, much later, Portovelo were quite 
literally built on top of their rich deposits of gold. In a Latin American context, this history is 
unique yet relatively unknown. In the words of the historian Kris Lane:  
The small mountain village of San Antonio de Zaruma is probably the longest-running hard-rock gold camp in 
the Western Hemisphere, yet it is hardly known outside the southern Andean provinces of the Republic of 
Ecuador. (2004: 65) 
This history expands over more than six centuries and involves both the Incan and the 
Spanish conquests of P-Z. It includes almost three centuries of Spanish hegemony followed 
by the independence and the birth of the Republic of Ecuador. Furthermore, history illustrates 
how, by the end of the 19th century, foreign investments paved way to an unprecedented 
industrialization of gold mining in Ecuador, represented by the presence of the South 
American Development Company (SADCO) from 1896 to 1950. Yet, political instability was 
notorious and social segregation was a dominant feature of the hierarchical society of P-Z in 
which the Ecuadorian State largely privileged the American company over the local working 
class. The latter endured an exploitative working regime, and while the first labor unions 
emerged already during the First World War, the fight for improved working conditions and 
rights was a tough struggle with few victories. Still, some pressure was made, and after the 
Americans left in 1950, the municipality of Zaruma obtained partial ownership (along with 
ex-workers of SADCO) to exploit the main mine of Portovelo, along with the tailings left by 
the Americans, for another 28 years. After this point however, the mines in P-Z have been 
characterized by the emergence of a large and complex ASGM sector.  
An attempt to do justice to this here is not possible. Accordingly, this chapter provides 
a brief outline of a long mining history. I seek to answer questions like: What is the trajectory 
of mining in P-Z? How has mining contributed in the process of place-making in P-Z? How 
has mining been consolidated and institutionalized? How can we conceive P-Z as a 
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globalized place? Related to the contemporary emphasis on the problems of informality and 
the use of mercury, history reveals that these practices go hand-in-hand and have been part of 
the overall mining practice from its very beginning. As such, informality, i.e. mining at odds 
with formal legal structures, has occurred at the margins of formal mining schemes, but also 
increased and decreased proportionately with the ups and downs of the latter.  
What follows are three sections that track a more or less chronological order of the 
trajectory of mining in P-Z. 
 
Conquests and Colonial times 
There is no existing archeological research on neither pre-Incan nor Incan settlements in the 
P-Z. Yet there is no doubt about the historical existence of indigenous settlements, which 
local people will quickly enlist by reference to archeological observations and sites. As thus, 
while there are trustworthy claims of pre-Incan settlements through de facto observations in 
the landscape, there are no scientific works on these. Hence, the literature on the history of 
this region is brief about pre-Incan times, although it asserts the existence of indigenous 
cultures like ¨chimús, punenos, cañaris, chonos, paltas, tumbecinos¨ (Astudillo 2003:13) in 
what is currently the province of El Oro. Others, like Lane (2004:67) picking up on Caillavet 
(2000), suggests that the indigenous population in the Southern highlands of Ecuador was 
scarce due to wars between Incas, Cañaris and Paltas. At any rate, Murillo Carrión (2010: 7) 
expresses a general lament on the lack of archeological studies and argues that although some 
people insist that subterranean gold mining took place centuries before the Spanish conquest, 
there is no evidence of this. Correspondingly, it is problematic to sustain this claim. 
Nonetheless, the above-mentioned ethnicities were still around in the colonial epoch and as 
we will see in the following, they provided the colonizers with much needed manpower, albeit 
in rather controversial ways.  
With the arrival of the Spanish crown in the beginning of the 16th century historical 
documentation improves significantly. The story told by people in P-Z, which resonates with 
Cortázar’s illustrative book ¨El Oro de Portovelo¨ (2005) and Murillo Carrión’s ¨Historia 
Minera¨ (2010: 22-3), is that the Spanish fleet heading south towards Lima made obligatory 
stops in Tumbes for supplies. Tumbes, on the coast of Northern Peru, is where the Tumbes 
River reaches the Pacific Ocean. The Tumbes River, in turn, is formed by the Puyango River 
Basin with its headwaters in Ecuador, more precisely in the mountains surrounding P-Z. Thus, 
upon noticing that the river contained golden particles in a colonial campaign that very much 
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revolved around the prospect of mineral deposits, some of the more adventurous Spaniards 
decided to follow the river to its source. Another motivating factor was that there were rumors 
that a significant bulk of the Incan gold designated to rescue Atahualpa from Spanish custody 
in Cusco, came from the headwaters of the Tumbes River. Henceforth, the Spanish 
conquistadors followed the river upstream on an ancient path that connected Tumbes with the 
Zaruma area. Finally arriving there, they confirmed their search upon finding gold in the local 
rivers and streams. Subsequently, they named the river that runs through Portovelo today, as 
Rio Amarillo (The Yellow River). Then they continued to climb the hills where they found 
golden ores at surface level and named the Zaruma mountain as Cerro Rico (Rich Mountain). 
In 1549 San Antonio del Cerro Rico de Zaruma was founded and a bourgeoning gold mining 
era was about to take place (Astudillo 2007: 10).   
At this stage, hopes were high – Zaruma was considered as one of the most promising 
gold deposits in the New World and comparisons with the silver mines of Potosí were 
inevitable (Lane 2004: 65). Yet, as Lane also remarks, there was a lack of work force to 
effectively exploit the mines (ibid.). From the outset, the indigenous population was scarce 
and additionally, two rounds of epidemics in the 1550s and 1580s made matters worse. Along 
with a general and high demand of labor throughout the Andes, this was solved through the 
colonial institution of la mita, which in the case of Zaruma, was proposed by Viceroy Toledo 
in 1573 and institutionalized a few years later (ibid.). The mita was based on the principle of a 
¨redistribution of Indians - not lands¨ (Murillo Carrión 2010:16) to the Spaniards for 
productive tasks, which again was meant to serve the Spanish crown through tributes and 
taxation. It was actually an adaptation of a similar Incan institution applied to their 
subordinates (i.e. conquered indigenous ethnicities). In practice, the colonial mita obliged all 
men between 18 and 50 years throughout the indigenous communities, to work for the 
Spanish in a rotating scheme for very low salaries. The mita institution was similar to the 
encomienda institution, yet slightly different in the sense that the former was based on (at 
least in theory) an alternating scheme, while the latter was of a more permanent character, 
which included a cultural assimilation of the indigenous towards Spanish beliefs and religion. 
The encomenderos were Spanish natives, while the ones recruiting mitayos for the mine 
owners locally were high ranking Indians who received payment for this service. In the 
beginning the mitayos could alternatively pay their tributes in crops or species, but soon 
enough, around 1570, these tributes were to be paid in monetary values. In practice, the 
systems were prone to resemble slavery, especially when considering that indigenous 
indebtedness was frequent and forced them into a vicious cycle. Nevertheless, these two 
	 37	
institutions came to persist as the dominant labor organization throughout the Spanish 
colonies until the beginning of the 18th century when they were officially abolished. Yet in 
practice, similar arrangements continued until the days of the republican independence, 
eventually evolving into the later hacienda arrangements.  
At this point in history, i.e. late 16th century, the Real Audiencia (the colonial 
administration) had divided their regions into modes of production where mineral mining very 
much revolved around the rich silver mines in Potosí (current Bolivia) and Zacatecas (current 
Mexico). In this scheme, what is now the territory of Ecuador was focused on textile 
production, in particular to feed the growing markets in Potosí and Lima. This was all part of 
the mercantilist economic system that lasted approximately two centuries before it faded away 
much due to its inherent assumptions of infinite growth and its lack of economic 
understanding of the value of labor and tradei. At any rate, the focus on textile production led 
to another institutional set-up that was called obrajes, which essentially consisted in 
indigenous textile fabrics producing cloths to sustain the markets in Potosí (Murillo Carrión 
2010: 18). Mining was not abandoned all together in Zaruma, but there were doubts about its 
profitability in the light of other kinds of productions. This was critically addressed in a rare 
visit on behalf of an official from the Real Audiencia de Quito, noting that the mines were in 
a terrible and unproductive state and that the owners used mitayos exclusively designated to 
mine, to perform other work. Put differently, mine owners, essentially consisting of an elite of 
Spanish descendants, were mining people instead of the gold deposits (Lane 2004: 70).  
Simultaneously, a nuancing voice can be found in the words of Fray Antonio Vásquez 
de Espinoza, a discalced Carmelite who wrote long descriptions from his travels in the New 
World. Upon his visit to Zaruma in 1614 he portrays a vibrant mining town with abundant 
gold in mines and rivers (which were panned for gold by the indigenous population), and 36 
mills to process the ore (Murillo Carrión 2010: 45). Meanwhile, this barefooted, 
contemplative friar also wrote, while directing himself to the colonial administration, that 
there was a widespread gold commerce that avoided paying quintos (the obligatory tribute to 
the Spanish crown). Typically, he noted, the people who manage the tavernas, where liquor 
was sold, bribe the mitayos to sell them small amounts of gold directly, which is then re-sold 
to third parties without paying quintos (ibid.). Another interesting feature was also 
recapitalized by Fray Antonio Vásquez de Espinoza saying that:  
So when they have milled the quote or quintal designated for each mill, they empty the water in each tank and 
unify or amalgamate the metal with mercury and after the union and the amalgamation they compress this under 
heavy pressure, remove the mercury and benefice the residue. This is the procedure of how they manipulate the 
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precious metals in these mines. In the surrounding areas there are a few farms with cattle and pigs. (Vásquez de 
Espinoza 1960: 578, in Murillo Carrión 2010: 47, my translation) 
The description is precise and gives testimony to the early use of mercury to amalgamate the 
gold (i.e. capture the gold from the milled ore) and the subsequent removal of mercury (i.e. to 
isolate the gold). 400 years later, this practice is subjected to outspread campaigns of mercury 
mitigation across ASGM contexts throughout the world. The main reason for this is a wide 
consensus about the malignant health consequences related to mercury exposure and a 
recognition that the global ASGM sector is currently the largest consumer of the infamous 
quicksilver (Veiga et al 2015: 268). Meanwhile, the point here is to notice and keep in mind 
that this practice is old. Indeed, technology, in practice meaning cyanidation and flotation has 
emerged as more efficient and less contaminating alternatives. Nevertheless, mercury has 
quite different connotations among artisanal miners compared to scientist or politicians 
detached from its ¨magic¨ properties. For the former, mercury has provided them with an easy 
way to perform the pivotal function of capturing the gold, making gold tangible and 
convertible into material wealth. Accordingly, along with the use of gravity to grind and pan 
the ore, mercury has been the most central ingredient in gold mining and is therefore 
conceived in positive terms by artisanal miners. 
Returning to the 17th century, after the initial promising 50-60 years of mining in 
Zaruma, there was a decline - yet importantly never a stop - in gold exploitation throughout 
the next century. The Zaruma mines were no exception to the colonial exploitation of 
indigenous people and Lane (2004:71-4) describes this through treating a 1699 petition on 
behalf of mitayos in Zaruma. With the lack of responsible authorities in Zaruma, these 
indigenous workers actually trekked all the way to Quito to present their appeal to the Real 
Audiencia. The petition for improvements of working conditions echoed both the pleas of 
Bartolomé de las Casas and the colonial ¨New Laws¨ of 1542-1543. Concerning the latter, the 
Church officials in the Cathedral of Quito in 1650 had already suggested that the 
implementation of these laws, which were meant to contribute to an improved treatment of 
indigenous people, was a flaw and that widespread abuse had been a reality (Lane 2004: 73). 
Accordingly, along with a growing concern about the lack of work force to sustain 
productivity, the petition of 1699 finally led to the official abolishment of the mita in Zaruma 
the following year. Yet, in analogy to a general argument that this thesis makes a point to 
sustain; laws and legislation is one thing, while practice in the fields of application is another 
thing. Put differently; although the mita was abolished in 1700 and the encomiendas in 1718, 
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colonial abuse of the indigenous population persisted with force (Murillo Carrión 2010: 53).  
The beginning of the 18th century was characterized by economic crisis for the Spanish 
crown. The Bourbon dynasty had taken over power in Spain and launched a series of reforms 
to modernize production in the colonies with the aim of competing with the ascending 
potencies of France and England (Mora 2008: 50). However, after two centuries of massive 
exploitation of both human and natural resources, this proved to be a difficult task - utterly 
impeded by pests and illness, and natural disasters (earthquakes and volcanic eruptions) in the 
context of Ecuador (ibid.). There was also a decline in mineral production in Peru, which 
affected the demands for the once prosperous textile production in the Real Audiencia de 
Quitoii. Eventually this effect was enhanced as the industrial revolution in England with its 
textile production (conceived as qualitatively better compared to the production of the 
obrajes) gradually took over the markets.  
The production in the mines of Zaruma was minimal during the first half of the 18th 
century. This was not because of a lack of gold, but rather as a consequence of the economic 
crisis and the lack of available work force. As a response to this, by 1777, the Bourbons 
decided to lower mineral production taxes from 5 to 3% (echoing the current royalties paid by 
small-scale miners to the Ecuadorian State), monopolize the business of mercury as to lower 
its costs and establish a fond for the miners (Lane 2004: 75). The effects however, were 
minimal and anarchic circumstances were reported (Murillo Carrión 2010: 60). What was also 
reported during these years, was the malignant health consequences related to the exposure of 
mercury and mercury vapor - resulting in what was termed ¨a pale, weak and unhealthy 
population¨ (ibid.: 60-1, see also Lane 2004: 76). The question emerging, in the face of these 
circumstances, was framed straight-forwardly by the Spanish navigators Jorge Juan and 
Antonio de Ulloa after visiting Zaruma: Why should the ‘naturally indolent’ campesinos of 
the region slave away underground, they asked, when nature made subsistence so easy? 
(Lane 2004: 75, my italics)  
Although we might ask Juan and Ulloa why they characterized the local peasants as 
¨naturally indolent¨, the essence of their question is far-reaching. Not only does it question the 
logics and moral of its time, but it also raises relevant questions to contemporary extractive 
industries in many parts of the worldiii. Moreover, its last part; ¨…when nature made 
subsistence so easy¨, potentially entails a long philosophical discussion on the human-nature 
relation (and questions of human empathy and ethics), including a political debate on the 
moral foundation of extractivism. It also resonates with the question I asked, quite literally, to 
many informants involved in mining: Given the dangers and hardship that you endure 
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working in the mines, and the fact that the salary is relatively low, how come you stick to it? 
One answer to this was given by Don Lucho in the beginning of this chapter, when he said 
that: ¨…since gold represents a profitable work, we have to look for it, and as there is gold 
here, even at the surface, are we going to let it trifle away? I don´t think so...¨. Clearly there 
are many different idiosyncratic answers to this question, yet the fact that mining became 
such a dominating orientation of subsistence makes the question of becoming a miner all but 
arbitrary. For instance, Scott argues that:  
The choice to become a miner (…) is clearly related to a person’s class position, related to living in an 
economically depressed region, related to having limited choices for a dignified life, and to the separation of life 
into public and private spheres (2010:221) 
Moreover, Scott places this question in the ¨intersections of class with race, gender, sexuality, 
and region¨ (2010:220), as to indicate the social interdependencies and intricacies involved in 
making a choice. In this sense, the choice of becoming a miner is not merely a conscious and 
individual choice, but as much a question about the social conditions surrounding the 
individualiv. Wether Juan and Ulloa put forth their question with or without a progressive 
agenda in mind remains in the shadows of history. Yet, the humanistic potential in their 
question was not very much favored by the Spanish crown, who in turn was desperately trying 
to increase the revenues from the colonies.  
Quite contrary to an orientation away from mining, the Zaruma gold mines 
experienced renewed interest during the last two decades of the 18th century. Yet, despite the 
Bourbon reforms, the economic crisis, the lack of work force and the lack of technical 
innovation impeded any substantial development. The mines and the mills remained in the 
hands of a few opportunists barely making a living.   
Perhaps it was as unreasonable to pin Ecuador’s hopes for economic revival on gold mining in Bourbon times as 
it is today, and perhaps there was truly no viable solution to Zaruma’s labor problem. But there was still gold in 
them there hills, and, regardless of outside interest, Zaruma’s hard-core miners soldiered on. (Lane 2004: 79) 
This was the scenario in Zaruma at the verge of independence in late 18th century. Big 
changes were about to take place within the next decades. Still, the mining activity proved 
itself extremely tenacious, facing all sorts of problems during the Spanish hegemony. As the 
quote above indicates, there was still gold to be found and while the attempts to scale-up and 
sustain larger production notoriously failed, informal mining consolidated itself as a means of 
subsistence. Thus, a key point upon summarizing this period is that there is an unbroken 
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continuity of gold mining since, at least, the Incan conquest of this region. This means that the 
human population largely adapted to mining as the principal economic activity and by 
maintaining this orientation through generations, naturalized its existence as part and parcel of 
this place. 
 
Independence and the emergent Republic 
According to Murillo Carrión (2010: 62-3), the weakness of the Spanish crown at the turn of 
the 19th century was evident, and had been for a long time despite the Bourbon reforms (in 
particular the orientation towards free trade and government centralization). Revolution and 
independence was picking up momentum, typified by the Independence of the United States 
of America in 1776 and the French Revolution in 1789. The latter eventually led to the French 
occupation of Spain in 1808, and an accelerated weakening of Spanish colonial power. Yet 
according to Mora, even more important - though indirectly related to these historical events - 
was the autonomous movement in the colonies (2008: 61-3).  Powerful elites, who had gained 
economic power either as landowners or merchants, developed the hacienda system in 
tandem with their increasingly autonomous ambitions. As already mentioned, the hacienda 
system had its background in the encomienda institution and equally based itself on the 
exploitation of indigenous and Afro-American manpower. In practice, many encomenderos 
acquired large lands, i.e. haciendas for agricultural production. As colonial power diminished, 
revenues from this production were gradually directed into private hands, a tendency that 
consolidated the economic foundation for the revolution. Accordingly, as local elites gained 
economic power in and around the metropolis, colonial bureaucracy was conceived as an 
obstacle towards economic development. Hence, these elites (later to be renowned as 
latifundistas) entered the political scene with a progressive and autonomist agendav. Finally, 
in parallel with Napoleon invading Spain, this momentum of independence surfaced in the 
revolution in Quito (1808-1812). Although the colonial forces battled these uprisings in Quito 
and re-established its power, this was the beginning of the end for the Spanish hegemony 
(ibid. 63-8). Ten years later (1822) colonial independence was symbolized by the famous 
encounter in Guayaquil between Simon Bolivar (fighting his way south from current 
Venezuela) and San Martin (on his way north from current Argentina, Chile and Peru).  
The mines of Zaruma were partly abandoned during this period and the population 
continued to live, with a few exceptions, in a general state of poverty (Murillo Carrión 
2010:63-7). Yet, with the hope that a change of regime would improve the conditions, the 
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local oligarchy, supported the movement of independencevi. During this period agriculture, 
particularly sugar cane production, complemented and actually bypassed the economic 
importance of mining. Curiously, several observers attributed the poor health of the workers 
in the mines to what they believed to be exposure to natural deposits of mercury in the 
mountains (ibid. 60-1, 71). This did not make sense as the colonial exploitation of the mines 
and its subsequent beneficiation process had relied on the purchase of mercury from 
elsewhere (cf. the Bourbon decision to monopolize it and lower its price). Later on, the claims 
of mercury ores in the Zaruma mountains were refuted by Theodor Wolf who re-claimed this 
to be ores of barite (a mineral partly resembling mercury in color). Wolf, a German scientist, 
was hired by the young Ecuadorian government in 1876 to report on the mineral potential of 
Zaruma (ibid. 73-6). His detailed and elaborated studyvii reflected two important features that 
would eventually incentivize a major development towards the end of the century: 1) the 
mountains had rich ores of gold, silver, copper and zinc, and 2) the historical and present 
exploitation was inefficient and superficial. In other words and according to Wolf, economic 
success was merely dependent on solid investments.  
By this time, the Republic of Ecuador had seen the light of day (1830) after a short 
period as part of Gran Colombia, which included the territories of current Colombia, 
Venezuela, Northern Peru, Panama, parts of Brazil and Guyana. Struggling to consolidate 
itself during the first decades, the Ecuadorian Republic had three main centers; Quito - the 
capital, Cuenca - center of the Southern Andes region, and Guayaquil - a burgeoning center 
for commerce and export (Mora 2008:75-6). Zaruma related mostly to the renewed ambitions 
of the central government to exploit the mines and to become a strategic point for state 
revenues. Hence, the insistence of President Garcia Moreno during his last period of 
administration, led him to issue a decree of land expropriation in and around Zaruma in 1875, 
a decision that in practice meant the establishment of the first Ecuadorian mining concessions 
(Murillo Carrión 2010: 72). 
With these events, in particular Theodor Wolf´s encouraging report, mining was once 
again on top of the game in Zaruma, and private interests were increasingly attentive to news 
from this little mountain village. The first attempt however, consisting of a partnership of 
Ecuadorians and a Chilean company, failed to succeed because of a lack of capital and 
technical resources (ibid.). Nonetheless, some of the associates from this partnership 
continued to work and finally managed to get financial aid from England. Accordingly, in 
1880 the Great Zaruma Gold Mining Co. Limited was founded with a starting capital of 250 
thousand English pounds (ibid. 77). Shortly after, the Ecuadorian congress established 
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Zaruma as a canton in the new province named El Oro (The Gold), a structure that has 
persisted ever since. 
At this point, there was optimism about the regional development the new investments 
in mining would provide. In 1883, this was accentuated in a presidential decree to build a 
railroad connecting Zaruma with the Pacific coast. This decree, however, only materialized 
partially at a much later stage. Meanwhile, the remoteness of Zaruma turned out to represent 
an obstacle for the newly established mining companyviii. It was for instance problematic to 
introduce the machinery necessary to scale up the production. Faced with these challenges, 
success was highly dependent on sustained investments, and, inconveniently for the local 
partners, English investments were increasingly directed towards the newly discovered 
mineral reserves in South Africa (Murillo Carrión 2010: 78). Hence, despite the promising 
explorations made by the English enterprise, it failed to succeed. Nevertheless, the English 
attempt had received international attention and was paralleled by several mixed enterprises 
with both French and Chilean capital working on adjacent concessions. Motivated to attract 
foreign investments, the Ecuadorian congress had furthermore published El Código de 
Minería in 1887, very much based on Wolf’s reports, where detailed information about the 
mineral ores could be found (Astudillo 2007:12-21). A climax and a decisive moment was 
finally reached when the newly formed South American Development Company, with their 
backbone in the Vanderbilt Corporation, bought the English stakes and installations in 1896. 
This action was to commence a new mining era for Zaruma, and along with a number of 
things, the birth of Portovelo, as we know it today. 
 
Industrialization and corporate governance 
At the turn of the 20th century, the United States of America was a nascent giant ready to take 
over the world where England had left it. Companies like Standard Oil literally grew out of 
proportions and the fundamental basis for this proliferation was the aggressive exploitation of 
natural resources. After stealing all the lands from Native Americans on the North American 
continent, the big corporations, which essentially dictated the political scene as well, looked 
south towards Latin America. Both the Rockefeller and the Vanderbilt dynasties were eager to 
expand their corporate territory to include the continent south of Rio Grande. One of their 
actions was the establishment of an American mining company in Portovelo.  
 It is worth noticing that at this stage and until the economic depression during the 
1930s, the gold standard prevailed in most Western countries. The gold standard meant that 
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gold was the key value reference in the economic system. This essentially meant that SADCO 
exploited the gold in Zaruma, shipped it off to the US where the gold was sold and 
accumulated in the reserves of the US national treasury bank. With the prevalence of the gold 
standard, these reserves were directly correlated with the bank’s ability to print money, and 
directly correlated with the economic growth in the US. The revenues directed to the 
Ecuadorian economy on the other hand, were marginal. SADCO was practically exonerated 
from paying all patents on their mining concession and all import taxes during the 54 years of 
operation in P-Z (Murillo Carrión 2010: 85). 
 In 1896, SADCO acquired the rich concessions of the defunct English mining 
company and Quebrada Mining Company (a mixed enterprise including Theodor Wolf as one 
of the proprietors). Gradually, SADCO acquired more concessions and in 1924 it had 40 
square kilometres of exploitable land at its disposal. The work force was provided from the 
neighbouring provinces of Loja, Cañar and Azuay, particularly recruited amongst mestizo 
farmers and the indigenous people from Saraguroix (Murillo Carrión 2010: 83-4). The 
operations were highly dependent on the cooperation with the Ecuadorian State, yet 
considering this history (and also with a concern towards current Ecuadorian extractive 
development), it is as if the Ecuadorian governments reasoned the other way around, i.e. that 
their success was dependent upon SADCO’s success. Seemingly, the Americans dictated their 
own terms and conditions in P-Z, and when there were occasional protests like the strikes in 
1919 and 1935, SADCO received help from the Ecuadorian army to ¨calm things down¨. The 
economic power asymmetry between SADCO and the Ecuadorian state, especially during the 
Ecuadorian economic crisis around the First World War (partly due to a drop in cacao prices), 
was striking. Consequently, offhand comments like the following were overheard:  
the American businessmen felt so powerful confronted with the flimsy Ecuadorian State that their manager was 
saying; ´outside Ecuador I feel obliged to follow laws, yet on Ecuadorian territory it’s different, here I do and 
undo with a handful of gold´¨ (Ycaza 1983:233, cited in Murillo Carrión 2010:98, my translation)   
SADCO’s mining installations were totally different from any prior mining activity on 
Ecuadorian soil. In 1916, the symbolic Pique Americano was raised in Portovelo. This 40-
meter-high shaft construction served as a mechanical entrance and exit for both workers and 
minerals to the large mine underneath it. This mine was named Mina Grande or simply 
Portovelo, and had 13 levels (each level separated by 30 vertical metres) of tunnel systems. At 
the time of its construction, it was the deepest mine in the world, and it served to exploit some 
of the richest ores encountered in P-Zx (Astudillo 2007: 35). In 1918, a new processing plant, 
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with a capacity to process 300 tons of material a day, was constructed (finished the following 
year). It was designed to use cyanide potassium for the processing of the ore, but this 
technique was complemented with the use of mercury amalgamation. The tailings from the 
processing plant were scattered along the Amarillo River in what is currently the town centre 
of Portovelo (Murillo Carrión 2010:86-88).  
In 1923, SADCO had about 800 itinerant workers working 300 days a year and a work 
camp consisting of approximately one thousand people (91). At this stage Zaruma had 5000 
inhabitants (including Portovelo) and 70 Americans living in their own camp with their 
families. It was a segregated society with a clear hierarchy: the Americans on  top, followed 
by their most loyal mestizo workers and a few powerful families, subsequently followed by 
the workers of the mine and local lumberjacks providing wood for the mines, and lastly; local 
campesinos (both mestizos and indigenous) who combined their cultivation with informal 
subsistence mining (both small tunnels and alluvial panning)xi. It is worthwhile to say that this 
hierarchy is less clear today as the society and the economy is more diversified. Yet, in socio-
economic terms, the main structures prevail: large external mining companies are situated in 
the privileged end, while relatively poor campesinos/informal miners are found at the less 
privileged end.  
 In 1924, new ores were discovered and located. From this period, Ecuadorians were 
for the first time included into SADCO´s administration - in the beginning very restrictively, 
later more liberally, depending on merits and social position. However, some of these 
Ecuadorians became the most loyal defenders of the interests of the company contributing 
significantly to consolidate its power and exercise of powerxii. Later on, SADCO also 
managed to acquire influential individuals as their partners and lawyers to negotiate terms 
with the Ecuadorian government. (Murillo Carrión 2010: 93). Although the first labor 
movement was established already in 1912 (Asociación Protectora del Minero), its political 
power was marginal. Nevertheless, it produced the first strike in 1919 where SADCO was 
pressured to sign the (very basic) demands of the workers. Yet, few changes materialized (cf. 
89-90). The first significant confrontation on SADCO’s privileges came in the late 1920s 
through a series of denouncements. A law was signed in 1929 saying that all mining 
companies were obliged to pay income tax and tax on their mineral sales. In the Ecuadorian 
Parliament however, SADCO´s lobbyists fought for their company’s interests and managed to 
avoid this payment for a number of years (94-5). 
 The mechanism of corporate power persuading governmental politics was repeated 
throughout SADCO’s time in P-Z. It applies as much to tax avoidance as to the welfare of the 
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workers and literally any critical concern about this mining regime. Along with the above-
mentioned asymmetry in economic power, a key dimension to understand this is by 
considering Ecuador´s political instability. Between 1925 and 1948 there were 27 different 
Ecuadorian governments in charge, meaning that any reform attempted to increase state 
revenues or control of SADCO´s operations in P-Z, was at best of a temporary character 
(107). For instance, Federico Paez, the President responsible for aggressive military measures 
against the labor strike in 1935, was replaced by the progressive General Alberto Enriquez 
Gallo. The latter reviewed the mining contracts of SADCO, demanded the payment of 
royalties and tax, and actually sent military battalions to take control over SADCO’s 
installations in the beginning of 1938 (103). And while this act forced them to sign a new 
contract with the government, in 1942, during the government of President Arroyo del Rio 
(ex-lawyer of SADCO), the contracts were revised again, this time to the advantage of the 
company, yet maintaining the tax rate at 12% (108).  
 From 1945 the municipality of Zaruma began to receive 30% of the total amount of 
the taxes paid by SADCO, which importantly never benefitted the population of Portovelo, 
and thus may have contributed to the resentment of the latter towards Zaruma (ibid). Despite 
SADCO’s long hands into the Ecuadorian governments, there was a socialist movement 
picking up momentum around Latin America after the Second World War. In P-Z, the union 
movement had matured (e.g. organized across the country) partially as a consequence of the 
unfair treatment and in the end, SADCO’s manipulative power had diminished to the extent 
that the administration was considering a withdrawal from P-Z. Adding to these conditions 
was a tragic accident in 1946; a subterranean flood in the Portovelo mine, leaving the deepest 
levels with the richest ores under water (109). Besides the human tragedy, this was a 
significant economic drawback because the company was not able to recover these depthsxiii. 
In 1950, SADCO withdrew voluntarily from P-Z. Their official argument was a decreasing 
density of gold in the extracted ore, a development that would eventually leave the mining 
operation unprofitable (115)xiv. 
 There are several estimates of the total quantity of gold and silver extracted by 
SADCO during their 54-year presence in P-Z. Some of them are mentioned by Astudillo 
(2007: 75-6). Compared with the information presented by Dynasty Metals & Mining Inc, 
proprietor of ELIPE Ltd., who currently holds many of the old SADCO concessions, there 
seems to be a consensus on approximately 3,5 million ounces of gold (almost 100 tons of 
gold)xv. I will return to the issue of value in the next chapter. Here it suffices to consider that 
except for symbolic royalties and some infrastructure, this considerable amount of gold did 
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little to develop P-Z or Ecuador (cf. Astudillo 2007:75). In the words of Alfredo Valarezo, 
alias El Toro, a 96-year old informant, born and raised in the outskirts of Zaruma: ¨it only left 
us with some chopped forests, some contaminated rivers, and quite a lot of sick people¨.  
 With SADCO on its way back to the US, the Ecuadorian government decided to form 
a new mining company to continue where SADCO had left. CIMA S.A (Compañía Industrial 
Minera Asociada) was established as a mixed enterprise consisting of former workers and 
senior employees from SADCO, and the municipality of Zaruma (Astudillo 2007: 79-80). A 
major reason to embark on this endeavour was the sky-rocketing unemployment that came 
along with SADCO´s exit. The other reason was of course the never-ending search for gold 
and profit, this time increasingly in the hands of the Ecuadorian State. Ironically however, and 
as a consequence of the State’s lack of industrial mining experience/capacity, CIMA’s first 
manager was Geo A. Davidson, SADCO’s last manager (ibid.). CIMA was created through a 
Presidential decree (Nr. 518 from 9th of December 1952) that categorized it as an industrial 
company for social benefits with few tributary obligations. After four years, the senior 
employees holding 35% of the stakes sold out, leaving the company in the hands of the 
municipality of Zaruma and ex-workers from SADCO. The work force was reduced to 
approximately 500 persons, i.e. a third of SADCO’s workforce, and massive migration took 
place. Still, the most fundamental problem for CIMA, a problem that resonates with the early 
colonial breakdown of mining activity, was its lack of capital to invest in the mines and 
perform explorations. Accordingly, CIMA faced economic collapses one after another (ibid. 
80-95; Murillo Carrión 2010:135-9). Yet, amid this general decline, there were occasional 
discoveries of rich ores that provided a temporal boost in production, which importantly 
served to sustain the orientation towards mining. During the military dictatorships in the 
1970s however, CIMA’s decline accelerated and finally led to its bankruptcy in 1978. All 
installations and machinery was transferred to the Ecuadorian State, i.e. the Ministry of 
Natural Resources (Astudillo 2007:95). The mines on the other hand, were soon invaded by 
cooperatives of artisanal and small-scale miners who had either worked for CIMA/SADCO or 
in parallel as informal miners. And with the end of the last dictatorship in Ecuador (1979), a 
burgeoning ASGM sector was on the move in P-Z.   
    
Concluding remarks 
In this chapter, I have traced the history of mining in Zaruma back to its early days prior to 
and during Spanish hegemony. I have remarked upon the organizing principles of labor in the 
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colonies, and how the mita institution prevailed in the mines of Zaruma in analogy with other 
mines and exploitative modes of production in the New World. Furthermore, informality and 
opportunistic regimes related to gold mining in Zaruma surfaced instantly and in parallel with 
organized and formal mining regimes. And while the largest mine operators in long periods 
struggled to keep up the activity due to lack of investments, manpower and a number of 
problems in the colonial administration, the informal miners were more flexible to cope with 
these challenges. Hence, the latter consolidated itself as a means of subsistence for low-
income people throughout the colonial times. Likewise, in regards to the methods of 
processing the ore that was taken out of the mountain and rivers, I have noticed the early 
presence of mercury in the beginning of the 17th century. Undoubtedly, mercury was used 
alongside gravity concentration, but the point is that the use of quicksilver, which currently 
constitute one of the major environmental hazards related to ASGM, represented the 
conventional way to capture gold particles for centuries. Moreover, its unique property to 
capture gold is, if not magic, a technique that made gold tangible and a cheap and simple 
technique that has sustained the autonomous character of informal mining. Regarding the 
legacy of this informality, I have also illustrated that illegal gold business (i.e. revenues 
escaping royalties to the Spanish crown) was similarly reported in the beginning of the 17th 
century. Upon acknowledging the continuity of informality it is possible to discern this 
version of gold mining as a useful vehicle for local people - both as a means of subsistence 
and a means to autonomy - fulfilling fundamental human needs.  
 While informal mining came to proliferate with the collapse of CIMA in late 1970s, it 
always existed alongside larger mining schemes. Regarding the latter, the story of SADCO is 
emblematic for the history of P-Z, especially for Portovelo that originates from this 
company’s working camp. In huge contrast to artisanal miners, this company industrialized 
gold mining in P-Z to a scale only comparable to the largest, contemporary gold mines in the 
world. What I wish to emphasize here is that these large exploitative regimes, epitomized by 
SADCO, and preceded in various forms since the beginning of the colonial epoch, have not 
represented any major economic development of P-Z. The exception is the infrastructure that 
mainly served the mining regime itself and the jobs it sustained. Rather, as El Toro (my 96-
year-old informant quoted above) indicated; the history of mining in P-Z is much more a story 
of human and environmental pain, suffering and injustice. A mercantilist or more precisely, a 
bullionist dogma prevailed, not only during the Spanish hegemony, but also during SADCO’s 
hegemony in P-Z. The guiding rationality in this scheme was to extract as much gold as 
possible at the lowest possible cost.  
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While SADCO represented a significant increase in investment, this was only directed 
to the facilitation of exploitation. All other costs (wages and welfare measures) were 
notoriously minimal and accompanied by the company’s rhetoric of hard times and the need 
for austerity. The reality was truly a stunning contrast; SADCO made millions of dollars 
while the miners in P-Z who survived the dangers and hardship of this exploitative regime, 
were left with silicosis, tuberculosis and other chronic illnesses. No measures were taken to 
re-forest the hills, no measures were taken to mitigate the polluted rivers. Importantly, the 
political instability of Ecuador was partly a prerequisite for SADCO’s success, and the same 
phenomena is highly characteristic for Ecuador’s 50-year-old history of oil extraction in the 
Amazon. However, in the context of government regulation and responsibility seen through 
the eyes of local people in P-Z as well as indigenous people throughout the Ecuadorian 
Amazon, the Ecuadorian State has been a true accomplice in these happenings. In this picture, 
it is quite understandable that many people in P-Z bear a deep resentment towards the State 
who in turn continues to prefer large, external mining companies (who are supposedly easier 
to control and regulate) and, despite increased legal recognition, continues to marginalize 
artisanal and small-scale miners. The point here is that the process of interlegality as touched 
upon in the beginning of this chapter, is deeply influenced by this resentment towards any 
top-down legislation. Through the gaze of local history, top-down legislation has contributed 
to a resource curse (wealth ending up anywhere else but in P-Z), a situation of path 
dependency (mining is what we can so we continue to mine) and marginalization of artisanal 
miners. 
However, this history has also made gold mining an intrinsic component to the place 
and the people. In P-Z, mining is intimately linked to local identity, and to a degree that is 
only comparable to fundamental constituents like religion (Catholicism) and language 
(Spanish). Don Lucho’s remarks in the opening of this chapter indicates this intimate link 
between gold and life. Although his recent discovery of a golden ore at surface level may be 
quite unique in present times, his story and relation to gold and gold digging is representative 
for many old people in Portovelo. When I asked him if he really believed that this ore would 
prove as promising as the first tests had shown, he answered; ¨la naturaleza no me falla a mi¨ 
(¨nature will not let me down¨). In this comment, Don Lucho applies the term ¨nature¨ as a 
substitute for the economic relationship between resources and the markets (cf. Scott 
2010:212). This gives testimony to the commodification of nature, consolidated through 
centuries of contact with external markets, to become the ¨natural¨ and ¨objective¨ way to 
conceptualize nature in P-Z. In her book about mountain top removals (MTR) in the 
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Appalachian coalfields, Scott depicts the above-mentioned as far from a ¨natural¨ or 
¨objective¨ conceptualization, but rather as ¨a traditional white middle-class orientation 
towards the environment¨ (211), which ¨…reveal a cognitive separation between his own self-
interest, as reflected in his personal property, and the non-human nature threatened by MTR, 
which he considers a mostly altruistic concern for environmentalists¨ (ibid.). Hence, despite 
several cultural, political and economic differences between P-Z and the Appalachian 
coalfields, there is a commonality consisting in a ¨culture of extractivism¨ (8) which has 
naturalized both places as extractive contexts and shaped the morality of mining. I will return 
to this in chapter three. 
On the issue of legal pluralism and interlegality we can roughly conclude with Simon 
Thomas’ observations (2009:171-2) that the Spanish colonial hegemony was characterized by 
a segregationist model (Spanish laws co-existing with indigenous customary laws as long as 
the latter did not oppose or interfere with the former), replaced by an assimilationist model 
during the first century of the Republican era (customary laws becomes illegal and seen as 
obstacles towards building a nation) and finally, from the 1920s, by an integrationist model in 
which land reforms was founded upon certain recognitions of indigenous rights and 
customary laws. This last model has eventually led to full constitutional recognition of 
indigenous rights (and customary laws), as a result of a strong indigenous movement from the 
beginning of the 1990s and accordingly a shift from de facto to de jure legal pluralism. As 
mentioned above, indigenous customary laws are a much more comprehensive system that 
includes all domains of life resting its case on indigenous ontology and epistemology. 
Accordingly, it differs qualitatively (in scope and elaboration) from the norms of mining 
praxis among artisanal and small-scale miners. Yet if we conceive mining norms, in line with 
de Theije et al (2014), as an ¨engaging legal system¨ at odds with formal national legislation, 
there are some similar challenges for the Ecuadorian State. For instance, current national 
mining legislation (cf. the Mining Act of 2009 and Presidential decrees 119 and 120) contains 
a special framework for artisanal and small-scale miners that recognize many particularities of 
this kind of mining. Similarly, Simon Thomas (2009:167) observes that indigenous customary 
laws survived for centuries due to its local legitimacy and effectiveness, a trait that also 
applies to the norms that has guided mining praxis in P-Z. For instance, the use of mercury 
has been, and continues to be, widely accepted among artisanal miners, in addition to a long 
tradition of getting rid of mining waste and tailings in the rivers. Likewise, tax avoidance and 
informal gold commerce has been notorious through all stages and all scales of mining 
operations, and continues to prevail. Another commonality between indigenous customary 
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laws and local mining norms in P-Z, is that they are both markers of identity established on 
shared beliefs and values which ¨recognizes the need to resolve conflicts through negotiations 
and by reaching a common ground¨ (ibid.). This being said, the differences between 
indigenous customary laws and the normative framework of mining in P-Z, clearly outweighs 
its similarities, which again impedes a further comparative analysis here. My point however, 
concerns the issue of governmental regulation and in this gaze, both customary laws and 
mining norms are intimately linked to praxis (past and present) which, rather than subjugating 
itself to national mining legislation, confront and adapt to formal laws, i.e. the process of 
interlegality.  
The next chapter addresses the emergence of ASGM in P-Z and takes us into the 
present complexity.      
 
	
	
Notes																																																								i	There	is	much	to	say	about	this	economic	history	that	I	will	not	treat	here,	including	the	question	of	whether	or	not	traits	of	mercantilism	continue	as	a	constituent	element	in	modern	capitalism.	However,	for	the	curious	reader,	the	book	Ethnicity,	markets	and	migration,	edited	by	Olivia	Harris	and	Enrique	Tandeter	(1995),	may	provide	a	good	starting	point.	On	the	end	of	mercantilism	(and	the	beginning	of	liberalism)	this	is	famously	analyzed	in	the	criticisms	and	insights	of	Adam	Smith	(The	Wealth	of	Nations)	and	his	predecessors,	especially	John	Locke	(e.g.	Second	Treatise).	ii	The	Real	Audiencia	en	Quito	was,	after	a	series	of	decisions	back	and	forth,	resituated	to	belong	under	the	jurisdiction	of	what	was	then	the	new	Virreynato	de	Santa	Fe	de	Bogota	from	1739	(Mora	2008:53-4).	iii	See	for	instance	Kirsch	(2010,	2014).	iv	Essentially	this	is	a	question	of	structure	and	agency	(cf.	Giddens	1979).	The	point	here	was	to	accentuate	structures	that	contextualize	and	inform	individual	decisions	without	dismissing	the	potential	for	agency	or	resistance	to	the	same	structures.		v	The	Catholic	Church	also	played	a	pivotal	role	in	these	happenings.	Not	only	did	it	acquire	large	land	areas	(some	of	it	still	intact	today),	but	it	was	principally	loyal	to	the	Spanish	crown,	although	many	clerics	sympathized	with	the	movement	of	independence	(Mora	2008:	63).			vi	This	was,	however,	a	complex	process	where	the	local	administration	and	local	elites	in	Zaruma	changed	its	loyalty	several	times	in	an	opportunistic	fashion	(Murillo	Carrión	2010:	67-70).	For	a	further	reading	on	this	very	period	see	Salmoral	(1994).	vii	This	is	comprised	by	two	publications	of	Wolf:	Geografía	y	geología	del	Ecuador	(2006)	and;	Relación	de	
un	Viaje	Geognóstico	por	la	Provincia	de	Loja	(1879).	viii	However,	at	the	end	of	the	19th	century	there	were	several	private	mining	companies	at	place	in	P-Z.	See	Astudillo	2007:26-7	for	an	overview.			ix	Men	from	Saraguro	(saraguros),	a	small	town	in	the	Loja	province,	not	too	far	away	from	P-Z,	has	a	long	tradition	as	miners	and	represent	a	continuity	of	indigenous	manpower	in	P-Z.	Several	companies	have	a	tradition	of	hiring	these	men	to	work	in	the	mines	and/or	the	processing	plants.	For	instance,	BIRA	S.A.	(a	Guayaquil	based	family	company,	currently	the	second	in	size)	at	one	point	began	to	transfer	the	salaries	to	the	Saraguro	wives	and	not	the	men,	supposedly	to	keep	the	latter	from	drinking	away	their	money	(pers.	communication	with	well-informed	informants).				
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																																																																																																																																																																													x	The	great	wealth	extracted	stands	in	stark	contrast	to	the	pain	and	suffering	endured	by	the	mules	(who,	once	entered	the	tunnels,	never	returned	to	see	daylight	again)	and	miners	(facing	all	sorts	of	accidents	and	respiratory	illnesses)	without	receiving	any	compensation.	See	Astudillo	(2007:36).	xi	On	segregation	and	social	control	see	Murillo	Carrión	(2010:	125-7).	xii	On	the	issue	of	secret	agents	(SADCOs	men)	infiltrating	the	labor	movement	in	P-Z	see	Murillo	Carrión	2010:	96).	See	also	Nash	(1993)	for	a	similar	observation	from	the	tin	mines	of	Bolivia.	xiii	MINESADCO,	the	company	who	currently	exploit	the	old	Portovelo	mine,	is	still	struggling	with	this	flood.	They	pump	water	out	of	the	mine	24/7	but	are	only	able	to	operate	six	out	of	13	levels.			xiv	For	a	more	detailed	review	on	the	happenings	surrounding	SADCO´s	exit	see	Murillo	Carrión	(2010:	115-	7)	and	Astudillo	(2007:74-8).	xv	See	http://www.dynastymining.com/operations/zaruma		
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Dirt is matter out of place 
Mary Douglas 1966 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2: Contemporary complexity 
 
The emergence of the ASGM sector as we know it today began immediately after CIMA’s 
bankruptcy in the late 1970s. Miners who had previously worked for CIMA and/or SADCO, 
formed alliances, established cooperatives and organized among themselves to exploit the old 
and easily accessible mines. State interference was low and this development was largely 
fuelled by local resentment to national authorities who had failed to assist and develop CIMA, 
and also, more generally, failed to control and regulate mining concessions in P-Z (Sandoval 
2001: 3). The development of a highly informal ASGM sector in P-Z was paralleled by the 
emergence of the ASGM sectors of Ponze Enriquez/Bella Rica (a three-hour drive north-west 
of P-Z) and Nambija (in Ecuador’s Southern Amazon) in the beginning of the 1980s. A 
significant explanation to this was a peak in gold prices in late 1970s (see figure 3 below). An 
important difference however, was that the other ASGM districts emerged rapidly without 
any planning or control, literally transforming these places into chaotic contexts of mining 
and contamination in a matter of few yearsi. In P-Z on the other hand, not only did local 
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miners rely on a long history of mining, but many of them had experience from larger mining 
operations (SADCO/CIMA) and a capability to envision joint ventures transforming into 
smaller versions of the former. In essence, there was a strong entrepreneurial spirit about the 
development of the ASGM sector in P-Z, a development that articulated and reinforced itself 
with the emergence of numerous processing plants along the Calera and Puyango River 
during the 1990s (Sandoval 2001: 3). Additionally, relatively large actors, like BIRA S.A., 
were established already in the beginning of the 1980s, giving continuity to relatively large 
mining operations, and importantly; demonstrating to the rest of the sector, an undertaking 
that controlled large part of the mining cycle (exploration-exploitation-processing-smelting-
refinement-sale).  
In parallel with these middle-sized operations being established in P-Z, from the mid-
1990s, large companies like the Canadian-based TVX Gold Inc.ii commenced mapping and 
explorations in P-Z by reaching agreement with local miners. Their work was taken over and 
extended by IAMGOLDiii who purchased numerous concessions for prospection and 
exploration. According to Sandoval (2001: 28), IAMGOLD’s operations occurred under a 
strong cooperation with local miners, and little State interference, and the outcome produced 
mutual benefits. Yet the most significant benefits, it seems, came into the hands of Dynasty 
Metals and Mining Inc. who in 2003, after IAMGOLD was bought out by Mineaustralia S.A 
(a company owned by the general manager of Dynasty), was subsequently acquired by the 
former. And as we will hear more about, Dynasty is the mother company of ELIPE Ltd., 
which is the largest mining operator in P-Z.  
Meanwhile, while these corporations attempted to get their grip on the gold deposits, 
there was an abundance in artisanal mining operations going on as well. Young local men, 
often with close relatives working in the sector, applied the same technique as Don Lucho 
explained in the previous chapter, and quite literally found gold a ten-minute hike from their 
house. For instance, Juan, now a superintendent of a relatively large mine, explained to me 
that he spent the evenings and weekends of his youth mining the surface of ¨some hills¨ and 
obtained so much money that he did not know what to do with it. I confronted him with the 
fact that the gold price during the 1990s (the epoch he referred to) was relatively low 
compared to the accelerating growth from the turn of the millennium. His reply was plainly 
that there was an abundance of gold easily accessible. Juan was concrete and honest about the 
¨happy 90s¨ and said that once a week, he and his close companions sold off their material to 
one of the processing plants and subsequently went to ¨El Harem del Minero¨ (the local 
brothel) where they split their shares, occasionally spending half their money the same night. 
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¨I had no reason to worry¨, he said to me, ¨because I knew that I would obtain the same 
amount of gold or more the following week¨. Hence, Juan spent his school days supplying his 
classmates with whatever they wanted from the candy shop and gaining full economic 
independence while still a teenager. 
The point in this introductory vignette is to briefly pick up on the previous chapter and 
underline the co-existence of several kinds of mining operations that characterize the 
contemporary ASGM in P-Z. I have already remarked on how informal mining has a long 
continuity at the margins of larger and dominant mining regimes. This continuity continues 
today, but an important difference that came along with the exit of CIMA was the 
formalization of numerous local cooperatives and the emergence of a profitable business 
through the establishment of several processing plants. An emergent problem for the 
Ecuadorian State however, was that this development was dominantly conducted on an illegal 
basis with regards to the mineral commercialization (basically without any fiscal income) and 
quite literally by dumping all waste into the rivers. 
In this chapter I seek to untangle some of the present complexity involved in gold 
mining in P-Z. I will not be exhaustive because, in analogy to the history of mining, this is a 
long story that involves many areas that are better treated by others. For instance, there is a 
much literature on the processing techniques and its consequences for both the environment 
and human health, including long-term studies (Prodeminca 2000). I will be brief about this, 
yet highlight some relevant aspects. Likewise, it is possible to ponder at length on the issue of 
(economic) value related to ASGM in P-Z. I will be brief about this as well, but underscore 
the fundamental traits and developments. Most importantly, in a pursuit to understand current 
regulations and the challenges of interlegality, I will start this chapter with some remarks on 
current Ecuadorian mining legislation. I then continue to categorize the mining operations 
according to legislation, yet in the critical light of empirical observations. Subsequently, I 
focus on controversial and non-controversial (depending on one’s position) processing 
techniques and their inherent links to contamination. Lastly, I finish off with an analysis and a 
consideration of fiscal income and distribution.     
 
Ecuadorian Mining Legislation 
There are two key legal texts that frame mining operations in Ecuador – the Constitution from 
2008 and the Mining Act of 2009. Alongside these legal texts are the Presidential decrees 119 
(general regulations to the Mining Act), 120 (regulations for the special regime of small-scale 
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mining), and 121 (environmental regulations to mining activity). Much of the regulations in 
these decrees are incorporated in the latest version of the Mining Act of 2009 (reformed 18th 
of December 2015). Additionally, there are a number of guidelines and instructions related to 
specific areas within mining legislationiv,  
 In Ecuador, as in most countries, the Constitution sets the overall legal framework for 
other, more detailed laws. Regarding ASGM and other extractive industries, the Constitution 
is of particular relevance in the following areas: Article 71-74 on the rights of nature; Art. 
313-318 about the role of the State in its strategic sectors in which mining of non-renewables 
is consideredv; Art. 395-399 about environmental principles; Art. 400-403 on biodiversity; 
404-407 on national patrimonies and ecosystems; Art. 408 on natural resources; Art. 409 and 
410 on soil; and Art. 411/412 on water. These articles reflect a very ambitious governmental 
agenda in relation to the safe-guarding of the environment and indigenous cultures (cf. ¨a will 
to improve¨ in chapter 3). The State is entitled as the benevolent guarantor of ¨nature´s rights¨ 
(Art.71-74), yet importantly maintains its right to decide (through a Presidential petition and 
declared parliamentary support) to exploit natural resources anywhere on Ecuadorian territory 
(Art. 407). Regarding natural resources, the Constitution also highlights that ¨The State will 
participate in benefitting from exploitation of these resources in an amount that will not be 
inferior to the company that conduces the exploitation¨ (Art. 408, my translation).  
A legitimate question, in relation to the last quote and the mining companies, is: how 
is this compatible with the demand of 3% royalties from small-scale miners, 4% from 
medium sized miners, or 5% from large-scale mining (cf. Art.93)? A governmental 
representative would probably point to the different kinds of taxes that the companies are 
obliged to pay on top of the royalties. Still, such an assumption relies on a coherency between 
the amount of production being declared and the actual amount being exploited. In the case of 
P-Z, and I assume in other places as well, ARCOM does not have the capacity to monitor this, 
but simply rely on the trimestral reports offered by the mining companies. As I will illustrate 
in the case of ELIPE Ltd., who publish their production volumes online (and are categorized 
as small-scale miners who are not obliged to pay windfall tax), the idea that the Ecuadorian 
State is benefitting (economically) as much as this company is simply absurd.  
Yet, few miners in P-Z would agree that the State should gain as much on the mining 
as the companies do. In fact, this Constitutional idea contradicts the economic rationality in P-
Z that highlights a sense of justifiable equilibrium between investments (risk) and outcome 
(profit). Taxes and royalties are hardly prioritized due to a general scepticism towards the 
State and a disbelief in the rewards of paying tax. Illustrative in this regard is the observation 
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that the mining companies have struggled for four, five years to incorporate their workers in 
the social security system (IESS – Instituto Ecuatoriano de Seguridad Social). For the 
companies, this is an obligation and a legal requisite to operate. For the workers, this welfare 
system provides them and their immediate family with rights to a number of public goods 
(including hospital). Still, most miners were very reluctant to be incorporated and mostly 
requested to be paid the extra 30-50 dollars a month (corresponding to the amount employees 
must pay to keep their workers in the social security system)vi. 
Another progressive step taken by the Correa administration was the mining mandate 
of April 2008 (Mandato Constituyente Minerovii). This reform aimed at withdrawing all 
contracts of mining explorations that was not complying with national mining legislation (in 
particular the avoidance of paying patents and/or violating environmental criteria). It also 
aimed at eradicating the problem of many concessions in the hands of a few people, but 
importantly excluded the concessions that were under the phase of exploitation. The result 
was a partial revocation of about 500 mining contracts (Velasquez-Lopez 2010: 41). An 
additional and important step to avoid straightforward corruption and clientelism, was the 
exclusion of current and former public functionaries (and their families) within the Ministries 
of Natural Resources (including energy, oil, and mining) from purchasing any mining 
concession. The Mining Mandate also gave birth to the national mining company (ENAMI) in 
an attempt to secure more national autonomy, but given the lack of Ecuadorian experience in 
the mining ambit, this entity has been obligated to associate with its counterparts in other 
countries (particularly South-Correa, South Africa and Chile). As Sacher & Acosta (2012: 19; 
see also Bustamante & Lara (2012: 143)) on the influence of transnational mining companies 
and Ecuador’s cooperation with other governments) point out, this cooperation comes with a 
cost, namely the interests of these entities to develop mining projects in alliance with mining 
companies. Likewise, and following the critical analysis of these authors (particularly Acosta 
who participated in this process as President of the Constituent Assembly), the progressive 
aim of this reform was largely abolished in the end (Sacher & Acosta 2012: 20). Hence, in 
January 2009, negotiations were closed and the new Mining Act was signed without 
mitigating the monopolization of mining concessions and neither without eradicating the 
concessions held by ex-public employees (ibid.). In other words, despite a strong public 
opposition, the Correa administration manifested its belief in extractivism and corporate 
social responsibility as a driving force for the Ecuadorian economy, and accordingly, its 
growing disbelief in democratic participation. 
	 58	
Nevertheless, the Mining Act of 2009 provides for a substantial improvement in 
contrast to former legislative frameworks, especially the return of the State as the major 
player in relation to control and regulation (Sacher & Acosta 2012: 21). And despite its 
weaknesses, this is currently the major legal guideline, explaining several key principles of 
Ecuadorian mining politics. While the document contains detailed information about many 
aspects of mining that does not necessarily involve ASGM, the main principle that guides 
Ecuadorian mining legislation is that the latter explicitly holds the State as the owner of all 
subsoil resources on its territory. This opens up for the distinction between holders of a 
concession and the owners of land, in which the rights of the former to exploit subsoil 
resources outweigh the property rights of the latter. This is essentially the source to several 
conflicts caused by extractivism in Ecuador, which are entrenched in a contradiction between 
the safe-guarding of indigenous ancestral lands as recognized in the Constitution (e.g. Art. 57) 
and Article 407 that secures the State with the right to override all other considerations if in 
the ¨nation´s interest¨ to do so (cf. Art. 15 of the Mining Act). 
Given the lack of indigenous people in P-Z as a region, this last trait is hardly an issue. 
Still, the issue of mining concessions vs. property rights is a core problem since most 
concessions are held by a few hands. The case of ELIPE Ltd. is illustrative, as this company 
has obtained almost the same number of concessions as SADCO, essentially covering large 
parts of the cantons of Portovelo and Zarumaviii. Thus according to the law, ELIPE Ltd. can 
rightfully start exploration and exploitation anywhere in these areas as long as it is done 
according to legal procedures. This means that local landowners have no legal rights to 
oppose this, although they can call for a prior consent that, in the case of resulting against 
mining, can equally be overridden by the Ecuadorian State (leaning on Article 407). The 
problem in P-Z however, is not so much the issue of ELIPE Ltd. expanding their mining 
activities spatially (currently almost all of their exploitation is done in the Cabo de Hornos 
mine), but rather the fact that they hold the great bulk of concessions in relative perpetuityix. 
Bluntly put, there are no room for all the artisanal miners who refuse to, or cannot, pay the 
15% tributes ELIPE demand as payment for extracting minerals from their concession. 
Accordingly, the artisanal miners throughout the region of P-Z, albeit with the exception of 
the ones who have come to an agreement with other concessionaires, work illegally at risk of 
being sanctioned by ARCOM. This is the legal situation for numerous artisanal miners 
regardless of the fact that some mine minerals on their own property, a property that may 
have been in their family long before ELIPE Ltd., nor any existing mining company in the 
world, was even invented. 
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A key question in this regard is how ELIPE obtained all these concessions. The 
Mining Act is rather diffuse on this process, stating that concessions are given ¨through an 
administrative act¨ (Art. 31), or alternatively that this is done by the Sectorial Ministry 
through a public auction (Art. 29). However, it clearly states that this is solely the State’s 
domain and that the granting of mining titles is under the responsibility of the Sectorial 
Ministry (Art. 7)x. Still, I asked this question several times during fieldwork and immediately 
got more or less the same answer regardless of whom I asked: ¨well, that’s where politics 
enter the game¨ (pues eso es politiquería). Asking people working for ARCOM or INIGEMM 
(National Institute of Metallurgical and Geological Mining Research), the conversation would 
stop at this point as if they did not know more about it, or to hint that I should simply accept 
this. Contrastingly, talking to people without loyalties to the State, the comment of ¨that´s 
politics¨ was always followed up by accusations of top-level corruption as if that was all too 
obvious. Leaving these accusations aside, the history of ELIPE in P-Z reveals that it 
purchased both information and concessions through a chain of concessionaires highlighted 
by the presence of IAMGOLD, a Canadian company well established in Ecuador, who 
conduced explorations in P-Z between 1998 and 2003. Accordingly, ELIPE state that on top 
of the 3% royalties paid to the Ecuadorian State, they also pay ¨1.5% of net value to previous 
concession-owner¨xi. 
The legal complexity and inconsistencies in Ecuadorian mining legislation could be 
subjected to a thesis of its own where discrepancies between the Constitution and the Mining 
Act could be related to government ideology, property rights and conflicting 
ontologies/epistemologiesxii. Although this may be a useful exercise, it would be increasingly 
complicated by the fact that the legal documents are altered continuously. Not only is there an 
immediate archival history that reflects regulatory adjustments within the period of the Correa 
administration since 2007, but also profound differences between current legislation and 
previous Constitutions and, for instance the Mining Act of 2000. Furthermore, as I will show 
regarding the categorization of mining operations, the current Mining Act is severely 
manipulated according to interests and bias.  
Likewise, to complicate matters even more: when I confronted an ARCOM official in 
P-Z with questions regarding the Mining Act in February 2016, he sent me a version of this 
document modified in July 2013, saying that this was the latest and most valid version that he 
and his colleagues followed. It turned out however, that the Mining Act was modified once 
more in December 2015. Consequently, the ARCOM official and his colleagues were 
enforcing the previous version. This is not necessarily too dramatic as the documents are very 
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similar, but it illustrates that the dynamics of the legislation are even too fast for the people 
who are supposed to enforce it. Accordingly, it is not surprising that miners with (or without) 
a good will to implement and follow legislation, feel frustrated with all this legal fuzziness 
and frequently opt to ¨do things the way they have always been done¨. Lastly, just to confirm 
the frustration among miners, by taking a close look, there are actually two different versions 
of ¨the latest version¨ of the Mining Act, both claiming to be validxiii. Importantly, they both 
state that the use of mercury is prohibited in all mining operations (Art. 86), but one of them, 
in its very end, includes a ¨transitory disposition¨ saying that there is a two-year buffer to 
implement alternative processing techniques replacing the use of mercury. Moreover, this 
¨transitory disposition¨ is actually echoed in the 2013 version of the Mining Act, meaning that 
by 2015, time should have run out. However, if we take the version from December 2015, that 
includes the same disposition (referring to different years), to be the valid one, miners are 
given another two years to replace mercury. This seems to be the case, since ARCOM do not 
currently sanction the use of mercury although they were on the verge to do so (and despite 
the fact that they work with the 2013 version!). I return to the controversies of mercury in the 
following chapter. Meanwhile, the institutional structure of the mining sector, according to 
the Mining Act (Art. 5), is as follows: 
1. The Sectorial Ministry (under which lies The Ministry of Mining that was separated 
from The Ministry of Non-Renewable Resources (heavily focused on oil) in the 
beginning of 2015) 
2. ARCOM (Agency of Regulation and Control of Mining) 
3. INIGEMM (National Institute of Metallurgical and Geological Mining Research) 
4. The National Mining Company 
5. Local municipalities (only covering their corresponding competencies) 
As the focus of this thesis is legislation and its link to mining praxis, my main interest is the 
role of ARCOM. In the last chapter I include INIGEMM as well. The National Mining 
Company is, as far as I know, not present in P-Z and will not be analysed here. Likewise, and 
despite their potential influence (for instance in obtaining and redistributing capital stemming 
from mining rents), the municipalities of Zaruma and Portovelo are not scrutinized here. That 
being said, these municipalities have a strategic position, exemplified through the formation 
of CIMA after the era of SADCO. Additionally, there are many links between local 
miners/owners (with their respective interests) and bureaucrats working in these 
municipalities. My general impression is that the municipalities play an important role 
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protecting the interests of the local mining elite (including APROPLASMIN – Association of 
Owners of Processing Plants) and that they do a poor job obtaining funds that can be directed 
to public spending, i.e. improvements in infrastructure.  
Regarding the link between mining legislation and the mining sector, ARCOM is by 
far, the most important public institution. It is present throughout all mining contexts of the 
country, with a strategic headquarter in Zamora (capital of the province bearing the same 
name), which is home to the most aggressive expansion of large-scale mining projects in 
Ecuador. As the operational extension of the Mining Act, ARCOM is, as acknowledged by 
one of their officials during an interview, ¨the mining police¨. Chapter three is dedicated to 
the examination of ARCOM’s work in its context. For now, I continue to comment on the 
categorization of mining operations in P-Z.  
 
Categorizing ASGM 
According to the Ecuadorian Mining Act of 2009xiv there are only two categories of metal 
mining at work in P-Z, namely small-scale and artisanal mining. However, there are two 
companies who, by far, exceed the rest, both in terms of infrastructure and volume of 
production. These two companies, BIRA S.A. and ELIPE Ltd., only maintain themselves in 
the category of small-scale mining due to a favorable interpretation of the Mining Act. Hence, 
I have included the category of ¨medium mining¨ because I consider this to be the correct 
interpretation (reflecting the difference between these two companies and the rest) and to 
illustrate how large companies achieve un-just advantages. In the following I present the main 
characteristics of these three categories:  
 
1) Medium mining operations. According to the Mining Act (Art.133: Titulo…Cap. 1), 
the production volume in this category must range between 301 and 1000 tons of 
material per day in the case of subterranean minesxv. The two largest companies - 
BIRA S.A. and ELIPE. – have a capacity to produce even more than this. Both 
companies have obtained concessions in order to explore, exploit and process 
minerals. BIRA S.A. is an Ecuadorian family owned company (currently based in 
Guayaquil) operating in Zaruma since the beginning of the 1980s. It is worth 
mentioning that this company has obtained considerable local integrity in P-Z, 
especially in contrast to ELIPE, and that they have achieved this by engaging in local 
projects of reforestation and education along with a sustained focus on mitigating their 
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environmental impact.  ELIPE, as mentioned above, is a Canadian subsidiaryxvi that 
has obtained the great bulk of concessions in the P-Z region. Additionally, it has 
exploration concessions and large-scale prospects in the provinces of Loja and 
Zamora. ELIPE has a plant capacity to process 2400 tons of ore a day and the largest 
single mine (Cabo de Hornos) in P-Zxvii. 
 According to Art. 93 and Art.133: Titulo, Capitulo 1, the concessionaries in 
this category are obliged to pay 4% royalties on mineral sale, income tax, added value 
tax, and on utilities: 5% to the workers and 10% to the State. Additionally, they must 
also pay annual patents in relation to the size of their concessions and the state in 
which it finds itself, i.e. exploration-exploitation (Art.34).  
   
2) Small-scale mining operations. This category is home to numerous small companies 
and cooperatives in P-Z. The criterion set by the Mining Act is that their capacity to 
exploit and/or process ore material must not surpass 300 tons a day (Art. 138). They 
are obliged to pay 3% royalty on the sale of minerals. As with medium mining 
operators, small-scale miners are also obliged to pay patents, albeit according to a 
different scheme, in order to maintain their concessions (Art.34). These companies are 
also taxed on income, utilities and added value, but no windfall taxxviii.  
The companies and cooperatives are diverse in terms of their composition, but 
many represent a combination of local footholds and external capital (either from 
within or outside Ecuador). Likewise, there is diversity in terms of their organization 
regarding concessions – some have obtained concessions for 
exploration/exploitation/processing, while others rely on formal agreements 
(contracts) with the concessionaire. Alternatively, they operate on multiparty 
concessions with other companies or, more controversially but equally true: they 
operate illegally on the concession of a third party. 
 
3) Artisanal mining. The difference from small-scale mining, according to the 
Presidential decree 120 signed in Zaruma in November 2009 (Special Regulation 
Rules for Artisanal and Small Scale Mining), is that this category consists of 
individuals, families or cooperatives that mine only for subsistence with manual 
equipment (Delgado 2009). Furthermore and according to the Mining Act, artisanal 
miners cannot associate with foreign companies or rely on foreign capital (Art. 29). 
They are not obliged to pay neither royalties nor patents (Art. 134) and can pay their 
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income tax through a simplified tributary regime (Art.148). They can be formalized as 
legal, artisanal miners with mining titles and set up a mining contract with the 
concessionaire (Art. 18). Alternatively, they work illegally on the concession of a third 
party, either as landowners or by ¨making a deal¨ with the landowner, and/or without 
paying tributes to the concessionairexix. Importantly however, a specific feature of the 
special regulations on artisanal miners is that, with the exception of alluvial miners, 
they are not allowed to process their ore themselves, but obligated to do this in 
certified processing plants (cf. Art 134).  
This is roughly the categories of mining operations in P-Z without entering into details and 
idiosyncrasies. A general observation is that there is a continuum of decreasing control over 
the mining cycle (prospection-exploration-exploitation-processing-smelting-refinement-
mineral sale-closure of mining operation) with ELIPE Ltd. and BIRA S.A. in one end, and 
artisanal informal miners on the other (and the rest scattered along the continuum). While the 
former control the entire mining cycle only limited by gold price fluctuation and the 
government’s (absence of) regulatory measures, the latter only extract small quantities of 
mineral ore and are totally dependent on third parties to convert this into monetary values. In 
practice, this procedure consists in artisanal miners delivering a small quantity of high-density 
ore that is normally processed in small ball mills (¨chanchas¨) through the use of mercury 
amalgamation. As part of payment for this process, artisanal miners leave their tailings, which 
are then subjected to another round of processing (normally involving cyanidation) where the 
rest of the gold and silver is separated and refined. This hierarchy gives a special flavor to the 
ASGM in P-Z as it uncovers an exploitative business model between the owners of the 
processing plants and artisanal miners. In fact, this model is somehow perversely innovative 
in the sense that the processing plants who do the worst amalgamation job for the artisanal 
miners are also the ones making most money since they extract more gold in the second round 
of processing (cf. Miserendino et al. 2013: 714). Two additional aspects related to this 
categorization should be mentioned.  
First of all, the ¨favorable interpretation¨ of the Mining Act that enables the two largest 
companies to be categorized de jure as small-scale miners, needs an explanation. In the case 
of ELIPE, the company simply avoids being categorized as medium-scale (or large scale) by 
reporting the extraction of less than 300 tons of ore per day per concession. Currently, the 
company extracts minerals from five concessions in P-Z. Despite the fact that almost all of 
this ore comes from one single mine (with a descent and tunnel system that extends into 
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several concessions) which is subsequently aggregated in one large processing plant, they 
maintain themselves as a small-scale mining operation because of this convenient 
interpretation of the Mining Act. Accordingly, ELIPE pays the same royalty and tax rates as a 
mining company pulling out, say, twenty tons a dayxx. According to themselves, ELIPE has 
produced more than 70 000 ounces of gold since 2013, which is equivalent to almost two tons 
of gold, which again amounts to approximately 70 million dollars given a current gold price 
of 35 dollars a gramxxi. The sheer scale of this production, along with the fact that ELIPE 
holds the vast majority of mining concessions in and around P-Z, is apprehended as a 
governmental bias, i.e. as a governmental preference for large companies, by local miners. 
This creates friction both internally to the sector and resentment towards the State in its 
various representations (government, parliament, provincial administration, regulating 
authorities etc.). Furthermore, as a general point also applicable to BIRA S.A., these 
companies deliver their trimestral reports carefully fulfilling all legal criteria, but are never 
scrutinized any further. Due to the lack of capacity and/or unwillingness on behalf of 
ARCOM, to monitor the relationship between the volume of production from each 
concession, these companies can practically report whatever they feel convenient. 
Second, manipulation of information is not restricted to the largest companies, but is 
very much the operating norm for all companies and operations. Although it may be 
conceived as an important improvement that the companies report anything at all, and 
although there are different degrees of honesty at play among the companies/cooperatives, in 
a realistic and practical frame the categorization of the ASGM sector is, at best, a guideline 
for how companies should report and behave publically.  
The notorious difference between mining legislation and mining praxis is something 
everyone involved in mining matters in P-Z are very much aware of. To an outsider or anyone 
apprehended as a potential critic (including ARCOM or other authorities), the discrepancy 
between legislation and praxis takes the shape of a taboo where mining administrators expect 
workers/miners to speak rhetorically along the lines of the law. For instance, I repeatedly 
asked miners in the mines how long they worked during a day. I never got an immediate and 
straight answer to this, but always answers beginning with ¨well, it depends…¨. In the end 
however, the best answer I got came from a miner that, after some hesitation, finally said that 
he worked the amount of time allowed in the Law (lo que dice la Ley) without saying (or 
knowing) how much this is. Evidently, he said this out of fear that he would reveal the fact 
that he worked too much. Yet in fact, Art. 19 in Security and Health Regulations for the 
Mining Ambit, is not concrete on this and merely state that employers are obligated to secure 
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a responsible well-being of the employees.  
Likewise, in relation to Article 68 in the Mining Act that emphasizes employers’ 
obligation to provide for a secure and hygienic working environment for the employees, this 
is mostly done by putting up signs and internal instructions on the walls, and providing for 
helmets and reflexive vests. In praxis, the workers of the mines face numerous risks (extreme 
heat and humidity in deeper levels, gas and dust exposure, poor ventilation and poor, if any, 
communication possibilities with colleagues outside the mine) even in the most developed 
mines. In more rudimentary mines, the conditions are increasingly dangerous due to a 
notorious lack of investments in security measures. People die regularly because of cave-ins. 
In the processing plants on the other hand, the immediate dangers are less, but leveled by a 
continuous exposure to chemicals (especially the ubiquitous smell of cyanide and the 
occasional mercury vapor), dust and noise. Additionally, in several smaller processing plants I 
witnessed how tiny, shared bedrooms designated for the workers, were placed right beside the 
mills operating 24/7 – providing for a dubious atmosphere to rest after a hard day’s work.  
Simply put, there are numerous environmental and security concerns that fail to 
comply with Ecuadorian mining legislation, in fact there seems to be few installations that 
would pass through a prolonged and detailed inspection. This was clearly put by an 
experienced ARCOM official during an interview in which he underlined that: ¨if we 
(ARCOM) were to apply a strict interpretation of the Mining Act, we would simply have to 
shut down all mining operations. That is undoubtedly a fact¨7. Curiously however, ¨everyone¨ 
seemed to agree that, compared to an undefined past, there has been improvements regarding 
waste management and working conditions. Before I explore this contradiction any further, it 
is necessary to have a closer look at the processing plants situated in the infamous Pache and 
El Salado further downstream in the Puyango River. As I have suggested, the position and 
workings of these processing plants is a key to understand internal power relations, which 
again serves to build an argument explaining why (not merely affirming that ASGM pollutes 
heavily here as elsewhere) unsustainable mining praxis prevails in P-Z.    
 
The processing plants  
As mentioned, during the 1990s a number of processing plants (currently 87) were established 
along the Calera, Amarillo and Puyango River. Today, these plants process ore not only from 																																																								7	Si	hubiéramos	implementado	la	Ley	según	una	interpretación	estricta,	hubiéramos	tenido	que	cerrar	todas	
las	operaciones	aquí.	Eso	si	es	un	hecho.	
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P-Z, but also from other ASGM districts like Ponze Enriquez/Bella Rica, Nambija and even 
Northern Peru. The establishment of the processing plants facilitated a much larger 
throughput of ore, but also increased contamination. This contamination is essentially due to 
the discharge of tailings and waste containing mercury and sodium cyanide, lead, arsenic and 
other heavy metals/chemicals into the rivers. To be specific, estimates from 2011 suggest that 
the total amount of tailings and mining waste dumped into the Puyango River was about 880 
000 tons annually containing approximately 650 kilos of mercury and 6000 tons of cyanide 
(Veiga et al 2014: 541). As this river eventually flows into Peru before it reaches the Pacific 
Ocean, this has created a geo-political tension between the two countries (Nichols et al 2015). 
There are rumors of large lawsuits, but on closer inspection (talking to authorities), the 
problem is so far treated in diplomatic terms. What is clear, however, is that there is an 
increased pressure on the Ecuadorian government to take action on river contamination.  
When the processing plants were established they were located and designed to release 
tailings into the river. Today, as we can recall from the opening story of this thesis, this 
practice is considered as an act of environmental crime according to current legislation (cf. 
Art. 81 and 86 of the Mining Act). In fact, all processing plants are obliged to either create 
their own tailings pond in accordance with environmental standards issued by the Ministry of 
Environment, and/or deliver their tailings by trucks at the communal tailings pond located 15 
minutes from Portovelo. Faced with the increased attention on mercury mitigation, especially 
after Ecuador signed the Minamata Conventionxxii in 2013, the processing plants have, at least 
officially, opted for cyanidation and in some cases flotation to process the ore. In the 
following, I briefly outline these processes as to give the reader an idea of the technical 
features involved. Admittedly, there are several publications that give much more detailed and 
elaborate descriptions of these processes and their consequences (see for instance Seccatore et 
al 2014; Veiga et al 2014; Miserendino et al 2013; González-Carrasco et al 2011). 
 All processing plants have some kind of mills (most commonly ¨Chilean¨ mills) to 
grind the ore that miners deliver by truck. The ore is mixed with water in these mills and the 
conventional technique is to pass the milled ore through sluice boxes containing woollen 
blankets that captures the minerals. The blankets are ¨washed¨ in a recipient and the minerals 
are henceforth concentrated and accumulated. This primary technique captures between 40 
and 50% of the gold in the original material (Veiga et al 2014: 541). A fast, yet inefficient 
technique, is then to pan this concentrate with the use of mercury, to obtain an amalgam 
consisting of gold and mercury (and potentially other minerals as well). In order to withdraw 
the mercury from this amalgam, it is burned at high temperature (ideally in a retort), which 
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causes the mercury to evaporate into the air. In the end, the miners who deliver the material 
that pass through this process, is left with a small ball of gold (with varying degrees of purity) 
which amounts to about 30% of the gold content in the original material (ibid.). This 
technique is essentially the same as observed by Fray Vásquez de Espinoza in the beginning 
of the 17th century (cf. chapter 1). Indeed, it is inefficient, but it is fast and do not require very 
much investment. And regardless of scientific analyses emphasizing its inefficiency, it is 
importantly, ¨the way it has always been done ¨, and a constituent praxis in the habitus of 
informal mining (cf. chapter 4). 
 Another widespread, more recent, technique to process ore with the use of mercury is 
through an amalgamation process in small ball mills (¨chanchas¨). Here, mercury is 
introduced in the mill with the ore and the water and thus the panning is avoided. This is a 
faster way to amalgamate (especially coarse gold from small amounts of high-grade ore), but 
¨more mercury is pulverized and lost with the tailings during the grinding¨ (ibid.). Similarly, 
the amalgam is subsequently burned to remove the mercury and the artisanal miners are 
likewise left with a small ball of gold. This process (amalgamation through the use of small 
ball mills) has proliferated in the processing plants and highlights the exploitative business 
model as referred to above. As mentioned, it also causes more mercury release than the 
traditional technique (gravitation/sluice box/woollen carpets/panning). However, this praxis 
seems to be decreasing with the pressure to eradicate the use of mercury and, for larger 
operators, upon noticing its inefficiency.   
The next step for the artisanal miners, who often do this on a weekly or monthly basis, 
is to sell their little ball of impure gold to a buyer (who buys according to the international 
price with a penalty depending on purity, quantity and the art of bargain). These buyers are 
often either local miners/processing plant owners or merchants purchasing these small balls of 
gold for a low price, accumulating for some time, and then finally smelting and refining the 
gold before selling it to gold traders. These gold traders comprise another, highly 
controversial level of analysis if we were to follow the entire chain herexxiii. Here, it suffices 
to say that local praxis of gold trade does not discriminate between gold traders with or 
without a certificate to legally trade in gold, neither regarding the destiny of the gold or the 
origin of the money. The important thing, seen from the perspective of the local traders, is to 
get a good deal without taking too much risk.     
Cyanidation, i.e. the leaching of mineral ore with use of agitated cyanidation tanks, is 
currently the most conventional way to process ore in P-Z. Both ELIPE Ltd. and BIRA S.A 
apply this method in combination with gravity concentration, and so do the vast majority of 
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processing plants (including their predecessors SADCO and CIMA). BIRA is additionally 
building a flotation pool in order to process old tailings and separate more minerals 
(particularly copper) and also concentrate fine gold that escapes the cyanidation process. 
Anyhow, cyanidation is applied to both gravity-concentrated ore and mercury contaminated 
tailings left by the artisanal miners as part of the payment for the service. This concentrate is 
either leached with cyanide in carbon-in-pulp or through the Merrill Crowe process 
(Velsaquez–Lopez et al 2011: 1127-29). This last process involves adding lime to the cyanide 
solution (to obtain a ph level above 10), and 12 hours’ agitation cycles repeated about three 
times. Omitting some of the technicalities here, cyanide basically dissolve the ore and the 
minerals. Gold and silver particles are then captured with the use of zinc shavings (hence, the 
success of cyanidation in general is largely dependent upon an optimal grinding that expose 
gold particles, i.e. gold that is hidden in larger host particles will not be recovered). This 
process is repeated until there are no visible traces of gold/silver in the zinc shavings. At this 
point the cyanide solution (no longer containing gold that this system is able to capture) is 
discharged into the river (or ideally into a tailings pond). Figure 1 illustrate this process.   
 
 
Figure	1	(retrieved	from:	Velasquez-Lopez	et	al	2011)	describing	the	Merrill	Crowe	process.	Hg	is	mercury,	Au	is	gold,	Zn	is	Zinc.	
 
The former process is preferred by many miners that rent this service because it is cheaper 
and faster than the Carbon-In-Pulp process. Still, the latter is gaining grounds in correlation 
with a decrease in amalgamation and the use of small ball mills. Carbon-In-Pulp process 
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essentially means that activated carbon is added to the cyanide solution after about 12 hours 
of leaching. These carbon particles capture the gold particles and are subsequently isolated 
and subjected to a 72 hours’ treatment in a hot solution containing ethanol among other 
chemicals. This solution is sent to an ¨electrowinning process, depositing gold onto cathodes¨ 
(Velasquez-Lopez et al 2011: 1128). Lastly, the cathodes are subjected to elution and/or 
electrolysis, i.e. the process of separating minerals from each other (essentially gold and 
silver).  
While there are advantages in using Carbon-In-Pulp over the Merrill-Crowe process 
(cf. Veiga et al 2009: 1379), the latter is much more efficient to extract mercury, in the cases 
where the cyanide solution is contaminated with mercury (Veiga et al 2014: 542). However, 
the advantage of mercury capture in the zinc shavings (Merrill Crowe) is not taken into 
account as miners burn the zinc shavings to obtain the gold, thus causing mercury to 
evaporate into the air (543). Figure 2 portrays the different processes: 
 
 Figure	2	(retrieved	from:	Veiga	et	al	2009)	illustrating	different	processing	techniques.	Hg	is	mercury.	
 
The main advantage of using cyanidation instead of mercury amalgamation is that miners 
capture much more of the gold (and silver) content in the ore, and if cyanide and other 
chemicals are handled carefully, it is also a cleaner process (Velasquez-Lopez et al 2011: 
1131)xxiv. If cyanide is not handled carefully, which is largely the case in P-Z (cf. Veiga et al 
2014: 542), the only advantage of its implementation is the improved ability to capture more 
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gold. Moreover, as cyanide solution containing mercury is discharged into the river, these 
substances form mercury-cyanide complexes that increase mercury mobility in water (ibid.: 
543; for a nuancing of this problem see Guimaraes et al 2011). 
 The last innovation regarding processing techniques in P-Z is flotation. Flotation 
essentially consists in milled ore being discharged into a pool where chemicals are applied to 
recover mineral particles (Hinton et al 2003: 104). This technique has been established in 40 
processing plants with a daily capacity to process between 30 and 100 tons and has the 
advantage of recovering copper that escapes both mercury amalgamation and cyanidation 
(Veiga et al 2014: 542). Additionally, the operators avoid using both cyanide and mercury and 
are also able to capture finer grains of gold that escapes the other techniques. The outcome of 
flotation is a mineral concentrate that must subsequently be smelted and refined in order to 
separate the minerals. However, based on metallurgic analyses of the degree of different 
mineral contents, these concentrates are sold directly to large smelters in Peru and China 
where this last process is accomplished (ibid.). Although this essentially means to move some 
of the contamination elsewhere, flotation has a potential to mitigate the local environmental 
impact of gold processing (cf. BIRA is also currently advancing this technique).  
There are additional alternative techniques to the ones described above, especially 
systems involving gravity concentration and centrifuges (Hinton et al 2003:104-5), which are 
implemented in a few modern processing plants in P-Z. However, the main obstacle to these, 
and flotation, is high implementation costs. And along with high implementation costs; the 
fact that all of these techniques are more time consuming than mercury amalgamation. This is 
a problem for relatively poor and impatient artisanal miners that rely on immediate economic 
feedbacks from the hard work invested in the mines. Thus, I largely agree with Veiga et al 
concluding that: 
The labour division between ¨rich¨ processing centres’ owners and ¨poor¨ miners introduces a huge hurdle for 
the evolution of the cleaner technologies and for equitable division of gold production. This is, in fact, creating 
more pollution. (…) They (artisanal miners) become trapped in the scheme of the processing centres and accept 
less than 30% of the gold extracted from their ores. (2014:543, my emphasis in italics) 
These authors suggest that the main solution to this development is education and training of 
the mining sector, and consider P-Z as one of many ¨examples of good progress¨xxv by 
comparing it to ASGM in Peru and Colombia (ibid.). I cannot tell if this is an obligatory 
statement due to their own ¨progressive¨ involvement in P-Z or if it stems from relativizing 
success with failures elsewhere, but I find it curious that they ignore their own observation of 
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an evident power asymmetry when it comes to suggestions for the future. Put differently, how 
far will education and training resolve this exploitative mining regime? Why such an 
avoidance to confront the problem of power relations and social injustice?  
The ¨success¨ of P-Z, they say, is due to 1) strong investments from the private sector, 
2) international training co-operation efforts, 3) active participation of miners in decision-
making, 4) more presence of the government in mining sites and 5) involvement of good local 
technical people (ibid.). First of all, one could certainly be critical to what kind of success 
they are talking about here, especially considering recent media reports featuring an increase 
in contamination and severe health consequencesxxvi. Secondly, one can critically ask how 
many artisanal miners are among the ¨active participating miners in decision-making¨, and be 
suspicious that these are in fact the most powerful miners (and/or processing plant owners). 
Third and related to the second, these authors portray the problem basically as a technical 
question, i.e. how to become more efficient and lower pollution rates. I consider this 
conclusion highly problematic because it avoids addressing the power relations and politics 
behind the governance of ASGM in P-Z. Furthermore, these authors are fundamentally 
enthusiastic that gold mining ¨…provides jobs for a large contingent of local people and 
sustains other social activities in the community¨ (ibid.), an attitude that echoes the rationality 
inherent to extractive industries (this is also echoed in Nichols et al 2015 and Miserendino et 
al 2013). As touched upon in the introduction, and as I shall continue to suggest in the next 
chapters, this is a key aspect to the problem because it represents a hegemonic world-view 
that obscures alternative visions of future development.     
More generally, while it is easy to sit back and critically examine the way processing 
plants should improve their praxis, many administrators and workers of these plants consider 
the move from mercury to cyanidation as a substantial improvement and talk of the latter as 
the sustainable path towards the future. In huge contrast to a person considering these 
substances from an outside perspective (especially people with environmentalist sympathies), 
for miners in P-Z cyanide and mercury are conceived as useful and positive substances. 
Empty barrels of cyanide are even used as trash cans throughout the urban areas of Zaruma 
and Portovelo. Not only do mercury and cyanide facilitate the recovery of gold that is 
otherwise hidden inside rock material. In P-Z they are per excellence the main ingredients in 
transforming nature into a commodity. 
Before I turn to examine the workings of ARCOM and the way mining legislation is 
enforced, I am going to finish off this chapter with some consideration on the economic value 
generated by the ASGM sector in P-Z. I have touched upon this in the passing, but in the 
	 72	
following I outline the major features and tendencies related to the value of gold. 
 
Is it worth it?  
The ASGM sector in P-Z is the centrifugal mining centre for scattered mining activities in the 
highlands of the province of EL Oro (la parte alta), which includes the cantons of Piñas, 
Atahualpa, Chilla and the eastern parts of Santa Rosa and Pasaje. Not only gold but other 
minerals (silver, copper, zinc, cadmium, lead) are extracted along with material for cement 
and construction (i.e. non-metal mining). Given this dispersed mining population, it is hard to 
accurately delimit how many people are involved in ASGM in P-Z. Accordingly, estimates on 
people directly employed in mining varies between 6000 (Miserendino et al 2013: 713) and 
10 000 (Veiga et al 2014: 541). These numbers also depend on where one draws the line 
between mining activity and its related services (i.e. the boundary between direct and indirect 
links to mining). At any rate, most people acknowledge that ASGM is the economic engine to 
the whole region (the highlands of El Oro) with long arms into other sectors on a provincial 
level (in particular banana and shrimp industries), investments on a national level (mining 
companies with footholds and interests in other parts of Ecuador), and capital flow into 
international corporate hands (epitomized by ELIPE/Dynasty Metals). 
 Estimates on total annual gold production in P-Z have somehow settled on 
approximately 9 tons (Nichols et al 2015; Veiga et al 2014; Miserendino et al 2013). This 
estimate is based upon the assessment of APROPLASMIN (cf. Veiga et al 2014: 541), which 
is the local Association of Processing Plant Owners. This association may have done this in 
good faith, but there is no description of their methodology anywhere (at least to my 
knowledge). Furthermore, what is relevant here is that APROPLASMIN represent strong 
interests to underreport on extracted quantity to avoid pressure of fiscal payments. 
Contrastingly, Astudillo (2007) estimated annual gold production to be between 10 and 15 
tons already ten years agoxxvii. I am being rather meticulous about these numbers because they 
certainly matter. In fact, if we think of regulation of the mining sector excluding national 
legislation, politics and its enforcement, it is clear that the major variable dictating the 
intensity of the ASGM sector is, along with input prices, the international gold price. Figure 3 
gives us an idea of the variations of gold prices.  
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Figur	3	(retrieved	from:	http://goldprice.org/)	illustrating	the	fluctuation	in	gold	price	during	the	last	40	years.	See	particularly	the	peak	in	1979,	which	in	essence	marked	the	start	of	ASGM	in	P-Z	as	we	know	it	today.	
 
What needs to be taken into account here is the general process of inflation in parallel to 
fluctuations in gold price and the fact that Ecuador switched currency from sucres to US 
dollars after the financial crisis of 1999-2000. Hence, the peak in gold price during the last 
years must be considered in the light of increased living expenditures which were 
considerably less before the turn of the millennium. Nevertheless, the peak in mid-2011, when 
a gram of gold was valued at 60 dollars, crystalized a major momentum for the miners in P-Z. 
With this value, even low-grade ore was being processed and the local economy flourished. 
As mentioned above, during fieldwork for this thesis, the gold price was stable around 35 
dollars (recently increasing to 40), and there were widespread complaints on ¨low gold price¨ 
(esta bajo) among miners. Although this ¨culture of complaints¨ is a cultural trademark 
among the miners (always emphasizing challenges/difficulties instead of profitable aspects), 
they conceived this ¨low price¨ in relation to increased input prices and increased transaction 
costs in order to comply with the increase in governmental regulations. More controversially, 
some miners even complained that there was a significant increase in the actual amount of 
money sufficient to bribe governmental authorities (ARCOM) when these threatened to 
sanction or close operations. According to miners and the service sector indirectly dependent 
on mining, the sector as a whole was currently passing through a crisis due to these 
circumstances. 
The controversy and the relativity of the above-mentioned could be discussed at 
length. Yet instead I wish to examine the recent development of fiscal tributes from the 
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mining activity, as to suggest how much economic value is actually left in P-Z compared with 
how much economic value that is generated. First of all, as I remarked upon in the beginning 
of this chapter, the mining cooperatives/companies are obliged to pay patents on mining 
concessions, royalties on total revenues and several taxes on top of these. Artisanal miners are 
excluded from all these with the exception of income tax (that is in practice, never paid). Still, 
although neither artisanal nor small-scale miners pay much tax, many spend their money 
locally and thus pay aggregated value (IVA) on the products they buy. Secondly, according to 
Article 93 in the Mining Act, 60% of the amount of paid royalties is to be directed to the 
localities from which the resources were extracted. Some of this money is channeled towards 
the local municipalities, some of it to the provincial level (Gobierno Provincial). Yet, this 
mechanism is increasingly accomplished by pooling tax and royalties in a central institution 
(Ecuador Estrategico) that finance public spending on project basis. Hence, in order to take 
advantage of Ecuador Estrategico, local or provincial initiatives must develop projects and 
apply for finance from this institution. One example of this was the financing of the 
communal tailings pond in El Tablón, a fifteen-minute drive from Portovelo. 
In the following I present the fiscal tributary development during the last six years. I 
have chosen to include the canton of Machala in addition to Zaruma and Portovelo as a point 
of reference and to illustrate that fiscal income do not necessarily follow the location of 
resource exploitation (there is little, if any, mining in Machala). Rather, this income seems to 
be channeled into the canton where the company is registered. This is of course, a matter of 
increasing concern regarding larger and foreign companies (cf. Panama Papers)xxviii. Both 
tables are elaborated by the use of statistics presented by the Ecuadorian tax service (SRI) and 
all numbers are in US dollars.xxix 
 
 
Canton/Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Zaruma 1 472 466 2 351 838 3 792 109 4 128 998 3 703 423 6 577 889 
Portovelo 737 065 963 749 1 989 945 5 315 100 8 109 583 6 845 909 
Machala 54 758 664 67 720 101 83 601 387 92 592 221 115 382 291 127 141 573 Table	1	showing	all	fiscal	income	(not	restricted	to	mining).	
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Canton/Year 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Zaruma 192 762 314 367 442 231 617 834 391 567 728 979 
Portovelo 50 735 83 978 201 312 769 089 1 764 291 1 229 969 
Machala 1 134 542 1 735 840 2 503 546 3 230 476 3 356 989 3 393 762 Table	2	showing	fiscal	income	from	mining	royalties.	
 
Several aspects can be commented upon here, but I will limit myself to two main 
observations. Importantly however, the Ecuadorian tax scheme has been relatively stable 
during these six years and the same royalty rate has prevailed. First, let us be moderate and 
for the sake of simplicity say that the ASGM in P-Z produces 10 tons of gold annually and set 
the gold price at 35 dollars a gram (echoing the lowest point during this whole period). 
Additionally, I leave silver, copper and mineral concentrates out of the equation although this 
also comprises a substantial income. Then we do the math: 1 kg of gold equals 35 000 dollars, 
1 metric ton equals 35 000 000 dollars and 10 tons equals 350 000 000 dollars. 3% (royalty 
rate) of 350 million dollars is 10,5 million dollars. As table 2 indicates, there has been a 
steady increase in fiscal royalty income, but at best (in 2014 and 2015), the three cantons 
taken together generated about five million dollars. Second, if we compare these numbers to 
the unparalleled and historical peak in gold prices from 2010 to 2013, royalty income is 
stunningly low. Consider for instance the combined fiscal income of Zaruma and Portovelo 
during 2011, when gold prices reached 60 dollars a gram. If we are moderate (again) and set 
the gold price for 2011 at 50 dollars and similarly assume that 10 tons of gold was extracted, 
P-Z generated half a billion dollars this year. The total and combined (Zaruma and Portovelo) 
fiscal income was approximately 2,4 million dollars (not restricted to mining taxes), while 
fiscal income from mining royalties in Portovelo was about 84 thousand dollars, and 314 
thousand dollars in Zaruma. 
 This essentially leaves us with one big question: where does all the money go? I am 
afraid I have no good answer to this. My point is rather that the money ends up anywhere but 
in P-Z (for a similar, yet more general observation, see: Sacher & Acosta 2012: 57-9). It may 
be the case that fiscal income from royalties flow into the cantons where the mining company 
is registered and/or has its headquarter. The question would then be if tax authorities in these 
other cantons manage to distinguish royalties stemming from mining activity in P-Z from 
other royalties (or other fiscal income), which would be a requisite to secure that 60% of this 
income is redirected to P-Z. I have repeatedly and insistently tried to get authorities and 
miners to comment upon this question without luck. Nevertheless, the correlation between 
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income from royalties and fluctuations in the international gold price is highly inconsistent 
(royalties slightly increasing while gold prices significantly decreasing). Besides this, 
royalties, as much as total fiscal income, are very low compared to the economic values that 
are generated. In sum, this indicates that the ASGM sector in P-Z largely operates outside the 
national tax system with unknown commodity chains and unknown capital flows.    
In this regard it would be legitimate to ask: What are the local municipalities and 
provincial administrations up to here? And why is there an absolute silence from local people 
in the face of this skewed distribution? However, as the previous chapter indicated, this is 
rather the general characteristic of wealth distribution generated by mining activity in P-Z. In 
other words, while mining has and continues to sustain the livelihood of the local population, 
all major profit has flowed into other places: first to centralized Incan authorities, then to the 
Spanish crown, then to the Vanderbilt corporation (during SADCO’s hegemony), then to a 
handful of stakeholders in CIMA (eventually leading to its bankruptcy) and lately, in more 
disperse ways, into the hands of the largest contemporary companies (ELIPE and BIRA) and 
the segment of processing plant proprietors. 
Instead of merely conceiving this as something unjust or unusual, this observation 
rather resembles the conventional story of the extractive context and echoes the concept of 
resource curse.xxx Thus, when I ask if it is worth it, I essentially question the rationality of 
extractive industries with a critical perspective on the distribution of wealth, which is utterly 
accentuated if we acknowledge the enormous externalities that are generated by ASGM in P-
Z along with the fact that the industry have done little, if anything, to remediate its ecological 
impact.  
 
Concluding remarks 
This chapter has been presented in order to provide for an analysis and description of the most 
central features of the contemporary ASGM in P-Z. I have contextualized the mining 
operations within Ecuadorian mining legislation, remarked upon several weaknesses in the 
latter and problematized the discrepancy between law and praxis. An underlying argument is 
that legislation, which I have characterized as highly problematic and highly dynamic per se, 
is somehow irrelevant given its minimal influence on mining praxis. Rather as the last section 
illustrates, economic premises and praxis is the heart of the self-regulating mechanisms in the 
sector and this corresponds to the regulating structures throughout the long history of mining 
in P-Z. Mining generates local jobs, sustains the local economy and generates investments 
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into other sectors. Still, there is considerable surplus being directed elsewhere, that is, into 
corporate hands and illegal commodity chains. 
 By scrutinizing the processing techniques to capture and refine minerals, it has been 
possible to discern some of the contaminating consequences of the mining activity. In 
particular, mercury and more recently, cyanide are locally conceived as benign substances 
that essentially transform nature into a commodity that can be sold in the markets. 
Externalities, i.e. ecological consequences with very real and high costs in an environmental 
economic perspective, have never been taken into account by the mining sector, and only 
recently during the last 15-20 years (due to research and increased governmental concern) 
been addressed. A central argument however, is that much of the research that has identified 
contamination and malignant health consequences has failed to address the political reasons 
behind this praxis. This apolitical research, which is highly influential on government politics, 
has increasingly identified mining praxis as a technical problem while sustaining the logic of 
exctractivism as fundamentally positive for local development (i.e. something that can be 
improved with more efficient techniques). This chapter has critically questioned this 
assumption and provided evidence to the fact that profit from mining in P-Z mainly covers 
local subsistence needs, while the ¨big money¨ ends up elsewhere. Not only can this be related 
to current exploitation; it represents a clear trend throughout six centuries of mining history. 
 Accordingly, and given these observations, the current process of interlegality in P-Z 
is characterized by non-compliance with national mining legislation that struggles to 
harmonize itself with high environmental ambitions in the Ecuadorian Constitution and the 
government’s commitment to a neo-extractive model. There is no opposition to mining in P-Z 
and the aim of this government, as its predecessors, is merely to increase fiscal income, while, 
at least rhetorically, mitigate environmental consequences. In the next chapter I will describe 
and analyze the enforcement of mining legislation. Here on the other hand, I have shown that 
this mining policy reflects a governmental preference for the largest actors, presumably 
generating more direct fiscal income and less contamination, and accordingly an accentuation 
of the marginal position of local, artisanal miners. This creates two important effects. First, a 
general and widespread resentment towards the State, which contributes to undermine any 
progressive article (emphasizing the importance of the environment and/or security) in 
national mining legislation. Secondly, it creates a lock-in for numerous artisanal miners who 
are dependent on processing plants to benefit anything at all on their mineral exploitation. 
Processing plant owners take advantage of this situation and consolidate their power both in 
relation to artisanal miners and the Ecuadorian State – the former by means of economic 
	 78	
exploitation and the latter by means of drawing on local integrity/autonomy in opposition to 
government regulation and control. As we shall see in chapter four, this last trait includes the 
ability of the local mining elite to mobilize large strata of the local population to demonstrate 
against any State intervention. 
 Thus, in contrast to the existent research emphasizing the complexity of contamination 
and human health consequences due to ASGM, I have argued that this is just one component 
in a larger complexity that involves a problematic mining legislation, a continuance of 
governmental marginalization of artisanal miners, problematic internal power relations, a 
formal economy that leaves practically no profit for public spending in P-Z and the existence 
of a vast illegal economy. Without presenting any hard evidence on this last dimension, 
according to the absence of local wealth and several testimonies indicating illegal trade of 
capital, minerals and inputs across the Peruvian border, there are strong reasons to suggest 
that the network (mafia) controlling this parallel economy, in practice regulates the sector 
much more than the government authorities (ARCOM) that are supposed to do this. 
Unfortunately, and symptomatic perhaps, I do not have much empirical material as to 
illustrate and sustain this. Instead, in the next chapter I turn to examine the role of ARCOM in 
their field encounters with miners and workers of the sector.             
 
 
 
 
Notes																																																								i	Particularly	the	case	of	Nambija	illustrates	this	where	thousands	of	fortune	seekers	arrived	to	mine	for	gold	during	the	1980s	and	90s.	A	large	landslide	in	1993,	essentially	a	collapse	of	the	mountain	where	both	mines	and	dwellings	were	situated,	caused	a	human	tragedy	with	the	death	of	approximately	200	people.	The	number	of	fatalities	varies	in	different	sources.	Here	I	rely	on	a	recent	newspaper	article:	http://elpais.com/elpais/2016/01/11/planeta_futuro/1452516408_109500.html	ii	In	2003,	TVX	Gold	Inc.	was	taken	over	by	Kinross	Gold	Corporation	(www.kinross.com).	These	are	truly	the	prototypes	of	corporations	engaged	in	the	exploitation	of	precious	metals	(and	human	labor)	throughout	the	world.	iii	For	an	account	on	IAMGOLD’s	operations	and	the	concept	of	corporate	social	responsibility	in	Azuay	province	(Ecuador)	see	Velasquez	(2012).	For	a	brief	explanation	of	the	motives	for	local	resistance	see	Latorre	Tomás	(2015:	22).	For	an	example	of	IAMGOLD	in	Surinam	see	De	Theije	et	al	(2014).	iv	These	can	be	retrieved	online	from:	http://www.controlminero.gob.ec/?page_id=525		v	Not	only	have	President	Correa	reiterated	his	belief	in	mining	as	one	of	the	most	crucial	sectors	for	Ecuador,	but	emphasized	that	any	opposition	to	this	is	¨infantile	and	ignorant¨.	Interestingly	he	says	that	Ecuador	has	to	take	advantage	of	¨its	last	gram	of	gold¨.	For	a	three-minute	video	of	this	see:	Enlace	Ciudadano	numero	422,	2nd	of	May	2015:	https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mD90CKx_MbM		vi	There	is	a	political	debate	on	this	system	because,	in	practice,	citizens	of	Ecuador	have	rights	to	school	and	medical	treatment	regardless	of	their	membership	in	IESS.	Still,	the	rights	are	expanded	with	this	membership,	especially	relevant	regarding	pensions	and	prolonged/complicated	medical	treatment.	
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																																																																																																																																																																													However,	the	implementation	of	this	welfare	system	has	largely	been	a	success	for	all	the	informal	workers	in	Ecuador	that	previously	had	very	few	rights.		vii	For	an	explanation	and	download	see:	http://www.accionecologica.org/mineria/acciones-legales/1178-mandato-costituyente-minero	viii	A	useful	tool	to	see	updated	and	digital	maps	of	concessions	in	P-Z,	or	anywhere	in	Ecuador,	is	the	Geo-Portal	on	ARCOM´s	homepage.	See	http://geo.controlminero.gob.ec:1026/geo_visor/	ix	According	to	Art.	36	in	the	Mining	Act,	concessions	are	given	for	25	years	at	the	time	and	are	renewable	as	long	as	a	new	petition	is	filed	before	this	period	ends,	along	with	a	favourable	report	from	ARCOM	and	the	Ministry	of	Environment.		x	Interestingly,	Bebbington	et	al	note	that,	until	2008,	the	Ecuadorian	State	was	obliged	by	its	own	law	to	grant	mining	concessions	whenever	a	person	or	a	company	requested	one	and	that,	once	given	it	could	be	renewed	every	thirty	years	(2008:	909).	xiI	retrieve	this	information	from	Dynasty	Metal´s	home	page:					http://www.dynastymining.com/operations/zaruma	xii	See	Arsel	et	al	2014	for	an	insightful	discussion	of	some	of	these	dimensions.	xiii	The	two,	different	versions	can	be	retrieved	from	the	section	of	¨laws¨	(leyes)	under	the	rubric	¨normative	tributes¨	on	the	Ecuadorian	government´s	homepage:	www.sri.gob.ec		xiv	I	refer	here	to	its	latest	version	that	was	reformed	in	December	2015.	xv	Any	metal	mining	that	exceeds	1000	tons	a	day,	in	the	case	of	subterranean	mines,	is	considered	large-scale	which,	related	to	the	tributary	system,	is	also	obliged	to	pay	windfall	tax.	xvi	Owned	by	DYNASTY	METALS	and	MINING	Inc.	xvii	See:	http://www.dynastymining.com/investors/fact-sheet	xviii	According	to	Miserendino	et	al	(2013:718),	referring	to	article	93	in	the	Mining	Act	of	2009,	on	the	issue	of	royalties	and	tax,	small-scale	miners	only	differ	from	industrial	(large	and	medium	sized)	miners	by	paying	less	royalties	(3	instead	of	5%)	and	thus	paying	the	same	amount	of	tax.	The	law	is	not	clear	about	this,	and	I	agree	that	it	can	easily	be	interpreted	as	Miserendino	et	al	do.	However,	when	reading	the	reports	of	Dynasty	Metals,	which	is	the	proprietor	of	ELIPE	Ltd.,	it	is	explicit	on	the	fact	that	it	has	managed	to	be	categorized	as	a	small-scale	miner	and	thus	avoid	windfall	tax	(see:	http://www.dynastymining.com/operations/ecuador-mining-legislation).	xix	On	an	interesting	observation	of	resentments	created	by	the	categorisation	small-scale	and	artisanal	miners,	which	in	practice	creates	an	incentive	to	be	categorized	as	artisanal	miners	(less	bureaucracy,	less	regulations	and	less	taxation)	see	Miserendino	et	al	(2013:	718).	xx	This	is	of	course	proportionally,	i.e.	ELIPE	Ltd.	pays	their	tax	on	larger	amounts	of	income	and	thus	generates	more	state	revenues	compared	to	the	mining	company	that	pays	the	same	percentage	on	a	smaller	amount	of	money.	xxi	Their	latest	report	was	published	in	January	2016:	http://www.dynastymining.com/investors/fact-sheet.	One	could,	of	course,	question	its	reliability,	yet	on	production	estimates,	it	is	principally	a	tax	advantage	to	under-report.	Here	I	use	it	merely	as	to	indicate	their	scale	of	production.	xxii	The	Minamata	Convention	on	mercury	is	a	global	treaty	towards	mitigating	the	use	of	mercury.	See:	http://mercuryconvention.org		xxiii	On	illegal	Ecuadorian	gold	trade:	http://www.planv.com.ec/historias/sociedad/el-oro-sucio-ecuador-sale-avion-desde-guayaquil.	On	¨dirty	gold¨	from	Ecuador	and	Peru:	http://www.planv.com.ec/investigacion/investigacion/oro-sucio-la-pista-detras-del-london-bullion-market	xxiv	In	contrast	to	mercury,	which	is	a	heavy	metal,	it	is	actually	possible	to	destroy	cyanide	components,	i.e.	detoxify	it	with	the	use	of	microbial	species.	See	Ackil	&	Mudder	(2003)	xxv	It	is	commonly	agreed	across	different	stakeholders,	that	there	have	been	improvements	(the	eradication	of	child	labour	and	to	some	extent,	improved	waste	and	chemical	management),	especially	with	the	establishment	of	a	communal	tailings	pond	in	mid-2014	where	the	processing	plants	are	obligated	to	leave	their	tailings.	However,	there	is	controversy	surrounding	the	infrastructure	of	the	pond,	which	I	can	assure	is	not	in	an	optimal	shape	and	furthermore,	a	widespread	observation	that	the	processing	plants	only	deliver	symbolic	quantities	of	tailings.	Another	major	prospect	of	improvement	is	the	plan	to	establish	a	22	km	pipeline	for	waste	and	tailings	from	the	processing	plants	along	the	Calera	River.	This	has	been	a	joint	initiative	between	INIGEMM	and	APROPLASMIN,	but	has	yet	to	become	a	reality	due	to	bureaucratic	obstacles.	xxvi	See:	http://expreso.ec/actualidad/el-legado-toxico-de-la-fiebre-del-oro-NC224935,	and;	http://expreso.ec/actualidad/mercurio-prohibido-pero-en-venta-BY230047.		
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																																																																																																																																																																													xxvii	I	discussed	this	with	Astudillo	on	two	occasions	(July	2015	and	January	2016)	and	although	it	is	tricky	to	make	a	coherent	estimate	(utterly	complicated	by	the	processing	of	ore	from	other	ASGM	districts),	mining	activity	tend	to	correlate	with	international	gold	prices	that	have	peaked	significantly	during	the	last	ten	years.	Considering	this	and	acknowledging	the	notorious	culture	of	underreporting	production	numbers,	we	concluded	that	the	annual	gold	production	in	P-Z	could	be	as	high	as	20	tonnes.  xxviii	This	may	be	of	little	surprise	anymore,	but	there	are	strong	reasons	to	believe	that	ELIPE	have	notoriously	avoided	compliance	with	mining	regulations,	exported	all	its	minerals	overseas	and	placed	their	profits	in	the	British	Virgin	Islands.	See:	http://www.ecuadorreview.com/in-depth-ecuador/investigations/ecuadors-dirty-gold-is-transported-to-the-us-on-commercial-flights	xxix	Ecuadorian	Tax	authorities	are	named	SRI	(Servicio	de	Rentas	Internas).	All	numbers	are	available	online:	http://www.sri.gob.ec	xxx	For	Ecuadorian	examples	on	resource	curse	see	Acosta	(2013).	For	Ecuadorian	examples	of	the	related	phenomena	of	¨accumulation	by	dispossession¨	see	Latorre	et	al	(2015).			
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The capitalist economy of the present day 
is an immense cosmos into which 
 the individual is born, 
and which presents itself to him, 
at least as an individual, 
as an unalterable order of things 
in which he must live. 
- Max Weber 1905  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3: A will to improve? 
 
Uptown Portovelo, quite close to where SADCO had their headquarters, there is a writing on 
the wall saying: ¨No tengas miedo a fallar, ten miedo de no intentar¨ (Don´t be afraid to fail, 
be afraid of not trying¨)i. It is signed by ¨Acción Poética de Portovelo¨ (Poetic Action of 
Portovelo – see picture above). In the context of Norway this would have resonated with the 
arena of sports and a general encouragement to participate. In Ecuador, this quote refers to 
love, to keep on searching for love. In the specific context of Portovelo on the other hand, the 
quote may easily be interpreted in relation to mining. Here, the slogan refers to thousands of 
miners that have, throughout its history, invested their efforts in the mines, occasionally 
succeeding, and occasionally failing. Through this interpretation, the quote contains an 
element of dignity recognising the people who died or lost everything while engaged in 
mining and a praise to keep on trying. In other words, the quote glorifies the hardships of the 
past as much as it incentives and legitimizes the continuation of gold mining on an individual 
basis. 
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 Another feature that distinguishes P-Z is its sharp contrast to social processes in so-
called Not-In-My-Back-Yard (NIMBY) contexts. In the latter, the logic is basically that 
people are positive to the idea that industries (extractive or not) will provide for economic 
development, yet only if the industries establish and operate at a certain distance from their 
livelihoods (Menegaki & Kaliampakos 2014). A slightly different logic was revealed one day 
a bit further up-town from the picture above. Along with a local friend and Jose Luis (the 
photographer), we were invited into a small house, some 20 meters from Rio Amarillo that 
runs through the town. The owner of the house, a man in his 70s and a friend of him, wanted 
to show us an old radio from the times of SADCO. He had managed to purchase this massive 
radio at an auction and explained to us that the SADCO administration used it to 
communicate with their headquarters in New York. We shot some pictures in the room where 
the radio was placed when Jose Luis suddenly noticed a hole in the back of the room (see 
picture above). I had also noticed it, but mistakenly taken it for a fire place (ignoring the 
tropical conditions surrounding us). Jose Luis asked what it was and the old man responded: 
¨Well that’s just my old mine, I don’t exploit much from that one these days.¨8 The old man 
said this in a laid-back tone, emphasizing that the mine didn’t produce any value and was 
practically useless. For us on the other hand, the fact that the man had a mine entrance inside 
his ¨living room¨ was rather fascinating. Contrastingly, the old man’s communication 
suggested that this was as normal as having any furniture. He simply hoped that gold prices 
would soon increase again, resembling the phrasing people invoke when they hope for better 
weather.      
 This thesis is largely a testimony of how this attitude permeates life in P-Z. In fact, the 
naturalization of gold mining as a way of life is so strong among some of the miners that it 
resembles radical, religious faith. In some cases, these two elements are actually combined as 
the general proliferation of Pentecostalism in Latin America is also at play in P-Z. Typically, 
this involves a change in life style from a materialistic and sinful life depicted in a 
stereotypical image of the miner as a hardworking, hard-drinking womanizer, towards 
religious faith and puritanism (see chapter four). The constant variable however, is gold 
mining, and this indicates that the activity is compatible with highly contrasting moral beliefs. 
 Following the rationality of mining as a benign activity which is largely shared among 
miners and non-miners in P-Z, the issue of regulation in the form of national mining 
legislation is provocative. It is provocative because it is apprehended as restrictions on the 																																																								8	Ah, bueno, eso es una mina vieja…ya no saco nada de ahí.	
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dimension of poverty alleviation and local capital accumulation. Furthermore, it shakes the 
very fundaments of a rationality in which mining is foremost life-giving and thus questions 
the legitimacy of local identity. Immediately, local miners point to their legacy and the fact 
that gold mining has sustained people through generations and continues to do so today. This 
rationality applies as much to gold mining in P-Z as it does to the oil and gas sector in 
Norway, although the latter is a much more recent example of extractivism. Yet, the list is 
long on this point; coal in the US, Australia and China (and many other places), mineral 
mining in Chile, Bolivia, Peru and South Africa (and many other places) and oil in the OPEC 
countries. Examples of this rationality are not restricted to, but epitomized by fossil and 
mineral resource exploitation. A fundamental question today however, as sustained in global 
dialogues on climate change and environmental conservation, is how to leave this extractive 
history behind. Beneath this question, lies the contradiction between extractivism and 
sustainability, which seems profoundly incompatible despite of (or because of) public 
awareness on the hegemony of extractive rationality since the industrial revolution.  
Although the mechanism in this contradiction is simple, it becomes highly complex 
when embedded in numerous institutions and particularly to ideas of modernity, progress and 
development. James Ferguson (1999) eloquently illustrates how these ideas are themselves 
influenced by a Western imagination about the ¨third world¨ (in his case Zambia and Africa) 
as backward and in need of (Western-colonial) guidance. Ferguson demonstrates how 
material progress and modernity is created through extractivism and the inclusion of Zambia 
into the global economy, and how the stark decline of copper production not only led to 
economic exclusion, but consequently to ¨a state of abjection¨ (236) where mine workers felt 
betrayed by the promises of modernity. In a linear conceptualization of progress and 
modernity (the imagery of modernity), Zambians regarded this as a declining backloop from a 
story of success that was essentially predicated upon capitalist accumulation of Zambia’s 
natural resources. For Zambian mine workers, says Ferguson, the sense of abjection entailed a 
distinction between being hung up (while talking on the phone to someone who befriended 
you for several years) and that of never having a phone in the first place (238). Zambians 
were given a phone, but subsequently, hung up. 
Scott on the other hand, illustrates how the ¨culture of extractivism¨ is predicated upon 
the commodification of nature, which ultimately rest on the modern separation of nature and 
humans (2010: 8). In Scott’s book, this is largely articulated in the ¨jobs-versus-the-
environment aphorism¨ (10) where the culture of middle-class white workers in the 
Appalachian coalfields dominantly favours the industry at the expense of the environment. 
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For Scott, this preference is deeply shaped by the extractive logic which places mankind as 
masters of nature. This is consolidated by the industry’s practice of gender segregation 
leaving high-paid, environmental destructive working positions for white men (14). Yet the 
main premise here, one which has also been achieved in P-Z, is to create the idea of the place 
and space as fit for extractivism, or by recalling the words of Voyles (2015), a ¨wastelanding¨, 
that is, a place rendered pollutable. Hence, Scott’s Appalachian coalfields have long ago 
obtained the public imagery as a ¨resource colony¨ (2010:13), an achievement that currently 
facilitates and legitimizes the rather drastic practice of Mountain Top Removal.  
Similarly, in P-Z the long history of mining and the hegemonic rationality of gold 
mining create substantial hurdles for control and regulation, but more fundamentally, the 
public association of P-Z as foremost a context of mining (and not as a place amid bountiful 
cloud forests stretching up towards the Andes massif) naturalizes the continuance of mining. 
As previously discussed, the trademarks of the ¨culture of extractivism¨ in P-Z are: a long 
mining history, the absence of opposition including the relative absence of the ¨indigenous 
element¨, extensive informal mining activity, dominance of a few mining companies (in terms 
of economy and concession rights), the strategic position of the processing plants, and 
permeating all of this; a notorious practice of non-compliance in relation to both fiscal tributes 
and environmental/security standards.  
This is the situation that governmental authorities face in their attempts to improve the 
mining sector in P-Z. I borrow the term ¨will to improve¨ from Murray Li (2007), along with 
her remarks on how problems, practices and places are rendered technical by governments 
and governmental programs (7). In the introduction of this thesis I remarked, in line with 
Murray Li, how this leads to the observation that ¨questions that are rendered technical are 
simultaneously rendered nonpolitical¨ (ibid.). In the previous chapter I illustrated how this 
articulates in relation to the on-going research on ASGM in P-Z, where the controversial 
mining/processing practice is essentially reduced to apolitical questions of technical and 
instrumental nature. Murray Li attributes this practice to the role of ¨trusteeship¨, which she 
defines as: ¨the intent which is expressed, by one source of agency, to develop the capacities 
of another¨ (4-5). To a large extent and despite her nuancing of this, Murray Li portrays 
government authorities (in alliance with colonial powers, and later on, several development 
programs) in Indonesia as ¨bad guys¨ and local population as marginalized victims. 
Nevertheless, she underlines that the objective of trustees (i.e. political actors and experts of 
various kinds) is not necessarily to carry any hidden agendas (9), but essentially grounded in a 
benevolent intention to improve the state of affairs (5). Yet one of the problems, according to 
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Murray Li, is the position of trustees as experts, which includes the act of defining the 
problem as to improve the lives of others. Trustees entitle themselves with power and 
authority, which leaves them in a fundamentally tricky position in relation to claims of 
autonomyii.  
In the context of P-Z, I regard the role of government officials (ARCOM, INIGEMM, 
MAE and Ministry of Work) as trustees which are supposed to communicate and enforce 
Ecuadorian mining politics. While ARCOM and the ministries are directly engaged in the 
enforcement, they are heavily informed by INIGEMM, which again is heavily influenced by 
the research referred to in the previous chapter. In line with Murray Li, I consider their 
collective efforts as a rather straightforward benevolent attempt to improve the conditions of 
the ASGM sector. Yet as I have illustrated, this will to improve is made complicated by the 
historical observation that Ecuadorian governments have largely failed to empower artisanal 
miners and continued to marginalize these at the benefits of larger operators (especially 
considering the politics of mining concessions). This is pivotal in order to understand the 
culture of non-compliance amongst miners because it suggests that the historical failings of 
the State have created a general and widespread resentment among the former towards the 
latter, and that most ¨big money¨ is continuously channelled out of P-Z.    
 Furthermore, in an attempt to nuance a conventional political ecologist narrative 
where local, marginalized people are dominantly portrayed as victims, I suggest that this is a 
complex relation, and that the governmental concern to control and regulate artisanal and 
small-scale miners (i.e. the will to improve) is not solely driven by neo-liberal interests, but 
by solid empirical evidence about environmental degradation and malignant human health 
consequences. This latter observation shows that the apolitical research is, in a sense, valuable 
and instructive with a potential to inform on pollution and controversial mining/processing 
techniques (as it informs this thesis). Yet it fails to inform us on the political-economic 
situation that creates and sustain this practice. And, by ignoring or avoiding this last trait, it 
sustains the rationality of extractivism and corporate social responsibility (CSR), which 
essentially reject critical and nuancing voices from emancipating. In their own view, these 
researchers are the only ones criticizing mining praxis in P-Z, an act they believe is improving 
the sector both through informing authorities and by directly engaging with technical 
assistance in the field. It is somewhat hypothetical to suggest how much this research has 
improved the state of affairs and how much of this hypothetical improvement is due to the 
presence of ARCOM and its sanctioning practice. Nevertheless, what is not hypothetical and 
to a large extent the shared consensus (among people external to the mining sector) on the 
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current situation, is that mining practice in P-Z continues to produce severe contamination of 
rivers and soil, which translates into extensive health risks for both the people working in the 
sector, as well as the people living here and downstream. As mentioned, the legacy of mining 
involves a historical marginalization of artisanal and small-scale miners that cannot merely be 
placed on the shoulders of the current government. Although the efforts of the Correa 
administration accentuate this asymmetrical relation by its instrumental approach and its bias 
towards large mining operators, I have also argued that this situation is sustained by skewed 
internal power relations in P-Z.  
I will return to some aspects of the above-mentioned in the next chapter. In the 
following however, I will address how this will to improve articulates when enforced in the 
field through two distinct ethnographic accounts of ARCOM operations. Before and after 
these empirical accounts I reflect on their implications and how they can be conceived 
through the concept of governmentality and the process of interlegality. 
 
Apply all the laws you got, but don’t shut us down 
It should be quite clear when considering the strong legacy of (informal) mining, the 
complexity of the current situation and the inconsistencies in Ecuadorian mining legislation, 
that the task of enforcing control and regulation on this sector is all but easy. Perhaps this 
partially explains the fact that the regional coordinator of ARCOM in El Oro has been 
substituted four times during the last year (2015/2016). The delicacy of this task was also 
illustrated by the outspoken ARCOM official in the previous chapter, who said that all mining 
operations in P-Z would simply have been shut down if legislation were to be strictly 
enforced. I have already remarked that mining legislation seen through the perspective of its 
enforcement is essentially a story of everyday negotiations between regulators and miners. 
What must be taken into account however, is that ARCOM and MAE have a combined staff 
of 15 inspectors in situ, (14 and 1 respectively) while the number of miners range somewhere 
between 6 000 and 10 000. Although governmental control is, at least in theory, facilitated by 
camera surveillance of the processing plants along the riversiii, it would be an impossible 
assignment to enforce mining legislation on an individual basis. Hence, ARCOM and more 
generally, the Ecuadorian mining authorities rely on some sort of government, which Michel 
Foucault famously defined as a ¨conduct of conducts¨ (1991: 48). Or, by evoking the 
dimension of power and authority, we can say that the success of ARCOM depends on what 
Murray Li leaning on Gramsci’s conceptualization of hegemony, describes as; ¨an amalgam 
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of coercion and consent¨ (Murray Li 2007:25). ¨We have to change their culture¨9 was 
repeated, not only among ARCOM officials, but also among representatives from MAE and 
the provincial government. Yet, instead of saying how this could be achieved, they all 
somewhat assumed that this would happen with continued enforcement of mining legislation.  
Applying the perspective of interlegality, I have argued that this concept can be used 
to acknowledge norms as operating laws in a situation of de facto legal pluralism. And as we 
have seen through some examples, these norms comprise a mining praxis at odds with the 
national legislation (e.g. waste dumping and open air burning of mercury amalgam). 
Furthermore, local mining praxis is not only a historical legacy, but also a praxis invoked as 
part of a ¨counter-hegemonic strategy¨ opposing the enforcement of national mining 
legislation. Hence, local miners, far from conceiving national mining legislation as a sound 
regulation resonating a fair treatment of the environment and/or its workforce, largely 
apprehend this regulation as an obstacle to mining activity which includes both a modest 
means of subsistence and the search for profit. 
In the opening story of this thesis I described a situation of wastewater being released 
from a processing plant. Here I focus on the inspections of mines. Although I did not mention 
it in the previous case, the issue of waiting, and keeping authorities waiting, is a common 
strategy continually applied by mining companies upon receiving visits from ARCOM. 
Undoubtedly, there are several advantages by doing so, in particular the fact that it provides 
the miners with crucial time to ¨clean up a potential mess¨, before being scrutinized and 
inspected. Yet, perhaps more importantly, the act of keeping ARCOM inspectors waiting 
prior to their entry to the mine or the processing plant, re-establish a sense of balance that is 
somehow violated by the fact that ARCOM appear without announcing their arrival. Both this 
and the following account contain this ingredient. I experienced this on almost all other 
occasions as well, sometimes apparently applied as a conscious strategy, sometimes due to 
practical hurdles (e.g. the absence of administrative staff). In the following I illustrate this and 
other aspects of regulating encounters. 
After about an hour and a half, Carlos (ARCOM’s chief inspector on this occasion) 
said that this was a waste of time and decided that we should return to Portovelo. He told the 
secretary that we would return after lunch and that he hoped to encounter the responsible 
engineer. The secretary assured us that we would. Thus we went back to Portovelo, the 
ARCOM officials openly frustrated by the fact that they had spent the last hour and a half 																																																								9	Tenemos	que	cambiar	su	cultura.	
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sweating in the tiny shades outside the mine entrance pretty much in vain. Yet there are 
different degrees of sweating; while we sat waiting, a young miner pushed a carriage full of 
ore, shuttling back and forth from the mine to the deposit right beside us. He was totally 
drained in sweat and kept on going as if the ghosts of despotic mine administrators were 
whipping his back. It was a display of hard work embodied in youthful strength and 
discipline. I thought of this as we descended the hill in the air-conditioned, four-wheel-drive 
pick-up truck.  
When we returned after lunch, the administrating engineer was there to receive us. He 
immediately excused himself for his absence before lunch by telling us that he had been deep 
underground and that the ¨phone¨ did not work. Carlos accepted his excuse, but dryly 
remarked that there should be some sort of communication in case of an accident. He then 
hastily continued to explain the reason for this visit/inspection and asked the engineer for the 
environmental certificate (licencia ambiental) to work on this concession, well knowing that 
the engineer did not have this requisite at hand. In fact, it was a shared problem for all the 
mines working on this very concession and ARCOM was following up by visiting the 
different mines and confronting them with this issue. The engineer said that the owners of the 
mine were working with this acute problem at this very moment and that it would soon be 
ready. Carlos responded that ¨yes¨ he could imagine that they were working on this, but only 
since the end of last week, and only because he had initiated this process upon observing this 
lack of operating requisites in another mine working on the same concession. The engineer 
responded: ¨Well, you got me there. If they just began working on this last week, I don´t 
know what to say to you. Yet, still, the important thing is that they are working on it…¨10 
Carlos repeated that the owners only worked on this now because he had noticed and reported 
on this illegality. The companies involved, he said, had been operating for a long time without 
environmental certificates. Carlos then finished off by reciting an article in the Mining Act 
and questioned the engineer what he thought was the correct thing to do given these 
circumstances. The engineer didn’t start to quarrel, but remained silent. ¨Well, stop the 
work…¨ (Paralizar pues…) said Carlos quietly, answering his own question. ¨No, no, no, you 
can’t paralyze us. They are working on those papers now, and I´m sure it will soon be okay¨11, 
responded the engineer. Carlos merely looked at him as if to say ¨the law is the law¨, but 																																																								10	Bueno,	ahí	si	me	ganaste.	Si	recién	la	semana	pasada	están	en	esto	no	se	que	decirte.	Pero	lo	mas	
importante	es	que	ya	lo	están	haciendo…	11	Nooo	pues,	no	se	puede	paralizar	las	actividades.	Ya	están	trabajando	en	eso	y	seguramente	lo	van	a	
arreglar.	
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didn’t push it any further. The atmosphere was quite good, although Carlos had clearly made 
his point. There was a shared and implicit understanding that a closure of the mine would be a 
very drastic event with far-reaching economic consequences for the company and its workers 
(three shifts of 20-25 workers a day). Then after some minutes, there was a change of focus 
and Carlos asked the engineer to take us into the mine for a brief inspection.  
We put on helmets, rubber boots (with metal tips) and flashlights – indispensable and 
obligatory equipment as we entered the muddy tunnel in the hillside of Portovelo. ¨Cabo the 
Hornos¨ is the name of this narrow valley, which is the site of several concessions and 
numerous mines of different scales. At the time we entered the mine, there was not much 
activity going on although we didn’t descend to the depths where dynamite was used to blow 
out the ore. Occasionally we noticed the explosions as some version of a far-away thunder 
while directing ourselves to the engineer and commenting upon it as to balance a lingering 
sense of insecurity – ¨they’re shooting right? Yes, they are.¨12  
The mine was a dark and gloomy place. The ladders leading down were made out of 
wood, about 30 cm wide, muddy and slippery from the humidity. Each ladder was about 5 
meters long, descending in 90 degrees and ending on a small platform. This structure was 
repeated several times, occasionally replaced with descending tunnels (with stairs) and then 
another structure of ladders. Parallel to the structure of ladders, which was obviously made for 
the workers, there was a system of rudimentary elevators designed to lift and carry ore and 
rocks. Every 30 meters there was a level of tunnels where ore had been exploited. In the first 
levels, close to the surface, the tunnel walls were made up of a clayish matter, while this 
turned into hard rock deeper down in the mine.  
We descended four levels (120 meters) and went for a walk in the tunnels at this level. 
The tunnel was big enough for me to walk upright although I had to bow down through 
several passages (my height is 1.86 meters). Some places were very hot and humid while 
others were better ventilated and fresher. Curiously we passed by the spot where the 
¨telephone¨ was placed. Carlos tried to call the secretary, but the phone was notably not 
working properly, which came as no surprise since this very spot was extremely hot and 
humid (probably corroding the phone line). We continued to walk. At one point we witnessed 
a big hole in the wall/roof, covered by large wooden trunks. The engineer explained that it 
was for security (preventing rocks from falling into the tunnel) and that he had spent lots of 
time and efforts explaining to the mine owners that this was necessary. This remark resonated 																																																								12	Ya	están	disparando?	Si,	si.	
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with a general statement from ARCOM officials about the lack of willingness, on behalf of 
the mine owners, to invest in infrastructure and security measures. In particular, during ¨hard 
times¨ the revenues to cover maintenance costs were hardly prioritized, consequently leading 
to higher risks for the mines working underground. To my knowledge (corresponding with 
media coverage and statements from ARCOM officials), at least four people died during the 
three months of my first fieldwork.   
The engineer that guided us in the mine was very much aware of the importance of 
security. He had recently returned from work in Chile, where he said that security matters 
were given much more priority, but explained to us that ¨ here in Portovelo this is a bit 
complicated…¨13. At least there was fresh water at hand, available from a tap that was set up 
in a passage in the tunnel. The engineer assured us that it was clean water and Juan (the 
ARCOM official from the introductory story) hesitantly drank a small cup. Then after some 
more walking we encountered a solid, metal gate with a lock that was covered with heavy 
armour. On our side, there was a camera pointing directly at this gate. The engineer unlocked 
it while he explained that this was a necessary measure in order to keep intruders away from 
the tunnels. I had heard about this from other mines as well, but just couldn’t believe that 
someone would descend into this system of tunnels in order to steal ore that they would have 
to carry out manually through ¨their own¨, improvised tunnels. One thing is the remarkable 
danger of such an endeavour, but another aspect is the remarkable effort one has to invest in 
carrying enough ore for it to represent a valuable theft (considering that a profitable 
concentration of gold per ton of rock material starts at 5-6 grams). Notwithstanding these 
practicable hurdles, this was a frequent problem, according to the engineer. Another 
dimension is that, by all means of probability, the intruders are dependent upon ¨inside 
information¨ for these operations, accordingly turning the workers of the mine into the main 
suspects. The workers are ¨body checked¨ by the woman secretary every day after finishing 
their work (typically, there where jokes about how the secretary enjoyed this). This daily 
revision was meant to keep workers from stealing gold, but added a suspicious atmosphere to 
the work. And although the workers seemed to joke about it, according to the engineer, it was 
not uncommon to confiscate gold during these ¨body checks¨.  
The ARCOM officials decided that it wasn’t necessary to descend any further and 
with that we started our climb back to the surface. Wet, sweaty and muddy we found 
ourselves in daylight once again. I could only imagine the physical efforts it takes to work in 																																																								13	Aquí en Portovelo esto es un poco complicado...	
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these conditions. We got to refresh ourselves in a water tap just besides the secretary’s office 
and sat down for some concluding remarks with the engineer. There was a good atmosphere 
and upon leaving, the engineer’s last words were: ¨apply all the laws you got, but don’t shut 
us down¨14  
The ARCOM officials always wrote their reports after conducting inspections. These 
reports are confidential and regarded as non-achievable secrets by people and miners in P-Z. 
Yet for ARCOM, they serve two important functions: 1) the making of a legal document that 
informs and registers the conditions regarding different criteria of the law, i.e. the document 
serves as a foundation for decision making and eventual sanctions, and 2) the documentation 
of the mine/processing plant conditions enables ARCOM to address responsibility upon a 
future accident. The conditions of this mine were not particularly bad, relatively speaking, but 
the problem was rather the lack of environmental certificate for working on this very 
concession. The following procedure for this was that Carlos and Juan would report to their 
superior, an act that was followed by a discussion leading towards the decision of what to do 
(all matters taken into account). 
Anyway, there was still some time left of this day and we continued uphill towards 
another mine on the same, problematic concession. The ARCOM officials were quite familiar 
with the area, at least Carlos, along with the driver who was a local man from a neighbouring 
town. The driver parked on the side of the road, but in order for us to reach this mine we had 
to descend on a small, steep path to a shack and a very rustic mine entrance some 50 vertical 
meters below. The reason we could easily find it was because of a system of cables between 
the mine entrance area and the road where we parked the car. The cables were apparently 
installed to pull up small carriages of ore that were subsequently transported by truck to a 
processing plant. Arriving at sites like this, the ARCOM officials would always be a bit 
cautious and announce their arrival by shouting: ¨Good afternoon!¨ (Buenas tardes!). The 
reason for this was not only out of politeness, but also because of the presence of dogs of 
varying size and aggressiveness. This time however, no dogs were there to greet us, but a 
young man came out of his shack. He responded to the ¨good afternoon¨ and Carlos explained 
who they were, the purpose of their visit, and finished off asking for the responsible 
administrator of the mine. The young man remained calm and went to fetch the administrator. 
While we waited I observed the shack from where the young man came. It was an open 
construction with no wall on the side in front of us. Inside I could see a woman preparing 																																																								14	Aplícanos	todas	las	leyes	eso	si,	pero	no	nos	cierran.	
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food and a little girl playing on the floor. They had of course noticed us, but ignored our 
presence and continued with their activities. Notably, their house was in poor conditions, but 
there was a satellite dish from Direct TV (one of two major Ecuadorian satellite services) 
securing TV signals for this family on lonely nights. Considering this and the aspect of 
poverty in general, relative poverty can most certainly be observed in this region, but still, 
people are not desperate. Food and basics remains quite cheap even for poor people and the 
friendly climate, except for occasional heavy rains and very hot days, means that people can 
get along with modest material possessions.  
While the young man had seemed rather indifferent to the arrival of ARCOM, the 
administrator signalled distance and scepticism. He arrived after a few minutes and was 
confronted with the same problem as in our previous visit: the lack of the environmental 
certificate. As always Carlos phrased it as a question - ¨Do you have the environmental 
certificate?¨ - along with some other obligatory documents. The administrator said that ¨yes, 
but down there in the office¨, pointing down at the building where we had just been. Carlos 
explained that we had just visited that site, and they (the responsible engineer from the other 
mine) could not present their own documents either. The administrator repeatedly said that all 
the documents where there and that everything was in perfect order. Obviously, Carlos 
doubted this statement, but since the administrator couldn’t present any documents, Carlos’ 
solution was to demand the administrator to present them in a couple of days when he 
returned. ¨Yes, no problem¨, was the administrator´s response.  
After that clarification, the administrator explained that it was hard for miners like 
him, to have all the papers ready when ARCOM came on their inspections. He explained that 
they were just extracting a little bit of ore and that this barely amounted to make a living, 
emphasizing the combination of increased input prices and low gold prices. The young man 
stood silently beside us during the whole conversation, as if giving some sort of protection 
and moral support to his superior. The whole situation was dense and resonated with 
historical anecdotes of tax collectors visiting poor people in difficult, economic situations. 
The ARCOM officials also noticed this and tried to maintain a friendly tone as they summed 
up the situation by repeating the request of all obligatory documents within a couple of days. 
This was accepted. Finally, we said goodbye and climbed up the hill towards the car. And 
with this, the ARCOM inspectors ended their working schedule, yet only after writing out 
their reports of the day. 
The reader must forgive me for being rather detailed in my descriptions here. I do this 
with the aim of bringing the reader into immediate proximity with the enforcement of mining 
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legislation, which constitutes the main analytic focus for this thesis. Without attempting to 
portray the ¨full experience¨, which obviously includes a lot more than what is possible to 
describe here, I wish to emphasize that this enforcement is always applied in specific contexts 
with specific conditions. Thus, and echoing a key argument in Murray Li’s book, the 
exclusion of certain facets of ¨the problem¨, which in the context of P-Z would translate to 
ARCOM’s (including INIGEMM, MAE and the above-mentioned apolitical research) 
exclusion of social, political and economic dimensions of the mining activity, ¨both limits and 
shapes what improvement becomes¨ (2007: 8). Furthermore, the empirical account above also 
indicates the difficulties in enforcing mining legislation. Not only is the safety of miners 
constantly at risk, but mining legislation is hardly useful to specify the limits between a safe 
and an unsafe mine. In practice, it is all up to the individual decision of the inspectors, which 
in turn face a significant pressure (from miners and administrators) to circumvent any 
safety/environmental concern. This pressure comprises not only the economic concern of the 
owners and workers of the mine, which can be related to Scott’s jobs vs. the environment 
aphorism as suggested above. This pressure also includes the habitus of local mining practice, 
the weight of history and the aspect of local autonomy in opposition to external and 
centralized impositions. Accordingly, this very moment of confrontation between ARCOM’s 
enforcement of Ecuadorian mining legislation and its object (local mining praxis) is vital to 
understand the process of interlegality in P-Z. It is vital because it indicates how local miners 
oppose and manage to modify formal laws through negotiations where they invoke situational 
explanations as the cover for controversial, informal praxis. ARCOM inspectors on the other 
hand, know very well that their potential success is dependent on a friendly tone and that a 
harder line will lead to increased distance between them and the miners. Hence ARCOM opt 
for compromises where they attempt to maximize compliance to formal legislation. Yet 
importantly, they catalogue and document observations at odds with legislation as to free 
themselves from responsibility in the case of accidents and to create an archive to sustain 
future sanctions. Alternatively, although this was not the case in the account presented above 
and despite the fact that I only rely on personal statements (from miners and lay people), 
corruption may and probably does (occasionally) interfere with the praxis of regulation at this 
stage.  
Without following the phenomena of corruption any further here, what can be pointed 
out is that the above-mentioned strongly indicates that ASGM in P-Z constitutes what Simon 
Thomas, leaning on André Hoekema, conceptualizes as a ¨semi-autonomous social field¨ 
(Simon Thomas 2009:165). Recalling the discussion of this (chapter 1), the empirical account 
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presented here suggests how ¨the process of interlegality is influenced by dominant (top 
down) national law, as well as by local (bottom up) pressure¨ (ibid.). Still, given the marginal 
compliance with national legislation, one might legitimately ask if it is not the local, bottom-
up pressure that constitutes the dominant scheme here? My short answer to this is that 
national legislation embodied in ARCOM inspectors, is contextually (i.e. situational) 
dominant because it represents the Ecuadorian State, which ultimately have a monopoly on 
legitimate coercion. Yet there are at least two important modifications to this. First of all, the 
State, as the owner of all subsoil resources, also has strong interests in the continuance of 
ASGM in P-Z despite the fact that mining largely avoids compliance with mining legislation. 
These interests are fiscal income (direct and indirect) in combination with social stability, and 
the safeguarding of a considerable economic engine that contributes in other sectors of the 
Ecuadorian economy. Second, while ARCOM may draw on State authority in specific 
situations, these inspections are only minute points across temporal and spatial ASGM 
operations that are largely dominated by local mining praxis. This is easily observed in 
contexts without the presence of ARCOM, where miners do things according to their own 
norms and outspokenly say that ARCOM officials are more interested in bribes than to 
facilitate improvements in relation to safety and environmental standards.  In other words, 
formal mining legislation struggles to become a government, i.e. ¨the conduct of conduct¨ 
operating effectively at distance.  
According to Foucault, governmentality, or the act of governing, means ¨to act on the 
actions of subjects who retain the capacity to act otherwise¨ (Murray Li 2007: 17)iv. 
Moreover, and still following Foucault, governmentality does not merely ¨seek one dogmatic 
goal, but ´a whole series of specific finalities´¨ which may be incompatible and contradictory 
(ibid.: 9). In this perspective it is possible to identify two essential observations. First, 
ARCOM’s enforcement of mining legislation reflects the ambiguities of legislation and 
governmental politics related to ASGM, that is, a pro-mining attitude that is incompatible 
with the informal nature of ASGM at odds with legislation. Second, as several authors have 
pointed out (Veiga et al 2014; Fold et al 2013), formalization of informal ASGM has largely 
been a failure because it does not manage to have an improving effect on mining praxis, but 
rather tends to legalize this controversial praxis. Hence there is little confrontation with 
regulating effects. This is discernible in the account presented above – whether the owners of 
the mines managed to present the environmental certificates or not, hardly impacts on their 
praxis in the long run. In fact, this somehow illustrates the impossibility of ARCOM’s task: 
sanctions create more distance and opposition to legislation, while their current efforts within 
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a diplomatic approach also struggle to have any improving effect (in terms of security and 
environmental concerns). Hence, the ¨whole series of specific finalities¨, which in this context 
translates into ARCOM’s regulating amendments according to the Mining Act, are hardly 
compatible with the emphasis on a special and privileged regime for small-scale and artisanal 
miners (cf. the Mining Act: Art. 134).  
Furthermore, in the eyes of small-scale and artisanal miners like the ones referred to 
above, it is difficult to interpret the practical implications of President Correa’s insistence that 
Ecuador has to take advantage of ¨its last gram of gold¨ (cf. footnote nr. 3 in previous 
chapter), and the fact that he has publicly and repeatedly announced that ¨we (Ecuador) 
cannot be beggars sitting on a sack of gold¨ (de la Torre & Ortiz Lemos 2015: 9). The 
dilemma was captured when Carlos questioned the engineer of his opinion on what to do 
given the fact that the mine was operating without an environmental certificate. In this 
situation, the silence of the engineer implicitly said that ¨well, environmental certificates or 
not, that’s basically your problem, here we just have to keep on mining¨. Carlos confirmed 
that, according to the law, the mine should be put to a stop, but he refrained from taking any 
actions to do so. And given the dominance of informal mining, instead of becoming an 
example on the obligation to comply, a temporary closure of the mine would foremost bring 
economic misfortune to the workers and hardly any improvement of mining praxis. The only 
thing left from the perspective of the regulators, is a belief that ARCOM’s continued presence 
and pressure will someday have an (miraculous?) effect on compliance. This may rightfully 
be conceived as a utopia (cf. Hinton et al 2003) given the fact that local miners continue to 
mine as they have done for centuries, despite the fact that their companions regularly die in 
the mines and despite the fact that their children grow up in a contaminated atmosphere.  
This is essentially where most apolitical analyses stop to conclude that any 
improvement of ASGM in P-Z depends upon: more public awareness of the problem, 
increased awareness amongst the miners, educational outreach and training programs, 
financial assistance, labor unionization and a revision/redefinition of Ecuadorian mining 
legislation (Nichols et al 2015; Veiga et al 2014a; Veiga et al 2014b; Miserendino et al 2013; 
Velasquez-Lopez et al 2011). I agree that there might be a potential for improvement in these 
recommendations, especially the last point, but these recommendations are, perhaps more 
than anything else, reflections of a self-referencing scientific epistemology (see chapter 4). 
Contrastingly, as I have emphasized quite thoroughly by now, the most substantial hurdles to 
any improvement lie in the political economy of P-Z and the power relations that permeate 
this. 
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In the following section I embark on yet another inspection with ARCOM as to 
provide for more empirical support for this discussion and to highlight other dimensions that 
comes along with the act of implementing mining legislation. As mentioned, law enforcement 
is always specific and contextual despite the routines that ARCOM attempts to establish. As I 
illustrated in the previous chapter, this is utterly complicated by the fact that legislation is 
problematic in itself (in the eyes of all actors involved, including ARCOM) and dynamic 
(shifting). Nevertheless, as briefly indicated above, the size and scale of mining operations 
being scrutinized also conditions the ¨limit and shape of improvement¨. The next account 
emphasizes this influence. 
  
The weight of Size and Scale 
- Good morning (Buenos días), I said as I entered the small reception hall at the 
ARCOM offices in Portovelo. 
- Buenos días, replied the secretary from her little office where she was accompanied by 
one of the drivers, watching something on her computer. 
There were some more ¨buenos días¨ here and there from other people as well, before I 
entered the large office where my two main companions, Juan and Carlos, had their desks. 
- Good morning, how are things going?, I said, saluting the two men. 
- Hey, how do you do?, said the chief inspector (Carlos), while Juan nodded his head in 
a ¨buenos días¨ style. Both of them were sitting in front of their respective computers, 
starting their day as usual by checking e-mails and reviewing the major newspapers (a 
million-dollar routine). Yet, Carlos was typing on his computer and looked slightly 
more stressed than normal. 
- All good, I said slowly and relaxed as to not bother Carlos with my presence as he 
seemed to have urgent matters to take care of.  
- And what’s up today?, I asked Juan who apparently was reading the news on his 
computer some five meters aside from Carlos. 
- Today it looks like we are going to the big mine… The thing is that yesterday, 
someone filed a complaint against that company (ELIPE) and we have to go and check 
it out, replied Juan. 
- Ah, what kind of complaint?, I asked. 
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- Supposedly, it’s because they are working outside their concession, that is, on the 
concession of someone else, replied Juan.15 
At this point Carlos was talking in his phone half-standing as if he was finishing the 
conversation and had already begun to move.  
- Let’s go, let’s go boys! (Vamos, vamos muchachos!), he said referring to us while he 
gathered his helmet, flashlight and boots. 
- Let’s go (Vamos), I replied and immediately put on the rubber boots I carried in my 
backpack. 
We got ready and went out through the hallway where Carlos commanded one of the drivers 
to accompany us. We then continued down four floors of stairs and found the pick-up truck 
parked in the street. It was almost like we were firemen on a mission. And actually it was a 
mission, a mission to confront the biggest mining company in this region with a denunciation 
(on behalf of a third party) claiming that they were working illegally. The actual mine, named 
¨Cabo de Hornos¨, is situated in the narrow valley with the same name, a three minutes’ drive 
from the centre of Portovelo, quite close to the other inspections referred to above. Yet as this 
is the largest mine in P-Z, the scale of things marked a clear contrast to all the small and 
rudimentary mines in these hillsides. Here there was a big gate at the entrance area where we 
were met by an armed guard who would not let us in until his supervisors told him to.  
Still, the first step on this occasion was the normal procedure: Carlos introduced 
himself, said that he represented ARCOM and that he wanted to enter on the purpose of doing 
an inspection. Both he and Juan showed their credentials to the armed guard, who asked if he 
could borrow them for a minute and returned to his office on the other side of the gate. 
Temporarily, we were left outside the gate waiting in the pick-up truck. The sun was strong 
and merciless. When the driver realized that this would take some time, he backed up and 
parked the car in the shadows of some trees. After about ten minutes, the guard returned with 
the credentials, saying that he had spoken to his supervisor, who in turn had spoken to one of 
the company lawyers who said that we could not enter without giving any notification of the 
visit. This was clearly an illegal conclusion and Carlos explained to the guard that ARCOM 																																																								15	-	Buenos	días.	Como	estamos?,	los	saludé	a	los	dos	hombres.	-		Ah,	que	fue,	como	estas?,	me	respondió	Carlos.	-	Todo	bien	aquí,	le	dije	tranquilamente	para	no	desconcentrarlo	en	medio	de	varias	tareas.	-	Y	que	hay	para	hoy?,	le	pregunté	a	Juan	quien	parecía	menos	ocupado.	-	Hoy	parece	que	vamos	a	la	mina	grande…Es	que	ayer	en	la	tarde	metieron	una	denuncia	a	esa	(ELIPE)	
empresa	y	nos	toca	ir	a	ver,	respondió	Juan.	-	Ah…Y	que	tipo	de	denuncia,	le	pregunté.	
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had the authority to enter all mining facilities in the Republic of Ecuador (cf. Art. 74 of the 
Mining Act). The guard said that he did not know about that, but simply followed orders from 
his supervisors. Carlos asked for the lawyer’s telephone number, which the guard recited from 
the contact list on his cellular phone. Carlos then called the lawyer and talked to him for about 
five minutes. When he returned to the car he was slightly upset and said that the lawyer had 
repeated what the guard told us. We all (Juan, the driver and me) understood that this could 
escalate the situation, as the message from the company lawyer was an illegal conclusion. It 
was as if Carlos felt sorry for the way things had developed because he knew that according 
to the law, he was right and they were wrong. Therefore, he immediately called his supervisor 
(ARCOM’s regional coordinator) and explained the situation.  
At this point I was very curious as to what would happen because the situation had 
evolved into a kind of litmus test as to how ARCOM handle these kinds of conflicts. If it had 
been a small mine, I don’t think Carlos would have even bothered to call upon his supervisor, 
but this was a mine with big installations, significant production and many employees (70 
persons per shift - three shifts). However, in this situation ARCOM proved itself as consistent 
with Ecuadorian law. Carlos talked to his supervisor who said that we should go and get the 
police if they did not open the gate. Carlos called upon the company lawyer once again, and 
gave him a diplomatic reality check. He hung up and we were left waiting once more. Then 
after some five minutes, the guard opened the gate and we drove in, stopping outside the 
guardian’s office where three representatives from the company came to meet us. 
Only at this stage did I present myself, i.e. my role as an observer and student. I was 
granted access along with ARCOM, and just had to leave some identification at this office 
before continuing. The representatives told us to follow them in their car. Finally, we came to 
a parking lot besides several office facilities. The driver parked his car in the shade and 
remained there with his smartphone as usual. Carlos, Juan and me followed the 
representatives, who turned out to be the company environmental engineer, a computing 
engineer and another engineer, to the superintendent´s office. Once inside we were greeted by 
the superintendent and a companion who were standing over a big map on a table, apparently 
discussing technical issues about the mine. The superintendent was from the US and did not 
speak Spanish, at least he did not while we were there. Therefore, the engineers who had 
accompanied us immediately began to explain who we (excluding me) were and why we were 
here, in English. Carlos and Juan were a bit perplexed, but patiently awaited the situation. 																																																																																																																																																																													-	Supuestamente	es	porque	están	trabajando	afuera	de	su	concesión,	es	decir,	en	la	concesión	de	otros,	me	respondió.  
	 104	
Carlos also explained the reason for the visit and this was translated to the superintendent. 
The superintendent gave the orders to fetch a particular man from down underground and also 
told the engineers to localize another man. He then withdrew to his office next door, yet 
leaving the door open. We were told to have a seat and make us comfortable, although there 
were only two chairs in the room. We were also told that this would only take a minute or so, 
that is, in order for them to localize and fetch the man who would take care of our visit.  
We waited for more than an hour. In the beginning there was no immediate rush, but 
after a while, both Juan and Carlos became impatient and furthermore, suspicious about what 
took them so long. I had, after a while, introduced myself to the superintendent when he came 
out of his office and we had a short conversation about Ecuador, how long he had been 
around, what we liked and disliked etc., an informal conversation with little talk about mining 
issues. I explained my role as a student of environmental studies at a university in Norway, 
which he saluted in positive, but brief terms. I asked him how come he was here and he said 
that he had been given this opportunity and had been here for five, six months now. He liked 
it, he said (referring to Ecuador), but also said that he had been working the whole time and 
not been able do any kind of tourism. The superintendent must have been somewhere in his 
mid-forties and what gave him a sharp contrast compared with the other employees (besides 
the language) was that he wore informal shorts (surfer style), a t-shirt and sandals. The other 
workers wore formal shirts, long trousers and occasionally, the typical construction helmet 
and reflexive west. Still, despite his informality, no one seemed to doubt the superintendent´s 
professional integrity – he was, by far, the man in charge. 
The engineers who had accompanied us, came and went as we sat in this office 
waiting. Obviously they were also uncomfortable by our impatience and by the fact that it 
took such a long time when they had told us that ¨the man¨ would soon be here. The 
computing engineer showed us a 3-D graphic of the mine on his computer and zoomed in on 
the concession in dispute. Seemingly, there should not be any problem as this company had 
several concessions in the area. The concession in dispute was shared among them and eight 
others, yet the majority (more than 60%) belonged to this company. The computing engineer 
also told us that they had a mutual agreement with the proprietors of the neighbouring 
concession, but then refused to say anything more about these things, saying they were 
outside his area of competence. Carlos asked several times about details of the graphic and 
more general questions, but he kindly refused to answer.  
In the end we ventured out of the office to have a look at the immediate surroundings, 
although there was not much to see. We waited and waited. Carlos had told the driver to 
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return to town for lunch and that he would call him when it was time to leave. Even the 
superintendent left in a car accompanied by a worker and returned with two packs of 
cigarettes and a Red Bull in his hand. At this point we heard some voices saying that our man 
had finally arrived. We went back to the office/room where we had spent most of the time and 
in came a big man with an accent from Quito. He briefly said ¨good afternoon¨ (buenas 
tardes) before he went straight to the bathroom to refresh himself. Then, with a natural 
authority stemming from a combination of a firm, confident voice and a solid, heavy weight 
body, he apologized for keeping us waiting and asked how he could help. Carlos did the 
talking and explained that the reason for the visit was essentially due to a denouncement by a 
third party on a supposedly illegal mining activity outside the company’s concession. The 
man responded calmly on this accusation first of all by referring to the company´s legal 
offices in Quito where all these kinds of issues were to be handled. He then continued to 
explain why he thought this denouncement was of ¨ bad faith¨ (de mala fe):  
 
At this mine we have virtual maps of approximately where we are inside the mountain. As you know, we go 
much deeper than most of the other mines around. I can assure you that once down there, it is hard to determine 
one’s position with accuracy, a lot worse in all the mines without real maps. As for this denouncement and the 
claim that we are working outside our concession, it is impossible for these people to know where we are 
working. We are working at depths that are, by far, superior to any of the neighbouring mines. What is true, and 
what I believe is the real issue here, is that there are many informal miners who work on our concession and we 
try to mitigate this by blocking their entrance from below.16  
 
Carlos and Juan listened. Carlos said that, ok, this might be the case, but he wished to 
have a look inside the mine anyway. This ¨anyway¨, he said, was because he did not carry 
instruments to scan the mine and that he was aware that such a thing would take weeks and 
probably months of work. Still, he wanted to visit the mine for a general overview and to be 
guided to the area underneath the concession in dispute. Ok, said the man (hereafter Ernesto), 
no problem, we can do that. 
A pick-up truck was called for and immediately arrived at the parking lot close to the 
office where we found ourselves. We got in, Ernesto in front with the driver, the three of us in 																																																								16	En	esta	mina	tenemos	mapas	de	mas	o	menos	donde	estamos	dentro	de	la	montaña.	Como	ustedes	saben	
vamos	mucho	mas	profundo	que	las	otras	minas	por	aquí.	Les	puedo	asegurar	que	una	vez	ahí	abajo	es	
bastante	difícil	determinar	donde	uno	esta,	peor	si	uno	no	tiene	un	mapa.	Al	respecto	de	esta	denuncia	
diciendo	que	estamos	trabajando	afuera	de	nuestra	concesión,	es	imposible	saber	para	estas	personas	donde	
estamos	trabajando.	Nosotros	estamos	mucho	mas	profundo	que	cualquier	otro	por	aquí.	Lo	que	a	mi	me	
parece	el	verdadero	asunto	aquí	es	el	hecho	de	que	muchos	mineros	artesanos	están	trabajando	ilegalmente	
en	nuestras	concesiones	y	nosotros	tratamos	de	bloquear	su	acceso	desde	abajo.	
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the back and an additional four workers in the pick-up carriage. We were invited to share a 
Coca-Cola before entering the mine and Ernesto poured it into plastic cups that we were 
handed. He said that the mine had some hot areas and that it was good to refresh oneself upon 
entering, although he commented that the Coca-Cola did less with his actual thirst. Finally, 
we were ready to enter the mine. 
At the entrance we had to write down our names and contact info. We were then 
supplied with gas masks. Compared to all the others mines I visited, this was a totally 
different story. The descent was designed as a downward tunnel in spiral with enough space 
for big trucks entering to pick up and carry ore and rocks. From this spiral, at every 30 
vertical meters there were tunnels reaching out more or less horizontally, following the ores. 
We descended slowly while Ernesto kept on talking about the mine and the conditions. Every 
now and then we paused and went for a stroll in the tunnels. Ernesto explained how they 
drained the mine by pumping the water up from every level into small pools, which in turn, 
was pumped up to a similar pool in the next level. He showed us the smokestack vents that 
secured a decent level of oxygen and several other installations. There were large signs on the 
rock wall informing workers and visitors on the depth, the number of the level and the 
direction of the exit. In total we descended 350 vertical meters. At this depth the heat was 
intense and the humidity likewise. We went for a walk and a talk, always accompanied by the 
four workers who did nothing but to follow us. The conversation somehow picked upon the 
theme of burglars and thieves entering the mine. Ernesto told us that it was a severe problem 
and that they permanently had guards walking around in the tunnels. Carlos asked if they 
were armed, and Ernesto answered; ¨no, but the ones outside are…¨. In parallel to the 
previous account presented above, Ernesto also told us that they always caught workers trying 
to smuggle out some valuable stones, ore or gold. 
As for the denouncement and the supposedly illegal activity outside the concession, 
Carlos soon realized the impossibility of verifying their position underground. He already 
knew this before entering, but still wanted to have a look as to have, at least, a symbolic 
impact on ELIPE’s confidence. And we most certainly had a look, as we spent roughly an 
hour or so underground. After a while, Enrique’s comments seemed to convince both Carlos 
and Juan that there was no illegal mining going on here. On our way up again, the 
conversation loosened up and touched upon working vacancies in this mine. Ernesto told 
Carlos that they were currently looking for an engineer to work underground as the former, a 
Peruvian man, had not resulted in any good and had been fired. Carlos asked about the salary 
and working schedule. The working schedule was normally 11/4, i.e. eleven days of work and 
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four days free, said Ernesto. But as many people, including himself, lived far away (in Quito), 
it was also possible to work a 22/8 schedule. The salary though, was no good though, joked 
Ernesto. Yet, shortly after he said that it was around 2000 dollar with additional benefits (a 
month). This was commented upon as ¨quite good¨ (mas o menos, in a positive tone) later on 
by Carlos, Juan and the driver when we returned to the ARCOM office and called it a day.	
Besides the observation that this kind of conversation would hardly happen in the context of 
smaller mining installations, it indicates a shared belief in ¨responsible mining¨ as a means for 
development and accordingly, a shared scepticism towards more rudimentary forms of 
mining.  
Once in the office however, Carlos was very curious about the contents of my talk 
with the superintendent. He wanted to know if he had commented upon the role of ARCOM. I 
said that we had barely touched the issue of mining. Carlos then explained to me that a few 
years earlier, some of his colleagues had conducted a thorough inspection of ELIPE’s 
processing plant called ¨Golden Valley¨. They had discovered several illegalities and actually 
taken all measures to paralyse production, including the characteristic application of 
¨enclosure banners¨ at the entrance gate. Then, while returning to their office, they had 
received a phone call from the regional coordinator of ARCOM commanding them to return 
to Golden Valley, remove all the banners and re-open the permits for production. Carlos said 
that this had created frictions between the ARCOM staff and the regional coordinator back 
then, since the latter had not given any explanation to his command. 
 While this last remark indicates a case of corruption, a more general observation in 
this account is how fragile the professional limits between the regulators and the miners can 
be. The computing engineer actually told us that he had previously worked for ARCOM in 
another region, and throughout my fieldwork I noticed several examples of this in the 
professional trajectories of both miners and regulators. Especially in the case of ELIPE or 
other ¨modern and developed¨ mines, ARCOM largely share the moral compass in the 
narrative of corporate social and environmental responsibility, i.e. that mining is good as long 
as it is done in a ¨responsible manner¨. Hence ARCOM officials consider these companies as 
viable alternatives to a continuing career as law enforcers/bureaucrats.  
As remarked above, this rationality is also reflected by the Correa administration, who 
explicitly and increasingly promotes extractive industries as a means for development. As 
several scholars have underlined, this is a problematic position because of the inherent nature 
of extractivism, and in the case of Ecuador, due to the contradictions with the ambitious 
reforms in the Ecuadorian Constitution and national development plan (cf. Arsel et al 2014; 
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Escobar 2010). President Correa may be right to indicate that extractivism combined with 
political rhetoric of sustainability and environmentalism is conventional praxis amongst many 
industrialized countries, and he actually recur to invoke the Norwegian example on high-
profile, double discourse on this pointv. Nonetheless, he can hardly escape the tension this 
double bind has created with the indigenous movement, the environmentalists and even 
national neo-liberalists who, opportunistic or not, stress this contradiction while engaging in 
the increasingly popular sport of opposing the Correa administration. 
The account from the inspection of ELIPE’s ¨Cabo de Hornos¨ mine gives empirical 
support to suggest that power and authority increase with an increase in size and scale. Not 
only is this discernible through the observation that Carlos and Juan essentially subjugated to 
the words and authority of Enrique, but also through the latter’s reference to the company’s 
legal department in its Quito headquarters as the ¨correct¨ place to address any critic. This act 
of externalizing communication and responsibility to a team of lawyers far from the site of 
dispute, resembles a well-known trademark of corporate behaviourvi. It also echoes the praxis 
of SADCO as illustrated in chapter one. Moreover, the outspoken preference and renewed 
incentives from the Correa administration towards foreign large-scale mining companies is 
largely an invitation to a complementary alliance between these stakeholders (i.e. the State 
and the Corporation). Although this takes a different shape in the contexts of large-scale 
mining in Zamora Chinchipe, the government’s bias is the same in P-Z. This is problematic in 
several aspects, but regarding the enforcement of legislation, it articulates in ARCOM’s lack 
of potency to confront these actors and a lack of governmental back-up to issue and sustain 
sanctions. This is hardly ignored by small-scale and artisanal miners, but quite contrary, 
interpreted as just another facet in the continuity of the State’s historical preference for large 
and powerful mining companies. Hence, it suggests that history repeats itself, i.e. the largest 
companies do as they please and that the ¨big money¨ is notoriously exported out of P-Z. In 
line with Fergusons observations on the sense of abjection amongst Zambian mine workers, 
this furthermore suggests that small-scale and artisanal miners in P-Z have never been fully 
included and recognised by the Ecuadorian State and subsequently that their destiny today, as 
historically, is in their own hands.  
 
Concluding remarks 
In her book that has largely guided this chapter, Murray Li outlines the limits of 
governmentality (2007:17-9). Although there is a qualitative difference in analysing 
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improvement schemes and development programs in the Central Sulawesi highlands and the 
enforcement of mining legislation in P-Z, there are important commonalities and similar 
mechanisms, which make the analytic in ¨the will to improve¨ useful for this discussion. 
Furthermore, the emphasis on the limits of governmentality is much less discussed compared 
to the critic of its application related to both conservation/environmentalism (Agrawal 2005) 
and neo-liberalism in the guise of states and corporations (Larner & Walters 2004). In the 
context of ASGM in P-Z, it is rather the limits and not the dominance of governmentality, that 
takes us closer to an understanding of ¨how power works and what it does¨ (Murray Li 
2007:19). According to Murray Li, some of these limitations are: ¨men in their relations, their 
links and imbrications are not easy to manage¨ (17) and in Marxian terms, the difficulties of 
governing ¨men in their relations with wealth, resources and means of subsistence…as the 
fulcrum of class-based injustice and political mobilization¨ (ibid.)vii. In P-Z this can be 
discerned through the respective characteristics of different scales of mining operations, their 
relations to place-making, varying political-economic power and its complex co-existence.  
 However, what is interesting to observe in relation to interlegality seen through the 
empirical accounts presented in this chapter, is that ARCOM officials’ roles as trustees entail 
a navigation between the norms reflected in formal mining legislation and the normative 
scheme applied by miners. To some extent, these legal systems align in the account from the 
inspection of ELIPE’s mine, yet mostly on a rhetorical level, that is, through a consensus on 
the rule of law which in praxis is notoriously challenged by ELIPE as much as smaller 
operators. ARCOM officials on the other hand, attempt to enforce the government’s will to 
improve the conditions of mining, yet they are increasingly forced to do this by affiliating 
with the miners’ practical norms. As a strict implementation of formal mining legislation 
would lead to widespread closures of mining installations, their diplomatic approach includes 
a tolerance for illegal practices on the basis of three important aspects: 1) the impossible task 
to confront ten thousand miners with illegal mining praxis and the impossibility of sustaining 
this, 2) ARCOM officials’ in site understanding of small-scale/artisanal miner’s economic and 
bureaucratic difficulties to update mining installations to concur with requisites in legislation, 
and 3) their awareness that informal mining is widespread and deeply embedded in the 
tradition of mining, an acknowledgement that legitimate a slow development towards formal 
mining laws, i.e. a soft enforcement of the law. 
Hence, in contrast to INIGEMM or central authorities like the Ministry of Mining, 
ARCOM officials, working as trustees and mediators between formal laws and informal 
mining praxis, have a closer affiliation to field sites and understand the impossibility of fully 
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achieving their task. Accordingly, they opt for compromises by partially respecting and 
recognising informal mining norms. This may be a controversial statement that several miners 
will refuse to acknowledge, and there are indeed occasions were ARCOM do recur to 
sanctions and closure, but one has to understand that this regulation praxis is a soft version of 
the mining legislation, and that a stricter implementation would probably make the lives of 
these public employees intolerable in the local setting. As noticed, however, they catalogue 
irregularities in order to re-connect this soft enforcement with their mandate according to the 
Mining Act, which in praxis means the creation of an archive that can be used to implement 
sanctions and free them from responsibility when accidents occur (i.e. a document describing 
poor conditions of the mine)viii. This dynamic of adaptation by both ARCOM and miners 
resonates with what de Theije et al say about ¨engaging legal systems¨ having different 
meaning and authority to different people and that, in practice, these systems (in this case: 
formal mining legislation and local mining norms) communicate and influence each other 
(2014: 131).   
Another key limitation for effective governmentality in P-Z is what Murray Li 
observes as the refractory will of ¨men in their customs, habits, ways of acting and thinking¨ 
(2007: 17). This relates to Bourdieu’s lessons on the concept of habitus and in the context of 
P-Z, how (informal) mining is embedded in local identity. I will return to this more 
specifically in the following chapter. Yet I also stressed this in the beginning of this chapter 
by referring to a quote on a wall up-town Portovelo and by my visit to a residential home with 
a mine inside of it. A dimension of this was also accentuated by the ¨bottom-up¨ pressure to 
circumvent mining legislation as ARCOM experience in their field inspections. Hence, in 
relation to interlegality, this chapter has provided more empirical support for the argument 
that regulation and control is, in contrast to critical voices emphasizing the failings of 
ARCOM or researchers pointing to the unsustainable praxis among artisanal miners, rather a 
question of the political economy in P-Z (e.g. the weight of size and scale and the internal 
hierarchy of labor) and the practical hurdles inherent to the governmental will to improve 
mining conditions (the intersection between mining legislation and the local legacy of 
mining). 
The next chapter follows up on these observations by analysing the politics of mining 
in P-Z. While some of this has been touched upon already, in the next chapter I will examine 
this more explicitly through yet another limitation to the realization of governmentality. 
Murray Li briefly describes this as ¨the limit presented by available forms of knowledge and 
techniques¨ (17-8) and goes on to quote Hannah saying that improvement schemes must 
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respect ¨the integrity and the autonomous dynamics of the social body¨ (2000: 24). My 
interests here is not so much about what should be done, but rather to say something about 
what is happening (cf. Robbins (2012: 98-100) on political ecology’s ¨hatchet and seed¨ and 
my emphasis on the ¨hatchet¨). This means to apply a critical perspective on the stakeholders 
that create the local politics of mining and to do this by looking at how they legitimize their 
positions by drawing on different epistemologies. In this perspective I explore how ¨engaging 
legal system¨ are founded upon divergent knowledge schemes, i.e. epistemologies, and that 
the politics of these cannot be reduced to the question of which epistemology is the most 
accurate, but rather, by following Foucault, to where these ¨regimes of truth¨ (1980:131) draw 
their respective power. Hence, as I will show, the politics or the problem of governance is, to 
a large extent, a problem of communication between these epistemic communities. 
 
 
 
Notes																																																								i	This	logic	is	replicated	in	the	proliferation	of	gambling	and	gambling	culture	in	P-Z	and	the	adjacent	districts.	Particularly,	cockfights	are	very	popular	and	organized	every	weekend,	some	of	them	as	big	events	with	much	money	at	stake.		ii	See	Murray	Li	(2007:3-4)	on	her	own	unwillingness	to	bridge	research	with	development	projects	and	on	how	good	intentions	may	lead	to	unexpected	and	worsening	outcomes.	iii	This	surveillance	is	done	through	ARCOM’s	cooperation	with	ECU	911	(see:	http://www.ecu911.gob.ec/la-institucion),	which	is	an	integral	entity	that	coordinates	several	public	institutions	(police,	firemen	etc.).	iv	Murray	Li	here	draws	on	Michel	Foucault’s	¨Afterwords:	The	Subject	and	Power¨,	which	can	be	found	in	Dreyfus	&	Rabinow	(2014:	220).	v	Norway’s	heavy	reliance	on	oil	revenues	combined	with	its	political	rhetoric	of	resource	sustainability	was	particularly	accentuated	by	President	Correa	during	the	controversial	decision	to	exploit	the	oil	fields	in	Yasuni	National	Park.	See	for	instance:	http://www.andes.info.ec/es/politica/presidente-ecuador-es-irresponsabilidad-no-utilizar-nuestros-recursos-naturales-superar;		http://www.presidencia.gob.ec/podemos-cuidar-nuestra-naturaleza-aprovechando-nuestros-recursos-naturales				vi	For	an	example	on	IAMGOLD’s	operations	in	the	ASGM	district	of	Bella	Rica,	Ecuador	see	Velasquez	(2011).														vii	Climate	and	territory	with	all	its	qualities	also	provides	limits	to	governmentailty	and	as	Murray	Li	mentions,	this	resonates	with	the	role	of	actants	in	actor-network-theory	and	the	writings	of	Bruno	Latour	(1993;	2013).	Although	do	not	traced	this	any	further,	it	is	clear	that	nature	responds	in	unforeseen	and	unpredictable	ways	when	it	is	challenged	by	mining	operations	of	different	kinds.	Despite	the	degree	of	precaution,	this	is	largely	outside	the	control	of	both	miners	and	regulators	as	there	are	few	studies	about	how	many	tunnels/explosions	the	inhabited	surface	can	resist.	Yet	nature	also	acts	regardless	of	this	(for	instance;	heavy	rains	occasionally	flooding	the	rivers	alongside	processing	plants	causing	tailings	ponds	to	collapse	and	chemical	spills	to	occur,	and	as	Ecuador	recently	experienced,	earthquakes	with	devastating	consequences).		viii	Accidents,	especially	cave-ins	frequently	occur,	sometimes	due	to	poor	investments	in	the	mines	and	sometimes	due	to	¨the	nature	of	the	game¨	(la	naturaleza	de	esta	industria)	as	some	ARCOM	officials	put	it.	Young	ARCOM	officials	describe	this	as	the	toughest	part	of	their	work	as	they	are	among	the	first	being	noticed	along	with	police	and	medical	staff.	Furthermore,	they	are	obliged	to	inspect	the	site	and	close	operations.	This	work,	they	say,	involves	dead	bodies,	communication	with	family	members	of	the	
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																																																																																																																																																																													deceased	and	sometimes,	ironically,	a	confrontation	of	why	they	did	not	do	anything	when	they	knew	about	the	conditions	of	the	mine.							
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And if you have a system of allocations going 
-as you always must where you can speak of change- 
it will be the rates and kinds of pay-offs 
of alternative allocations within that system 
 that determine whether they will be adopted,  
that is, institutionalized.  
- Fredrik Barth 1967 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4: The Politics of Mining 
 
The will to improve and the governmental ability to regulate the ASGM sector in P-Z 
depends, as we have seen, upon many conditions. While ASGM is sweepingly generalized 
across countries and continents as an activity characterized by its informal character, its 
(ab)use of mercury and its link to poverty alleviation (Seccatore et al 2014), the case of P-Z 
stands out primarily because of its peculiar history giving rise to its specific, current 
composition. Two components, or rather the combination of two components in this history, 
distinguish P-Z from other ASGM sites. First, the long trajectory of ASGM in parallel with 
the attempts of scaling up production through different governing regimes. Second, the early 
industrialization of the mining sector, i.e. SADCO and its legacy. This combination has had a 
significant effect on the formation of local identity, the habitus of mining and the way mining 
regulation is conceived locally. It creates a story of the current situation, a story in which 
narrative elements are modified, adjusted or accentuated according to the context of 
application. Similarly, regulative authorities conduct their work according to an understanding 
(a story) of the current situation of ASGM in P-Z. There are distinguishable frontstage (in 
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contexts like the inspections in the previous chapter) and backstage (ARCOM’s office or 
mines/processing plants without the presence of regulators) features to this which could be 
theorized through the writings of Erwing Goffman (1959). Yet, instead of venturing into 
social-psychology, this chapter seeks to examine the role of knowledge in this controversy. 
More concretely, I am interested in how different regimes of knowledge guide the 
stakeholders in their self-identification and in their confrontation with other actors.  
Put differently, we can say that underpinning the accounts of the current situation of 
regulation and mining politics in P-Z, there are claims about the objective truth of this 
situation, claims that reflect different epistemologies among the stakeholders. For instance, 
the scientific community informing governmental authorities on the environmental 
degradation, applies a natural scientific discourse that claims to provide for an objective and 
¨realistic¨ description of the eco-system in P-Z and how mining affects this (cf. Robbins 2012: 
97). Local miners on the other hand, apply an experienced-based explanationi on the current 
situation, in which the naturalization of gold mining is an inherent element, and regulation is 
conceived as an obstacle towards a legitimate means of subsistence. There are commonalities 
between these ¨habits of thinking¨ (139), for instance about the processes to extract gold from 
the ore, yet there is a major difference in the target for setting this knowledge into motion (i.e. 
scientists aiming towards regulation while local miners aiming to produce capital, albeit in 
very different degrees). 
Contrastingly, from a political ecologist perspective with an inclination towards the 
social constructivism of nature/environment and its meaning, the story of ASGM in P-Z as an 
account of environmental degradation can essentially be conceived as a ¨struggle over ideas 
about nature, in which one group prevail not because they hold a better account of a 
process…but because they access and mobilize social power to create consensus on the truth¨ 
(Robbins 2012: 127). This correlates with Foucault’s lesson that truth is a mundane matter 
and an effect of power rather than an objective fact derived from empirical observation (70). 
It is worth quoting Foucault on this point:  
Truth is a thing of this world: it is produced only by virtue of multiple forms of constraints. And it induces 
regular effects of power. Each society has its regime of truth, its general politics of truth: that is, the types of 
discourse that it accepts and makes function as truth. (1980:131, in Robbins 2012:70)  
The implication of Foucault’s insight is a relativity of the epistemological foundations of 
stakeholder’s moral claims to what gold mining is and should be. But of course, this type of 
claims is always political, i.e. imbued with a normative agenda. In relation to Foucault’s 
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words it is, for instance, possible to observe that the operating ¨regime of truth¨ in P-Z has 
avoided the recognition of environmentalism as a discourse of truth. Scientists and policy 
makers on the other hand, work according to authoritative wisdom from natural science and 
struggle to accept the practical knowledge of local miners.  
This chapter seeks to untangle the claims of stakeholders and examine how they 
interact. I will do so by presenting a sequence of three empirical accounts that serve to 
illustrate this point of departure. The first account emphasizes the institution of informal gold 
mining, where the use of mercury is an integral component today as it has been for at least 
400 years. This account also illustrates how religious faith may be part of the morality of 
mining. The second account exemplifies the collective efforts of the mining community to 
oppose regulations and external interference with local mining praxis. The third account 
illustrates governmental representatives’ efforts to engage in capacitation and training of local 
miners. A commonality through this sequence is the controversial use of mercury, which is 
currently receiving global attention among scholars, activists and politicians in touch with 
ASGM. 
Yet, before I turn to these empirical stories, some more theoretical reflection on the 
issue of knowledge and worldview is addressed in the following section. In particular, as I 
have explicitly identified this thesis as a work in political ecology, I wish to ground this 
approach in the history of ideas to illustrate that beyond political ecology’s roots in Marxism 
and cultural ecology (Robbins 2012: 25-48), there is a certain world-view emerging from 
dominating ideas and authoritative exponents. Hence, in self-reflective terms, this points to 
the conditionality of this scholarly tradition that profoundly and necessarily shapes its 
approach to study social phenomena (in analogy with other disciplines or other people’s 
thinking about the world). I will be brief on this, and although it is a side-track to the analysis 
at hand, I regard the self-reflective element as important in the exercise of de-constructing 
other views of the world because it underscores that my view is also a situated perspective 
indeed. 
 
On worldviews, ontologies and epistemologies 
The Oxford dictionaryii defines ¨ontology¨ as: the branch of metaphysics dealing with the 
nature of being. ¨Epistemology¨, on the other hand, is defined as: the theory of knowledge, 
especially with regards to its methods, validity, and scope, and the distinction between 
justified belief and opinion. At first glance, ontology and epistemology are clearly two 
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different concepts, the first dealing with the nature of being and the latter with the theory of 
knowledge Still, it might be argued that they go hand-in-hand since an ontological statement 
hardly avoids an epistemological justification and vice-versa.  
If we consider political ecology’s claim of nature as socially constructediii, Robbins 
links this back to Kant’s metaphysics, which proposes that ¨our ideas do not conform to the 
objects of the world around us but that, rather, objects are constituted by the world of our 
ideas¨ (Robbins 2012:123). The statement indicates an anthropocentric ontology that places 
humanity in an extraordinary-objective position rather than accepting the material conditions 
as constitutive to human existence within the world. This marks the beginning of what Tim 
Ingold claims to be: ¨…the notion of the global environment, far from marking humanity’s 
reintegration into the world, signals the culmination of a process of separation¨ (2008:462, my 
emphasis). For phenomenologists like Ingold, this illustrates a move from conceiving the 
environment as ¨a lifeworld¨ to ¨a globe¨ where humans obtain an outsider’s perspective and 
thereby a shift in ontological orientation (463). The consequences are profound and it might 
be argued that this sets the grounds for the Enlightenment and the whole idea of human 
domination of nature. 
    According to Descola (2013), the separation of humanity from nature began in the 
Christian-Judean 17th century Europe where the meaning of God also changed with the 
emergence of scientific explanations. It was paralleled and presumably deeply enmeshed in 
the separation of the mind from the body, i.e. the Cartesian dualism. Yet, God was still highly 
present at this stage and Descola emphasizes how great thinkers such as Bacon, Descartes and 
Spinoza created a trend where God´s ¨finalist convictions¨ was substituted with God’s role as 
an organizer, which again legitimized an analysis of nature (Descola 2013:68-9). Spinoza 
would still maintain a belief in universal determination, but: ¨[W]hat now came into existence 
was a notion of Nature as an autonomous ontological domain, a field of inquiry and scientific 
experimentation, an object to be exploited and improved…¨ (ibid.). Referring to Foucault and 
The Order of Things, Descola underlines that the emergence of the modern concept of ¨Man¨ 
was a consequence of this, and furthermore that the dichotomy between ¨Man¨ and ¨Nature¨ is 
unparalleled in human history (70). 
In opposition to Kant’s metaphysics and radical social construction, Martin Heidegger 
and later on Pierre Bourdieu, propose a more social ontologyiv. These two authors also share a 
critic of the Cartesian dichotomy and suggest that: 
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…as individuals we are thrown: we come into a world not of our making. This world polarizes us, mediates and 
constrains our understanding of ourselves in it. We exist in it, first and foremost, and it is “existingly” – through 
our traffic or engagement with the things and with others in the world – that we arrive at this understanding… 
(Weiner 2001:5) 
For Heidegger, the existential analytics, i.e. what human nature is and how we relate to the 
world, is the ontological exercise that should come prior to studying social phenomena. In this 
sense: “ontology then becomes the excavation of epistemology” (Weiner 2001:3) where our 
assumptions (as researchers) needs to be properly addressed. Similarly, Bourdieu (1977) is 
very much concerned about the conditions in which ¨objectivity¨ is (re) produced, not only as 
a focus for study, but also in a self-reflective manner (epistemologically).  
It can be argued that this outline is highly Eurocentric, but the point here is to notice 
how a shift in ontology (the perception of being) led to a whole tradition of epistemological 
explanations (the Scientific Revolution and onwards) and not the other way around. We might 
add that the coupling of science and secularism has undermined the explanatory power of 
religion, yet as I will briefly illustrate below, this is not necessarily the casev. Moreover, 
knowledge is but one component in the politics of identity which articulates differently in 
different places, and indeed differently in specific places as well. 
 Hence, it is a tough treat to generalize on one local worldview in Portovelo-Zaruma. 
As in most communities throughout Ecuador, and the world for that matter, in 2016 we can at 
best talk about some kind of glocal soup of identities. Still, there are local trademarks and 
specificities about a place that works as constituents in a collective, local identity which 
reflect a way of seeing and identifying with the world. Moreover, local identity is shaped by 
both commonalities (adaption and assimilation) and contrasts (response and autonomous-
movements) with neighbouring communities and its exposure to other cultural influences (e.g. 
Incan/Spanish/North-American hegemonies in P-Z). And, as this thesis has accounted for 
sofar, artisanal gold mining is a key constituent in the politics of identity. Not only has mining 
been a centrifugal force for livelihood orientation, the history of P-Z shows us that the 
continuity of mining even exceeds fundamental markers of identity such as Catholicism and 
the Spanish language.  
Nevertheless, P-Z is not alone in this sense. There are many ASGM communities 
throughout the world and in technical terms, we pretty much know what they are up to 
(Telmer & Veiga 2009). Yet, each and every one of them are situated in highly diverse 
cultural and political conditions (independent variables) and accordingly articulate themselves 
differently. Hence we can conceive ASGM as a commonality (dependent variable) for all 
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these societies, where the independent variables work as modifiers. Or we can see it the other 
way around, for instance by zooming in on the province of El Oro and conceive cultural and 
political conditions as shared (dependent variables) and the particularity of ASGM as an 
independent variable, i.e. as a modifying force.  
Both ways to conceive this arguably have something to them; the gold mining 
community of P-Z differs profoundly from the gold mining communities in Mongolia (High 
2014) but also from the fishing communities in the mangroves outside the city of Machala (to 
use a ¨local¨ example). At the same time there are important similarities in both cases. Despite 
the differences among Mongolian and Ecuadorian gold miners, they both deal with the same 
substances/commodities in their daily work and face similar challenges. Likewise, the 
fishermen in the mangroves and the miners in Portovelo share numerous socio-cultural 
attributes (language, religion, citizenship etc.). My point is not to enter a discussion of 
universalism and particularism, but rather to conceptualize the limits of gold mining as an 
independent or a dependent variable. When addressing the question of a local worldview in P-
Z, we could accordingly ask if a third-generation miner from Portovelo, who has worked all 
his life in the mines, has a worldview that resembles that of the Mongolian miner or the 
Ecuadorian fisherman? Surely, the heavy influence of language and religion will overshadow 
the praxis of mining and thus incline the probability of sameness towards the Ecuadorian 
fisherman. However, in ontological terms, there might be more sameness between the miners 
compared to the fisherman who has lived all his life by the sea. The miner from Portovelo and 
the miner from Mongolia are likely to share several cognitive patterns as they perform their 
work in their respective mines and share an extensive amount of embodied knowledge (the 
habitus of mining). They probably also share notions of purpose as to why they (continue to) 
mine for gold (economic rationality) and an orientation towards the mountain, in contrast to 
the fisherman who orients himself towards the sea.  
If we think of this in the light of epistemology, we might imagine how the three of 
them (the fisherman and the two miners) share the feature of practical wisdom as the basis of 
their daily work. On a general level we can conceive this as a dominance of knowledge how to 
mine for gold and how to fish, in contrast to knowledge that explains the chemical/technical 
processes involved. In the context of ASGM in P-Z there are several knowledge schemes at 
play simultaneously, including overlaps that create both frictions and cooperationvi. These 
knowledge schemes can be systems of classification resonating with different moral grounds 
(e.g. the divergent attributes given to mercury/cyanide among miners vs. people external to 
the mining context) or knowledge reflecting different rationalities about the human relation to 
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nature (e.g. local vs. external views on the (ab)use of the environment). For instance, the large 
bulk of informal/illegal mining is very much based on acquired practical knowledge and low 
budgets (subsistence mining) that thwarts the possibility of compliance with regulations. In 
contrast, there are small-scale miners that have been formalized and currently work, albeit in 
varying degrees, along the lines of regulations by profiting on entrepreneurial adaptation 
(economic-legal knowledge). In this segment, the practical knowledge of ¨how to mine¨ is 
likewise, arguably confronted with state regulation that is very much based on knowledge of 
¨what mining is supposed to entail¨ (largely derived from a scientific-academic, epistemic 
community). Yet, the outcome, as I illustrated in the previous chapter, is far from given, but 
propagated as a win-win situation where environmental impacts are mitigated and revenues 
for the mining operators increased. The point here is that whilst both of these epistemic 
communities have normative and political dimensions that are coupled with economic and 
environmental arguments, they are qualitatively different in relation to the question of what 
gold mining is, and epistemologically different in relation to the knowledge/theory that guides 
their approach. 
A more radical take on this emerges in contexts where questions of resource 
governance have to deal with divergent ontologies on what the world, or the universe for that 
matter, is. Law (2011) explores this by making a point that Australian Aborigines (alongside, 
yet emphasizing their particularity, other indigenous groups) simply have a very different 
world-view compared to conventional Western thought (emerging from the history of ideas 
outlined above). In fact, the difference is so great that it resembles an incommensurable 
difference. Hence Law asks:  
Is it simply that people believe different things about reality? Or is it that there are different realities being done 
in different practices? If the first of these positions is right, then we’re in the business of beliefs, perspectives and 
epistemologies. If it’s the second then we are backed into issues of ontology. Here’s the analytically radical 
nature of this second position. We are in the business of treating reals as effects of contingent and heterogeneous 
enactments, performances or sets of relations. (2011:2, italics in original) 
Law’s point is that the Western (hegemonic and imperialist view) ontology of a ¨one-world-
view¨ that separates humans from nature is politically imbued because it colonizes and 
suppresses other, well documented, multiple ontologies, and he actually portray this encounter 
as ¨catastrophic¨ (9). From a slightly different angle, this is also the starting point for thinkers 
such as Arturo Escobar (e.g. 2008), Marisol de la Cadena (e.g. 2010) and several othersvii. 
Yet, as mentioned both here and in the introduction of this thesis, the business of divergent 
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ontologies become clearer in post-colonial contexts that includes the ¨indigenous element¨, 
although not necessarily (as Law emphasizes, this is also a problem within the ¨North itself¨ 
(2011:11)), and henceforth I limit myself to speak of epistemological differences. That is, I 
assume (or reduce) the question of different realities to be shared as a ¨one-world-view¨ 
among the stakeholders in P-Z.   
 In the following I turn to illustrate the most rudimentary mining practice in P-Z and 
how this articulates in a specific case. 
 
 
The habitus of informal mining 
There is a mining museum in Portovelo. It is situated in a hill with a view of the town’s 
central squares and the football field below. The owner and administrator of the museum, 
Magner Turner, is a mineral prospector and descendent of miners with American roots. He is 
a well-known figure both locally and nationally and has extensive knowledge about 
Ecuadorian geology and the trajectory of mining. From the outset he was enthusiastic and 
eager to tell me about the mining in P-Z, especially its history and geological technicalities. 
During my stay I visited him and the museum (which is not very frequented except for 
weekends and holidays) several times and we had long talks about mining issues.  
On this particular occasion, however, we were not alone. An Ecuadorian friend of 
mine was present, but more importantly there where two men panning for gold in the middle 
of an open area of the museum. After a brief tour around the museum we approached the two 
men sitting beside a big rock that was hollowed out like a big pot. Apparently, these men and 
the owner were close friends and they came to the museum to carry out this work, not only 
because of friendship, but also to seek advice and discuss the prospects of their search for 
gold. They did not directly use the hollowed rock, but held their metal pan with concentrated 
ore/sand in the space right above it. With our eyes gazing curiously at the sand in the pan, we 
greeted the two men, one of them slightly younger than the other. The youngest man 
(hereafter Claudio) was using a rock the size of a melon to crush the sand that covered the 
bottom of the pan. He put a lot of weight into it and it looked like hard work. Occasionally, 
the other man (hereafter Miguel) poured some more water into the mix and Claudio paused to 
have a look at the sand. He moved the pan so that the water would move around in circles and 
then poured away some of it before he examined the heaviest particles that gathered towards 
one side of the bottom. We all saw the glimmers, but unlike them, my friend and I could 
hardly distinguish gold from other minerals.  
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- Hmm…it doesn´t want to let go right?, said Claudio.  
- We have to continue grinding, said Miguel. 1  
Claudio continued the laborious task of pressing the rock against the sand in the bottom of the 
pan. The conversation went slow in the beginning. Both men were hesitant and only gave 
very brief answers to our questions. As we got to introduce ourselves properly, that is; as we 
explained the purpose and intention of our presence, the two men dropped their shoulders and 
talked more freely. This effect was utterly enhanced when the owner of the museum 
confirmed and commented upon my research plan. Until then, the two men had not said much 
about what they were doing. Now, they explained that they were panning this material as a 
test to see if it was worthwhile to exploit larger quantities of the same material. I asked them 
where they had found this sand. Miguel, probably in his mid-forties, poured some more water 
into the pan while he answered;  
- In a river far from here...  
- Yes, we are doing this because my friend here got an idea to extract two kilos (of 
gold) and time will show if we can find something, commented Claudio.  
- Are you doing this all by yourself? asked my friend.  
- Yes only the two of us, and properly armed of course, replied Miguel.2  
He then continued to say that they had walked several hours to find the spot where they dug 
out the sand they were now testing. Sometimes, he said, these walks could even stretch over 
several days. He also commented upon the dangers involved in these hikes because people (la 
gente) are highly observant and talk very outspokenly (habla mucho) about gold diggers. I 
could not resist my curiosity to ask if it really was necessary to carry weapons for protection. 
Miguel looked at me very seriously as to make me understand the realities involved, before he 
calmly said that: 
- If someone is going to kill you, then you’re only left with the choice to kill him 
before he kills you.3  
He told me this in such a tone and with such an expression in his face that he almost 
convinced me that he had actually experienced this kind of situation.  																																																								1	-	Hmm…no quiere salir verdad?, dijo Claudio. 
- Hay que seguirle dando, dijo Miguel.	2	- En un rio muy lejos de aquí… -	Si, estamos haciendo esto porque se le metió la idea de los dos kilos (de oro) hace unos seis meses y vamos a 
ver si encontramos algo por ahí, comentó Claudio. 
- Y van solo los dos?, preguntó mi amigo. 
- Si solo los dos y vamos bien armados pues, respondió Miguel.	3	- Si alguien te quiere matar, pues, no te queda otra que matarlo primero.	
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- Shit, this sounds quite heavy, I responded.  
- Well, that’s how it is down here, people kill for gold, we don’t, but we have to be 
very careful, Miguel responded4.  
He told us that he did this with Claudio because he fully trusted him. He also told us that they 
were very careful not to talk about their doings to anyone else (although they did talk to us 
about it!) out of fear to create gossip and attract competitors. 
 Once more they paused to examine the sand for gold. Claudio repeated the same 
movements with the pan; the water moved around and around and he spilled it out along with 
some of the non-valuable material. Then he pointed at the glimmering particles in the sand 
and told us that these were particles of gold. He explained to us that the gold was trapped 
inside the sulphur grains. Accordingly, the reason why he crushed the sand with the stone was 
to release the gold. Admittedly, they had also added mercury to capture the gold although 
they began the conversation by calling mercury for ¨chemicals¨ (químicos). Evidently, this 
was because they were dubious about our agenda given the fact that the governmental 
prospect of a mercury prohibition was on the lips of everyone in P-Z during these days. After 
some more panning, Claudio gathered a tiny droplet of amalgam, i.e. a mix of gold and 
mercury, and moved it around with his fingers. It was very liquid in its consistency, mostly 
resembling the properties of mercury.  
- Isn´t it dangerous to touch the mercury like that?, I asked.  
- Naah, nothing happens. If you drink it, on the other hand, you will have a serious 
problem), Claudio answered5.  
They both looked at the amalgam in the bottom of the pan, a bit disappointed.  
- We have to keep on grinding a bit more I think, said Miguel6.  
The owner of the museum came around and Miguel addressed him saying:  
- This gold is really misbehaving; it just doesn’t want to be released.  
- Misbehaving indeed, confirmed Claudio, as he continued the work with the stone.  
- Yes this material has a lot of sulphur in it, said the museum owner7.  																																																								4	-	Mierda, esto ha sido cosa seria entonces, respondí yo. -	Claaaro, así es la cosa aquí, la gente mata por el oro...nosotros no, pero hay que tener mucho cuidado, 
respondió Miguel.	5	-	Y el mercurio, no les hace daño al tocarlo así?, pregunté yo. 
- No, no pasa nada. Ahora si te lo tragas ahí si estas fregado, respondió Claudio.	6	-	Hay que seguirle dando un poco mas creo, dijo Miguel.	7	- Ha sido malcriado este oro, no quiere salir. 
- Malcriadísimo, confirmó Claudio mientras continuaba el trabajo con la piedra. -	Si tiene muchísimo sulfuro ese material, dijo el dueño del museo.	
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They told us that what was left in the pan by now was the extract of a bag of 15-20 kilos of 
sand material and that they had worked with this for two whole days. The use of the word 
¨malcriado¨ (here I translate it to ¨misbehaving¨, but literally it translates into ¨badly raised¨) 
when referring to the gold was new to me. ¨Malcriado¨ is typically invoked when referring to 
a child that behaves improperly. It may raise a somewhat comic contradiction when parents 
refer to one of their children as ¨malcriado¨, but this is part of daily speech and goes by 
without much reflection. Nonetheless, when referring to the gold as ¨malcriado¨, Miguel was 
referring to the particularity of this gold to remain hidden/trapped in the sulphur despite all 
the efforts invested by him and his companion. The gold simply did not behave the way it 
should.  
The two men were dubious about the promise of this material. As mentioned, they had 
spent two days panning and several weeks exploring a riverbank in a secret hinterland. 
Subsequently, they had carried test material, probably disguised by the darkness of the night, 
a long way. All this effort meant that there was a good portion of hope mixed into their doubts 
about its profitability. Miguel’s plan was to collect two kilos of gold and he was to dedicate 
another six months to explore and search in the rivers of the region. With two kilos 
(approximately amounting to 70 000 dollars given the gold price at this time), he said, he 
could build himself a decent house. Meanwhile, in relation to the comments of the gold being 
¨malcriado¨, Claudio told us that:  
- The gold is a jealous thing. If you go out to look for it with too high ambitions, 
you’re not gonna find anything. Even worse if you have any bad intentions. One has to 
go with a clean heart.8 
He then told us of his father who had been a miner for a lifetime and a person that found 
considerable amounts of gold, yet spent it all in the ¨life of liquor and women¨ (la mala vida 
de trago y mujeres). This lifestyle, he said, had destroyed his father and been devastating to 
his family. He continued by asking us how old we thought he was, whereby we responded 
¨around 25¨. He said that he was 32 years old but maintained himself so young because he did 
not smoke, drink or take any drugs. He told us that he had overcome that period in his life.   
At this point in the conversation the two men began to reveal their religious inclination 
towards a Pentecostal church with local footings in the community. Miguel actually told us 
that he was a preacher of this church and had been for the past two years. Claudio and the 
owner of the museum were both followers of the same church. Their faith consisted in two 
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clear dimensions; the first was their declaration of having left their old lives of wrath behind, 
meaning that they had abandoned the materialistic pleasures of wealth along with refraining 
from alcohol, drugs and tobacco. These were, not surprisingly, sinful acts according to their 
new texts (los textos). The other notable dimension to their religious convincement was that 
of a prophecy. This prophecy was about the days of doom that were closing in and virtually 
were almost upon us by now. In this scenario God would separate ¨good and bad people¨, 
rewarding the former and punishing the latter. My friend and I went along with this 
conversation, a bit aloof, but respectfully listening to their talk. Yet, perhaps because of a felt 
distance or the lack of religious resonance, Miguel and the owner of the museum 
complemented their talk about the prophecy of doom by referring to the discourse of global 
warming and scientific announcements of global climate change.  
- At this point everyone knows, even the scientists. The world is coming to an end and 
time is running out, said Miguel9.  
I did express some degree of agreement on this statement, that is; I confirmed the scientific 
consensus on global warming, but I also marked my distance to the religious components in 
this belief. It felt right to do this because what had started out as a smooth conversation was 
now markedly changing character into a religious and increasingly intensive monologue. The 
owner of the museum felt our distance and subtle scepticism and remarked that it had taken 
him ¨many years to be convinced by the holy texts¨. We then somehow managed to pull the 
conversation back to the gold in the pan.  
By now we had spent three hours talking. During this time the two men had continued 
to rub the sand material in the pan. They had occasionally paused to have a look at the 
quantity of gold-mercury amalgam, but continued working with the stone, convinced that it 
was possible to press out more gold form the sulphur grains. Towards the end it was Miguel 
who carried out the work. Claudio poured some more water into the pan and once again they 
revised the sand in search of gold. The size of the amalgam droplet had grown. Claudio 
picked it up between his fingers, although it tended to disintegrate as in the previous occasion. 
He then pulled out a cloth (a piece of a cotton handkerchief), which he used to squeeze the 
little drop of amalgam in order to remove water and some of the mercury. It somehow failed 
to filter properly and he complained that the cloth was not the appropriate one. Still, he held 
this little ball of amalgam between his fingers saying: 																																																																																																																																																																													8	- El oro es celoso. Si uno busca con demasiadas ambiciones no va a encontrar nada. Peor si uno tiene malas 
intenciones. Hay que ir nomas con el corazón limpio.		9	- Ya lo saben todos, incluso los científicos. El mundo se viene abajo y se acerca la hora, dijo Miguel.	
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- Well, we got something in the end didn’t we? 
- Yes, but this gold is misbehaving indeed, no wonder why people don’t exploit it. 
They ought to know by now, said Miguel referring to people who would have 
exploited this material if it had proven to be rich in gold10. 
There was an atmosphere of slight disappointment, somehow balanced by statements like: 
¨well, there is undoubtedly gold here, that´s for sure¨ and ¨if there had been a little bit more 
(gold) I wouldn’t have hesitated at all¨11. The owner of the museum who ventured around 
back and forth between his house and our spot, asked to see ¨the small ball¨ (la bolita) upon 
which he said: ¨ah, this ball doesn’t contain more than about two grams¨.12 As to conclude, 
despite the hopes of the two men, they seemed to reconcile themselves with the fact that this 
material did not hold very much promise for any further exploitation and that they would have 
to continue searching somewhere else. With that conclusion we withdrew from the museum 
and the company of these adventurous men. We said good-bye and good luck in their future 
search and strolled down to the town centre where we caught the local bus up to Zaruma.  
 In this case, Claudio and Miguel relied on manual alluvial gold mining, a technique 
that is even older than the subterranean extraction of ore from tunnels which is characteristic 
for the mining in P-Z. Still, the manual process of recovering gold from ore with the use of a 
pan, a stone to grind the material and mercury to trap the gold, is the same regardless of its 
extraction in a mountain or a river. The only difference is that ore from the mountain must be 
milled to become a sandy material. Anyway, manual alluvial gold mining is an ancient 
technique, only modified by the introduction of mercury in the early 17th century, which also 
implies the burning of the amalgam and the problematic mercury release into the 
environment. Yet, in this context, the environmental concern was hardly a subject. Mercury 
was rather conceived as a natural ingredient to this process, much like adding salt to food. 
Here, the use of mercury as salt was not critically addressed; it serves an important function 
and it works - today, as 400 years ago.  
Besides accounting for some of the particular beliefs that accompanied Miguel and 
Claudio in their search for gold, this story represents the institutional traits in the habitus of 
artisanal mining. The illegal aspect of this, however, is of course due to the recent legislation 																																																								10	-	Si	salió	algo	no?	-	Si,	pero	esta	muy	malcriado	este	oro,	con	razón	que	no	están	sacando	nada	de	ahí,	yo	lo	saben	esos	manes,	dijo	Miguel	refiriéndose	a	gente	que	hubiera	explotado	este	material	si	fuera	rico	en	oro.	11	-	Bueno,	pero	si	hay	oro,	de	eso	no	hay	duda.	-	Con	un	poquito	mas	(de	oro)	no	hubiera	dudado.	12	-	Dos	gramos	nomas	ha	de	tener	esa	bolita.	
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placing this institution at the margins of the law. Hence the habitus exceeds, by far, the 
governmental attempts to criminalize it, and it constitutes a prototype that works as a key 
symbol (Ortner 1973) in local identity.  
Sherry Ortner enlists several indicators on how to identify key symbols within a 
culture (ibid.: 1339), but basically what we are talking about here, are indicators that point to 
a focus of interests and appears in many contexts (which corresponds to mining in P-Z). Yet, 
Ortner also makes a distinction between summarizing and elaborating symbols, in which the 
former is a symbol holding local integrity and respect that synthesize and ¨´collapse´ complex 
experiences and relate the respondent to the grounds of the system as a whole¨ (1344). The 
elaborating (key) symbols on the other hand, are ¨valued primarily for the ordering of 
conceptual experience, i.e. for providing cultural ´orientation´¨ (ibid.). Here, while analysing 
the prototype of the artisanal miner, we can actually see how this distinction somehow 
collapse, i.e. the artisanal miner both synthesize an array of activities and also contains a 
normative direction of autonomy.  
 Furthermore, if we see this in relation to Bourdieu’s definition of habitus, we can 
acknowledge the deep legacy of artisanal mining, which includes:  
...systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures, predisposed to function as structuring 
structures, that is, as principles of the generation and structuring of practices and representations which can be 
objectively ¨regulated¨ and ¨regular¨ without in any way being the product of obedience to rules, objectively 
adapted to their goals without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations 
necessary to attain them and, being all this, collectively orchestrated without being the product of the 
orchestrating action of a conductor. ̈ (1977:72) 
It might be argued that Claudio and Miguel had a very clear intentionality upon doing what 
they were doing, but the point here is that they enacted a form of mining that represents a 
¨structured structure¨ that lies latent within the communities of P-Z. It does not need any 
internal explanation upon being enacted, it is internalized a long time ago, reproduced on an 
everyday basis, and it is what I refer to as habitus of informal mining that can be juxtaposed 
with the prototype of the artisanal miner.  
What should also be noticed here is that this habitus/prototype emerged even before 
regulation became an issue (before the Incan rulings in the 15th century) and that it has been 
sustained and consolidated at the margins of regulations ever since. Henceforth, it has an 
intrinsic element of opposition to it. The next account displays the use of this prototype as a 
powerful imagery to mobilize and unite the mining community to oppose and confront the 
regulations that threaten its existence.  
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Political mobilization 
On the 23rd of July 2015, there was a demonstration on behalf of the mining community in 
Portovelo. The demonstration was organized by APROPLASMIN (association of owners of 
processing plants) and consisted of a peaceful march through the town, a stop with an appeal 
outside ARCOM’s offices, and in the end a press conference outside the office of 
APROPLASMIN. Approximately two thousand people showed up. Not only miners, but all 
sorts of people – merchants, restaurant owners, shop keepers, chauffeurs and housewives - 
from the local communities were present to show their support. The event was covered by 
local newspapers and radios, as well as national TV channels (Ecuavisa, Canal Uno, RTS), 
and got considerable attention. The protest addressed the issues of regulation and control. 
More precisely the demonstration represented the mining community’s complaint on: unfair 
closures of several processing plants, camera surveillance, bad conduct by ¨certain¨ ARCOM 
officials, the lack of feasible alternatives to the use of mercury, lack of progress to implement 
a tailings-pipeline (arenoducto), a sense of un-just privileges given to the largest operators, 
and the failure of ARCOM to stop the continuation of mining (i.e. detonations) underneath the 
city of Zarumaviii. 
Prior to the demonstration I had been in contact with Danilo Castillo, the head of 
APROPLASMIN, who invited me to come along this day. Besides leading the most important 
mining association in the region, this man is also a councillor in the municipality of Zaruma 
and an owner of a processing plant. Accordingly, he is very much involved in the politics of 
gold mining, albeit from different positions. Moreover, through APROPLASMIN he is 
involved with both national and foreign university collaborations with or without links to 
INIGEMM. Castillo was open and friendly, but understandably a busy señor. 
The march was to commence at ten am at the roundabout where the two rivers, 
Amarillo and Calera, unite. Predictably enough, there were some delays, but the march began 
only a few minutes past schedule. However, many people had arrived early and at the moment 
when I arrived, it was difficult to find a place with shadow. Hence, the equatorial sun was 
slowly consummating us while we waited for the action to take place. Street vendors took 
advantage of this, selling refreshments, ice cream and sodas. I even noticed some people 
having cold beer during this morning hour. People were mingling around, but for the most 
part standing together with their fellow companions. The miners and the processing plants 
workers wore their helmets and rubber boots making them very easy to identify. Many also 
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wore a t-shirt with the name of the mine/processing plant where they worked, while others 
wore shirts with some kind of pro-mining slogan. Everyone however, were informally 
dressed, even the leaders of the march. This was undoubtedly part of the strategy (as well as a 
practical relief!) as the multitude was to represent and symbolize the working class of the 
region and in some way making a distinction between them and the uniformed authorities 
who control them.  
As the march began, the narrator of the day began to repeat three, four messages 
through a megaphone while sitting in a pick-up truck equipped with two large speakers in the 
back. He introduced the multitude to the slogans of the day that were shouted repeatedly 
throughout the march: ¨unified miners will never be defeated!¨ and ¨he can be seen, he can be 
felt, the miner is present¨13. For anyone slightly familiar with Latin American history, they 
will know about the roots of socialism and its revolutionary movements. The first slogan 
above is a derivation of the lyrics in the song written by the Chilean Sergio Ortega: ¨el pueblo 
unido jamás será vencido¨, which has been a consolidating protest song for many working 
class movements in Latin America. It is also used world-wide in all sorts of mass-
demonstrations. Its origin, however, is the political context of Chile in 1973, prior to the coup 
d’état of Pinochet overthrowing the government of Salvador Allende. The second slogan (Se 
ve, se siente…) is also widely used in public protests, at least in Latin America, and as with 
the first one, the word ¨pueblo¨ (literally translated to ¨town¨, here meaning ¨people¨) was 
effectively substituted with ¨minero¨ (miner). In between these punch lines, a recurrent mantra 
was also: ¨Hail the mining!¨ (Que viva la minería!). This was typically shouted out by the 
narrator or someone else taking initiative and subsequently echoed by the crowd. 
The use (reproduction) of these slogans was very much expected. In fact, they are 
almost obligatory in events like these. People expect them and it facilitates the collective 
shouting and singing. Importantly, it also connects this particular protest with a long tradition 
of class struggle in Latin America. In this way it brings in an element of legitimacy that 
resonates with the historical, moral grounds of most people attending. People related to this 
and rapidly began to participate in the shouting. In analytical terms we may observe that the 
form of the demonstration (predictable and efficient) worked to enhance the message coming 
across as it had a boosting effect on people’s self-identification with the cause. This 
developed collectively as people observed each other.  																																																								13	Mineros	unidos	jamás	serán	vencidos!;	Se	ve,	se	siente,	el	minero	esta	presente! 
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The march was well underway and the atmosphere was good. Although people, 
especially some of the women, continuously shouted the slogans and probably woke up with a 
sore throat the next day, the mood of the crowd was far from aggressive. Rather, it was 
surprisingly easy-going, perhaps due to the fact that there were very few outside spectators 
during the first kilometres without any settlement except for a few mechanic workshops and 
some car repair shops. Yet, whenever the front group observed the TV cameras, they 
increased their intensity, an act that spread backwards in the crowd.  
After about 40 minutes, the protesters (including myself) reached the first bridge, 
crossing the Amarillo River. At this point the leaders instructed the crowd to stop. The truck 
with the narrator managed to pass through the multitude to become the march’s arrow spear 
crossing the bridge. The bridge was also the gateway into the urban area of Portovelo with 
houses, buildings and importantly; spectators. The crowd followed the truck repeating the 
same slogans again and again, with increased passion at this point. After the bridge, the crowd 
continued straight ahead for another two blocks. The leaders and the media used the 
opportunity to take pictures, as this was one but few places where one could get a glimpse of 
the entire crowd in one stretch (about four blocks long). We then turned left and after some 
five, six blocks the march reached its first and most important destination; the ARCOM 
headquarters. As previously mentioned, ARCOM had their offices on the fourth floor of a 
relatively modern building situated on a corner with a view down on a crossroads. The crowd 
filled up the streets with the pick-up truck in the middle of the junction. It was time for the 
first speech of the day – a petition directed at ¨unfair regulation¨ conducted by ARCOM 
officials that were now hiding behind closed doors and windows. Castillo gave the speech and 
was enthusiastically supported by the crowd. His approach was rather diplomatic, as he 
appealed for dialogue and collaboration before pending over to a voice of complaint and 
finishing off with firm words of protest and demands of integrity on behalf of all the people 
that had showed up. The crowd shouted in his support, but there was no physical aggression at 
play. The most controversial act was perhaps a group of men shouting: ¨No more bribes, no 
more bribes!¨14. Castillo appealed, several times, for the ARCOM officials to come out, but 
without any luck. Still, they undoubtedly got the message. Although the protesters were not 
directly threatening, it would have been a very difficult undertaking for ARCOM 
representatives to enter the debate at this stage. In fact, Castillo later told me that there had 
been meetings between APROPLASMIN and ARCOM during the days prior to the 																																																								14	Ninguna	coima	mas,	ninguna	coima	mas!	
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demonstration and that the latter had promised to reverse several plant closures. Yet, 
APROPLASMIN had by then mobilized people throughout the province’s highlands (la parte 
alta), and accordingly the urge to protest was too great as to cancel it in the last hour.  
In the end, after about 30 minutes outside the ARCOM headquarters, the march 
continued up towards the town centre. On our way we crossed the Amarillo River once again, 
on a different bridge further upstream. We passed through the town centre and continued past 
the football field to end up just in front of the office of APROPLASMIN. People in the crowd 
continued to shout enthusiastically while the organizers set up the sound system for the 
following press conference. Once again, Castillo took the word, representing the mining 
community. The speech was quite similar, albeit a bit longer, to the one he gave in front of the 
ARCOM offices. Likewise, he started off in quite diplomatic terms, but then increased the 
loudness of his voice as he shouted out complaints, punch lines and utterances speaking the 
minds of the miners surrounding him. Importantly in this regard, Castillo explicitly mentioned 
the name of ELIPE as a company that, by profiting on their size, scale and government 
alliances, threatens to expand their dominance in P-Z. This was an efficient rhetorical move 
because it drew the line between us (local mining companies/cooperatives including artisanal 
miners) and them (large, external operators), as it resonated clearly with the hegemony of 
SADCO and the sense of marginalization among artisanal miners. More generally, Castillo 
alternated between directing himself to the President of the Republic (facilitated by media 
coverage) and the multitude in front of him. The following statement was part of his speech: 
Where is INIGEMM comrades? Where is the alternative for using mercury, comrades? That kind of 
collaborators, Mr. President, are those who make the Citizen’s Revolution look bad…That kind of entities who 
have simply transformed into a series of well-paid stage dolls!…because down here (in Portovelo) they have not 
proposed any solution!…and if someone can prove the opposite, here or anywhere in the country, please feel 
free to do so... Where is the alternative for using mercury? And please don’t come and tell us that: ¨you have to 
apply flotation, you have to apply cyanidation…¨ Among us there are miners that have been mining since they 
acquired the ability to reason!...and we Know that flotation works until certain densities, and we Know that 
cyanidation works up to a certain point…But what about the ¨free¨ gold? What about the coarse gold that is left 
in the pans? That´s the question we want to resolve technically! And that is an obligation for the ones who arrive 
here to propose solutions, but instead transform themselves into just another problem.15 																																																								15	Donde	esta	el	INIGEMM	compañeros?	Donde	esta	la	alternativa	para	no	ocupar	mercurio	compañeros?	
Ese	tipo	de	colaboradores,	señor	Presidente,	son	los	que	están	haciéndole	quedar	mal	a	la	revolución	
ciudadana.	Ese	tipo	de	entidades	que	lo	que	simplemente	se	han	convertido	en	una	serie	de	pipo-tascos,	por	
que	aquí	no	han	planteado	las	soluciones,	caso	contrario	que	lo	demuestren,	aquí	o	en	cualquier	parte	del	
país.	Donde	esta	la	alternativa	para	no	ocupar	el	mercurio?	Y	no	nos	vengan;	que	hay	que	flotar,	que	hay	que	
cianurar…aquí	hay	mineros	que	venimos	haciendo	la	actividad	desde	que	tenemos	uso	de	la	razón	y	sabemos	
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The statement was followed by the crowd shouting: ¨That is the truth, that is the truth!¨16, 
before he continued his speech. Point by point, Castillo highlighted the arguments that 
comprised the background for the demonstration. Meanwhile, his statement on mercury sheds 
light on several important aspects. He started off by mentioning the absence of INIGEMM. 
Then, by emphasizing the lack of alternatives for the use of mercury, he accentuated its 
importance for artisanal miners and blamed INIGEMM for not coming up with alternatives. 
With this point of departure, he directed himself towards President Correa to emphasize the 
uselessness or even worse; the hypocrisy of this entity that, in the collective mind of the 
multitude, does not contribute towards any solution. Then, and this is perhaps the most 
important issue, he indirectly referred to prior situations where miners have been told (by 
representatives from INIGEMM) to use flotation and cyanidation instead of processes 
involving mercury. This ¨advice¨ was interpreted as a major provocation as it questioned the 
knowledge and capacity of the local miners that, according to Castillo, have dealt with these 
questions ever since they acquired the capacity to reason. He then fired back, saying that they 
know that flotation works until a certain point and that they know that cyanidation works until 
a certain point, but, and this is a collective worry among the great majority of local miners; 
what about the situations where mercury is considered to be the most efficient technique 
(implicitly referring to the business with artisanal miners described in chapter 2, that is, 
situations where artisanal miners arrive to process small amounts of ore with course gold). 
What are the available techniques to replace the use of mercury in these situations? This and 
precisely this, was what the miners asked in the face of a prohibition on mercury. As for now, 
Castillo said, INIGEMM (implicitly including ARCOM), are merely provoking more 
problems by pretending to prohibit mercury without presenting any alternatives.  
Most of these arguments are easily countered. At a general level it might, for instance, 
be interfered that it is the proprietors of any given industry, not the authorities or other 
institutions, which are responsible for adjusting themselves to regulations. In economic terms, 
the industry and its owners should cover the transaction costs of adjusting to a new reality 
(with a prohibition of mercury). At least, the question of who is to cover the costs should be 
an open question to discuss. Furthermore, many trustees, to use Murray Li’s words, would 																																																																																																																																																																													
que	la	flotación	se	da	hasta	cierta	densidad	y	sabemos	que	la	cianuracion	se	da	hasta	ciertas	leyes.	Que	se	
hace	con	el	oro	libre?	Que	se	hace	con	el	oro	grueso	que	queda	en	las	ollas?	A	eso	queremos	soluciones	
técnicos.	Eso	es	obligación	de	venir	a	plantear	alternativas	para	la	solución	y	no	convertirse	en	un	problema	
mas	al	que	ya	lo	tenemos.  16	Eso	si	es	verdad,	eso	si	es	verdad!	
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have felt sorry for Castillo’s description of INIGEMM as an entity that merely creates more 
problems. INIGEMM’s involvement in P-Z has taken place since its foundation in 2009 (with 
the new Mining Act) and prior to this, through its predecessors DGGM (Directory of Geology 
and Mines17) and CODIGEM (Corporation for Development and Metallurgical Geological 
Mining Research18). Although Castillo questioned the efforts and results of this ¨will to 
improve¨, INIGEMM has indeed facilitated collaboration with foreign and national 
researchers and attracted both capital and scientific knowledge to P-Zix. Surely, the great 
majorities of ASGM contexts do not receive similar attention.  
Yet as I have emphasized quite thoroughly in previous chapters, the reasons why 
improvements fail to materialize cannot merely be placed on the shoulders of INIGEMM or 
ARCOM for that sake. What is more noteworthy in Castillo’s speech and echoed in the 
organization of the demonstration, is the momentum of collective protest despite the fact that 
the mining community is highly heterogeneous (the co-existence of varying scales of mining 
operations). Castillo achieved this momentum by evoking the imagery and the preoccupation 
of the artisanal miner working for subsistence. As already remarked, this is a powerful local 
image because it draws upon the long history of mining at the same time as it underscores the 
normative direction of autonomy and integrity in opposition to external interference. Simply 
put, it portrays the situation as a class struggle (cf. the socialist slogans) between ¨us¨ (local 
artisanal miners) and ¨them¨ (external authorities, in this case INIGEMM as an academic 
elite), while obscuring the strategic position of processing plants taking advantage of the 
current situation. In the following account, I give the word to INIGEMM to let this entity and 
its collaborators balance this perspective.    
 
The workshop - the limits of scientific knowledge 
In the beginning of September 2015, UNIDO (United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization) in collaboration with INIGEMM, GEF (Global Environment Facility) and the 
Peruvian Ministry of Environment held a two-day workshop for small-scale and artisanal 
miners in P-Z. The workshop was held at a hotel in the outskirts of Portovelo and was 
explicitly about improving processing practices and gold recovery without the use of mercury. 
About twenty-five local miners/administrators/workers of processing plants showed up along 
with a group of miners from the ASGM district of Piura in Northern Peru. After the opening 																																																								17	Dirección	General	de	Geología	y	Minas.	18	Corporación	de	Desarrollo	e	Investigación	Geológico	Minero	Metalúrgico.	
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act on behalf of representatives from UNIDO and INIGEMM, it was all set up for the first 
presentation, which was to focus on mineralogy, methods and equipment for mineral analysis. 
Yet, just before it started, a local processing plant owner raised his hand and said the 
following: 
Well, it is nice to see all of you here, but just before you start I wish to say that what we need here in Portovelo 
are practical and technical solutions to the use of mercury. I have been to so many workshops that theorize on 
mineralogy and scientific analyses and I simply do not benefit from it. We know the processes! What we need 
are practical and technical solutions.19 
The comment was well-received among the audience. One of the organizers even took the 
microphone and said that he understood the man and that the issue he raised was exactly what 
this workshop was aiming to address. The first presentation then got underway as planned. 
The presenter was an engineer working with mineralogical analyses for INIGEMM in Quito. 
He did the presentation in a conventional lecture style, using PowerPoint slides. As he 
proceeded, however, it became clear that his content was overly technical and theoretical, a 
fact that resonated all too clearly with the comment prior to his presentation. Yet, it was too 
late to turn around and the engineer continued as planned. After about forty minutes, the man 
who had raised his hand and made the comment, left the building accompanied by ten local 
miners. Apparently they had other things to take care of. The engineer continued, and finished 
off his presentation. No comments were made on the observation that a third of the audience 
had left before he finished. There was a short break, some more coffee, and the program 
continued with a lecture given by a teacher from the University of San Franciscox in Quito. 
The lecturer of this presentation had apparently noticed that several miners left, and gave a 
vivid performance engaging the audience with questions and comments. The difference from 
the prior presentation was stark. Yet, in many regards it was too late, as the ones who had left 
were not there to experience this. Quite contrary, the ones who had left had simply confirmed 
their anticipated suspicion towards attending the workshop.  
I do not use this example to direct a sturdy critique to the organizers of the workshop. 
There are many potential challenges in organizing a workshop for a diverse audience and as 
the program succeeded most people seemed satisfied, in particular the Peruvian group. The 																																																								19	Bueno,	me	alegra	verlos	todos	aquí,	pero	antes	de	comenzar	solo	quiero	decir	que	lo	que	necesitamos	aquí	
en	Portovelo	son	soluciones	practicas	y	técnicas	para	el	uso	de	mercurio.	He	estado	en	tantos	talleres	en	
donde	se	habla	de	mineralogía	y	análisis	científicos	y	simplemente	no	puedo	aprovechar	nada	de	eso.	
Sabemos	los	procesos!	Lo	que	necesitamos	son	soluciones	practicas	y	técnicas.   	
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problem, on the other hand, is the social effect of this episode. The man who made the 
comment this morning is an influential person in APROPLASMIN. I had talked to him on a 
previous occasion and got the impression of a man who was genuinely frustrated and worried 
by the current situation with increased input prices and decreasing gold prices. He was also 
more explicit about it than others and criticized the government for monopolizing both 
cyanide sodium (currently only imported and re-sold by the Ecuadorian State) and dynamite 
(currently only issued legally by the Ecuadorian Army). These two regulations, he said, had 
increased operational costs considerably, and led to a proliferation of illegal trafficking of 
both cyanide and dynamite.  
These worries resonated with the majority of the local population who felt that the 
economic situation was very slow and, as mentioned above, outspokenly characterized 
present times as ¨a crisis¨. This was the situational context for the demonstration as well as the 
workshop. Accordingly, the mining community was increasingly sensitive to any further 
regulations that would restrict their activity additionally. In this line of reasoning, it was 
probably with a fair amount of ambivalence that this man and his allies had showed up at the 
workshop in the first place. And then, with a strike of bad luck (?), the episode above 
occurred, and these men returned to their work to talk about this with their colleagues. The 
social effect thus becomes a reaffirmation of the negative impression of external actors that 
corresponds to the images drawn rhetorically during the demonstration described above.  
The example from the workshop illustrates how good intentions may lead to 
contradictory outcomes, but it also points to the importance of how scientific knowledge is 
presented to a non-academic audience. This point was actually touched upon by the 
representative from UNIDO during the opening act, saying that in these settings ¨everything 
presented may not be useful to everybody attending¨. And indeed, confronting a diverse 
audience might be a difficult performance to balance. Yet, this workshop was dedicated to the 
local miners in P-Z and accordingly, the content could legitimately be tuned to them at the 
expense of others (e.g. organizers, researchers, bureaucrats).  
In contrast to the example from the demonstration we can, in analytical terms, observe 
how form (power point/academic lecture style) served to carry the message of mineralogy 
towards an academic audience, while fundamentally failing to inform local miners. The 
presentation that followed, signals that this is not necessarily an incommensurable opposition, 
but in fact, achievable by changing the form (not necessarily the message). Thus, if we 
conceive the workshop as a collision of two divergent epistemologies leaning on divergent 
theories of knowledge and divergent rationales towards the praxis of ASGM, not only does 
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this resemble the problems of interdisciplinarity (e.g. natural science/positivism vs. political 
ecology/social constructivism), but it highlights the role of pedagogy and communication as 
means to narrow the gap (or prevent the collision) between these divergent ¨habits of 
thinking¨. In other words, there is hope, yet I argue that this is not merely a question of 
accommodating a scientific discourse to the language of local miners. As I have illustrated 
several times by now, there is an elephant in the room and it is not about the technicalities of 
mining, but rather about the political economy and the power relations inherent to the 
governance of ASGM in P-Z.   
 
The politics of the meaning of mining 
The three accounts illustrate different aspects of mining in P-Z. Meanwhile, the sequence all 
taken together aims to inform the reader on the logics of artisanal mining, how this is 
institutionalized as a local prototype that serves as a collective vehicle for local identity, how 
this can be used politically and how it responds to the government’s will to improve. While I 
have so-far used Bourdieu to suggest the existence of a mining habitus that, despite cultural 
variations, may be generalizable across ASGM contexts, his definition of doxa is useful to 
conceptualize the field in which this habitus originated:  
 ...the established cosmological and political order is perceived not as arbitrary, i.e. as one possible among 
others, but as self-evident and natural order which goes without saying (...) the agents ́ aspirations have the same 
limits as the objective conditions of which they are the product. (1977: 166)  
Doxa is the field of implicit meaning in which, in this case, gold mining at some point was 
carried out. But it is a field of meaning that, despite its predicaments in the legacy of mining, 
has been thoroughly contested through efforts to regularize, control and organize it, not only 
as a will to improve it, but also through a will to exploit it, i.e. the historical efforts by several 
regimes to take advantage of mining labor and channel the profits of mining out of P-Z. 
Hence, if the origins of the mining habitus were to be found in a doxic field, the contestation, 
whether in the shape of governmental efforts to exploit it or regulate it, has questioned its 
legitimacy and thus moved doxa into a field of opinions (heterodoxy/orthodoxy), that is, into 
the arena of politics (Bourdieu 1977:168).  
Still, in contrast to more recently emerging ASGM sites, the legacy of mining in P-Z 
is, as we have seen, both deep and complex. Accordingly, what Bourdieu terms as ¨the 
agents’ aspirations¨ corresponding to their ¨objective conditions¨ in the quote above, 
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encompasses ASGM contexts characterized by recent, artisanal exploitation that dominantly 
operates within the confines of poverty alleviation. In P-Z, the co-existence of several scales 
of mining, its emergence through the Incan rulings, through the Spanish hegemony towards 
its early industrialization, have developed a political field that contains a deep and 
multidimensional meaning of what mining is and can be. In this field, different variants of 
economic rationalities have co-existed, problematically yes, but consolidating towards 
sustaining the economic incentive to legitimize various kinds of mining operations (cf. Scott’s 
¨culture of extractivism¨ discussed in chapter 3).  
Only recently have this extractive logic been challenged by governmental concerns 
about its contaminating properties, yet as we can recall from chapter 1, the concern of 
malignant health consequences related to mercury exposure was observed already in the 17th 
century. And whilst new scientific knowledge is highly influential to the governmental will to 
improve environmental and security standards in this sector, the economic exploitation of 
artisanal miners is merely observed, but not further addressed. Rather, it is supported as an 
entrepreneurial achievement and used as a bridge for cooperation (cf. INIGEMM’s attempt to 
create a win-win situation – higher economic returns and environmental impact mitigation). 
Artisanal miners do not openly protest on the exploitative element in this regime because 
either ways, they are dependent upon the processing plants to process their ore. That being 
said, many have found a way to unite and set up their own little plant with a mill, but most of 
them still rely on renting this service, in which their gold return may be below 30% of the 
gold content in their ore. Even though this is clearly a skewed working regime, as most 
economic benefits go to the processing plants, there is a complementarity at play here, and the 
privileges of the processing plants are, in the minds of local miners, legitimate because of the 
investments and risks taken by the owners of the plants. Accordingly, when regulations 
threaten to change this regime, local miners apprehend this as a cover for reducing the sector 
all together. Thus, by applying the prototype of the artisanal miner in public acts (the 
demonstration) or a derivation of the mind-set of this prototype (the workshop), this symbol 
works as a collective defence-mechanism to continue ¨business as usual¨, which includes 
opportunistic practices, but importantly also the survival of the prototype, which in the words 
of Ortner translates into sustaining a key symbol in local identity.  
 The differences in conceptualizing ASGM as a livelihood orientation (local miners) or 
¨a problem with a potential to be scaled up¨ (INIGEMM/scientific episteme), resemble the 
difference between an emic (internal view) and an ethic stance (external view), yet none of 
these critically address the political-economic conditions that sustain the current state of 
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affairs. By avoiding this, and by rendering the problems technical (cf. chapter 3) rather than 
political, status quo is suspended to a state of ¨permanent deferral¨ (Murray Li 2007:15), in 
which few if any, substantial actions are taken to address the political economy of ASGM in 
P-Z. Furthermore, there are reasons to suggest that the ethic/external stance is indeed also an 
emic view, that is, far from objective, but rather reflecting a specific scientific episteme 
(natural science/positivism) imbued with normative claims to truth (Barnard 2002: 182).  
A typical question from the tradition of political ecology would then be: who wins and 
who loses in this situation? As I illustrated above (chapter 2), the degree of miners’ economic 
success is highly dependent on the fluctuations in international gold prices. Yet regardless of 
that, the situation in P-Z largely benefits the owners of processing plants, who take advantage 
of the government’s failure to control and regulate the sector. Likewise, and increasingly so, 
the largest operators, epitomized by ELIPE, benefit from a situation where the major problem 
identified by state representatives (informed by the discourse of natural science) is the 
controversial mining practice among artisanal and small-scale miners. These large companies 
position themselves as responsible mining actors in contrast to smaller operators by aligning 
with the scientific episteme to marry under the umbrella of corporate social responsibility. 
This is where the big money is. The scientific community on the other hand, in which we can 
include INIGEMM and the research that informs ¨us and them¨ on technical and 
contaminating properties, may have a good portion of genuine will to improve things, but 
from a critical perspective, they also secure themselves with quite good prospects for future 
(paid) work in P-Z by reducing the problem to questions of efficiency and improper mining 
praxis.  
As we have seen, a recurrent recommendation for improvement on behalf of this 
scientific community (see chapter 2 and particularly the conclusions in Miserendino et al 
2013; Veiga et al 2014) is training and education of local miners. In other words: to 
incorporate miners into the epistemology of natural science. While this is not necessarily 
recommended in a paternalistic fashion, the last two empirical accounts make it quite clear 
that local miners interpret it as such. The more general point, or concern, is that this has been 
the on-going refractory scientific approach for several years. And while there have been some 
improvements, especially the eradication of child labor (which admittedly may be conceived 
as a major progress) and to some extent waste management, these are marginal despite some 
researchers emphasizing ¨the success¨ of P-Z (see chapter 2). In fact, an immediate 
consequence on the rumours of a prohibition on mercury (which is strictly speaking not 
legally enforced according to the latest reform of the Mining Act) was that artisanal miners 
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recurred to burning their mercury amalgam in their houses or in the countryside to avoid 
being caught by ARCOM while doing this in the processing plants (with retorts, at least 
occasionally). The consequence is a worsening of air pollution in P-Z, a pollution that has 
previously been measured to contain severe human health implications (Gonzalez-Carrasco et 
al 2011). Hence the situation of ¨permanent deferral¨ creates favourable conditions for the 
continuance of industrial pollution. As a ¨local matter of fact¨ everyone knows that miners 
continue to discharge mercury and cyanide rich tailings into the rivers, despite their obligation 
to deliver this by truck to the communal tailings pond. The mayor of Zaruma, responding to 
questions of why contamination continues, recently (8th of April 2016xi) said that: 
The mining industry doesn’t give a shit about the environment. Its interest lies in benefitting economically. If 
you pass by the river after 8 o’clock pm it’s full of sand (tailings) because everyone discharges their waste (…) 
They only send a portion of their contaminants (to the communal tailings pond). ¨I am the owner of that and this 
mine and I send this amount¨, to comply. Yet even if they had sent it all it would still be contaminating. Because 
the tailings are transported (uncovered) by truck through the whole town.20 
In the most recent scientific publication from P-Z, Nichols et al (2015) leave the reader with 
the impression that all the processing plants are to be closed down in the immediate future and 
removed to an industrial park in proximity with the communal tailings pond. Yet according to 
miners and people in P-Z, this is still very much a plan with no binding agreements towards 
its realization. The communal tailings pond has indeed been operating since mid-2014, but 
there are several problems concerning its design, its infrastructure, maintenance 
costs/competence and the administration in charge (Gobierno Provincial de El Oro), along 
with the lack of compliance on behalf of the miners. As Nichols et al remark, it is correct that 
there are plans to build a pipeline (arenoducto) that will transport tailings and waste from the 
processing plant to this tailings pond. Yet, this plan has been discussed for five years and has 
still to become a reality as it depends on the approval from the Ministry of Environment 
among others. APROPLASMIN and INIGEMM were the initiative-takers to build this 
pipeline, and although there is broad scepticism among ARCOM officials about its potential 
success (largely due to the fact that the plants will still be placed along the river), local 
opinions suggest that the main obstacle are the largest mining companies and their intimate 
relation with government decision-makers. These companies have their own tailing ponds and 																																																								20	A	la	industria	minera	le	interesa	un	comino	el	ambiente.	Le	interesa	sacar	su	beneficio.	Pasas	por	el	río	a	
las	8	de	la	noche	y	está	lleno	de	arena	porque	todo	el	mundo	bota	los	desperdicios	(…)	Envían	solo	una	parte	
de	los	contaminantes	(a	la	relavera	comunitaria).	Soy	el	dueño	de	tal	minera	y	envío	tanto,	para	cumplir.	
Pero	así	envíen	todo,	contaminan.	Porque	eso	va	en	camión	por	toda	la	ciudad.  
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water treatment plants, and in a scenario were all the other plants send their tailings through 
the pipeline, any evidence of continued contamination of the rivers will point directly at the 
few companies who do not connect to the pipeline. 
Even in the hypothetical scenario that all processing plants will be closed shortly, it is 
fairly optimistic to suggest that this ¨will result in significantly less, if not zero, ASGM-
generated tailings entering the local rivers¨ (Nichols et al 2015: 46, my emphasis in cursive). 
While ignoring the naïve and utopian assumption in this conclusion, the problem in these 
statements, correlating with several scientific publications quoted above, is that they reiterate 
the problem as technical rather than political. Thus, and as discussed numerous times by now, 
the controversy of environmental degradation in P-Z is portrayed and maintained as ¨a 
tragedy of the commons¨ where the only viable solution is to educate those mineros 
malcriados. 
 
Concluding remarks 
Different kinds of knowledge and ¨regimes of truth¨ shape the politics of mining in P-Z as 
elsewhere. This may be self-evident, but this chapter has illustrated how this actually occurs 
in a specific context, insinuating that cultural and political-economic conditions will always 
influence this process and that sweeping generalizations fail to grasp the dynamics that 
sustain ASGM across countries and continents. This is not to de-legitimize efforts towards 
comparing ASGM practices, but rather to suggest that mining praxis and its complex 
consequences must be contextualized within its historical, political-economic and social 
scene. Bourdieu is helpful here because he suggests, in line with Foucault, that epistemologies 
are politically imbued, but moving beyond this, we can use his theories about habitus and 
doxa to conceptualize how the ¨self-evident¨ or ¨what goes without saying¨ involves a social 
cohesion that can be put into motion, that is, as a mobilizing political force against external 
interferencexii.     
 In the perspective of interlegality as a process occurring in a ¨semi-autonomous field¨ 
(Simon Thomas 2009), this chapter has situated the conflicting normative agendas in their 
respective epistemologies. As we have seen, this is not a trivial theoretical observation, but a 
collision that sits at the heart of the problem of regulation. As suggested in the previous 
chapter, it illustrates what Murray Li identified as the tricky position of trustees as experts 
telling local people what to do, a task that is fundamentally difficult to achieve (as reflected 																																																																																																																																																																														
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by all sorts of Northern ¨development¨ engagements in the South) and ethically challenging in 
itself. One way to start however, as has been an underlying argument in this chapter, is to 
acknowledge that the will to improve in the case of ASGM in P-Z, is also situated within a 
very specific epistemology (natural science) and that its coupling with the doctrine of 
corporate social responsibility is a major obstacle in the eyes of artisanal miners in P-Z.  
More generally, this chapter reflects how practical wisdom couples with a collective 
sense of belonging in the shape of local autonomy, to oppose any external interference (both 
external regulators and external mining companies) and how this fits into the discourse of 
class struggle. While it is tempting to reiterate this ¨fitness¨ in the sense that the largest 
mining companies, the State and the scientific community taken together, indeed represent a 
powerful discourse that marginalize both the ideas and actions of artisanal miners, this chapter 
also tells the story of how this situation can be used to obscure the complexity in the field. 
More to the point, the account from the demonstration illustrates how collective worries 
among artisanal miners and the collective will to confront any regulation, is used politically to 
maintain the privileged and exploitative position of the processing plants. To what extent this 
is a planned strategy on behalf of APROPLASMIN is potentially a polemic discussion in P-Z, 
but the outcome is rather clear; the local mining elite consolidates its power vis-à-vis 
governmental authorities (by its ability to mobilize the mining community) and vis-à-vis 
artisanal miners (by its ability to speak up against increased regulations) that are largely 
locked into an exploitative working regime. 
 Concurring with Foucault, I think that ¨truth¨ is an effect of power rather than 
something empirically determined. One way to acknowledge this is by considering the human 
fetishism of gold, i.e. not as an arbitrary relation, but a very peculiar and long-standing human 
invention about a particular metal and its valuexiii. In other words, gold may occur naturally as 
an empirical fact, but the reasons to exploit it (or not) derives from human ideas which is 
necessarily politically imbued. This has some serious consequences for scientific knowledge 
production, especially on the inherent assumptions of positivism or any claims towards 
objectivity. Hence I consider the apolitical pretensions (its inherent claims to constitute 
objective knowledge) represented by INIGEMM and its collaborating scientific community as 
highly political. Bluntly put, they may be right or wrong, but they are indeed political. 
 The last chapter seeks to overcome the relativity that may be discerned in these 
interpretations. As this thesis has suggested, sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly, 
power relations and the effects of power permeates the politics of mining and render the field 
fundamentally political. Hence some reflection on this is appropriate.   
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Notes																																																								i	This	kind	of	knowledge	resembles	the	Aristotelian	concept	of	¨phronesis¨,	which	essentially	means	practical	wisdom	obtained	through	experience.	See	Moss	(2011).	ii	www.oxforddictionaries.com	iii	Robbins	differs	between	¨hard¨	(radical)	and	¨soft¨	constructivism	(2012:127-130)	whereby	Kant	would	be	a	proponent	for	the	first	and	followed	by	Foucault´s	genealogical	studies	where	the	notion	of	¨truth¨,	or	even	¨reality¨	is	inescapably	linked	to	contextual	power	and	authority	(Robbins	2012:123-4).	What	I	am	aiming	at	here	is	rather	the	contradiction	of	political	ecology´s	position	in	social	constructivism	while	at	the	same	time	scrutinizing	the	social	construction	of	environmental	narratives.	iv	For	Heidegger,”Being-with	(others)”	comes	prior	to,	and	is	an	existential	condition	to	”Being-in-the-world”	(Weiner	2001:6).	v	A	generalization	of	scientific	progress	solely	in	the	name	of	secularism	would	ignore	the	fact	that	the	great	religions	seem	capable	of	incorporating	science	and	that	many	famous	scientists/philosophers	had	religious	faith,	e.g.	Newton,	Darwin,	Linnaeus,	Kierkegaard,	Einstein.	vi	There	are	undoubtedly	several	knowledge	schemes	(practical,	cultural-religious,	and	interdisciplinary	variations)	at	play	simultaneously	also	within	epistemic	communities,	but	his	is	somewhat	beside	the	point,	as	my	aim	here	is	to	contrast	different	groups,	leaving	internal	variations	and	idiosyncrasies	alone	for	the	sake	of	the	argument.	vii	It	would	be	pointless	to	enlist	these	thinkers	here,	and	it	would	also	be	beyond	my	familiarity.	Yet	much	of	this	literature	can	be	found	in	the	so-called	¨ontological	turn¨	(Paleček	&	Risjord	2013)	within	political	ecology	(especially	through	its	anthropological	exponents).	If	you	want	a	tentative	list	anyway	(?),	this	line	of	thought	includes	the	works	of	thinkers	such	as	Bruno	Latour,	Marylin	Strathern,	Donna	Haraway,	and	Eduardo	Viveiros	de	Castro.	viii	The	mining	underneath	the	city	of	Zaruma	is	a	common	concern	for	its	inhabitants,	not	only	because	it	creates	risks	for	buildings	and	infrastructure	to	collapse,	but	also	because	it	works	against	the	city’s	ambition	to	become	a	UNESCO	world	heritage	site.	ARCOM	has	an	on-going	project	aimed	specifically	at	this	illegal	mining.	The	project	has	a	duration	of	three	years	with	the	objective	to	determine	and	safe-guard	the	safety	zone	and	the	frontier	of	the	mining	exclusion	zone	in	the	urban	areas.	Yet	ARCOM	struggle	to	succeed,	as	local	miners	with	extensive	knowledge	about	their	underground	whereabouts,	invade	the	old	tunnel	systems	to	exploit	rich	ores.		ix	This	reflects	the	apolitical	research	referred	to	throughout	the	thesis,	which	mainly	springs	out	of	Norman	B.	Keevil	Institute	of	Mining	Engineering	at	the	University	of	British	Colombia,	and	in	Ecuador;	the	Universities	of	Machala	and	Loja.	x	Not	to	be	mixed	with	its	counterpart	in	the	US.	The	Ecuadorian	University	of	San	Francisco	is	a	private	university	situated	just	outside	Quito,	and	is	considered	among	the	best	in	Ecuador	on	social	science.	xi	The	quote	is	retrieved	from	a	recent	newspaper	article	(http://expreso.ec/actualidad/la-contaminacion-desde-dentro-FH238689).	The	translation	is	mine	along	with	the	clarifications	in	parenthesis.	xii	In	contrast	to	Bourdieu’s	intricate	theories	on	structures	and	power,	he	is	rather	clear	on	this	point:	The	
theory	of	knowledge	is	a	dimension	of	political	theory	because	the	specifically	symbolic	power	to	impose	the	
principles	of	the	constructions	of	reality	–	in	particular,	social	reality	–	is	a	major	dimension	of	political	
power.	(1977:	165)	xiii	For	a	discussion	on	this	see	Peter	Oakley’s	chapter	on	the	¨social	identity¨	of	Fairminded	gold	(in	Drazin	&	Küchler	2015:	155-74).	For	a	chef-d'oeuvre	on	the	fetishism	of	gold	(and	cocaine)	see	Michael	Taussig	(2009).		
	 142	
Indeed, the dynamics of cultural imperialism 
are such that, while the power structure 
of colonialism is everywhere clearly laid down, 
the colonizing process itself is rarely 
a simple dialectic of domination and resistance. 
- Comraroff & Comaroff 1989 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 – Power, interlegality and political ecology 
The previous chapter attempted to analyse the politics of mining by examining stakeholders’ 
epistemological foundations and their articulations. It basically said that local miners and 
external scientists wake up to think very differently about what mining is and should be. The 
empirical accounts illustrated the difficulties towards harmonizing these divergent 
conceptualizations imbued with their respective, normative claims. The regulators in the 
institutional shape of ARCOM on the other hand, were not treated to the same extent, but we 
could place them in the tricky middle-position between the claims of miners and the claims of 
INIGEMM. As we saw in chapter three, ARCOM officials are the mediators between mining 
praxis and mining legislation and must accordingly answer to both parts. While their loyalty, 
at least in theory, is with the Ecuadorian State, we also saw that the role as trustees entails, at 
best, a search for compromises and that their assessments are influenced by the working 
contexts.  
 In this final chapter I put the concept of power at the centre stage of the analysis. I 
have already touched upon it several times in the passing, especially by drawing on Michel 
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Foucault’s ideas about the contingency of truth in the previous chapter, but also by outlining 
the hierarchical composition of the mining community and the (historical) marginalization of 
artisanal miners. This is also with us in the following. Yet, there are other dimensions to 
power that has not been addressed thoroughly and while the literature on this in political 
ecology (at least it critical strains) is abundant, some perspectives fit better than other with my 
interpretation of the politics of mining in P-Z. I will spell this out in the first part of this 
chapter. Here it suffices to say that I am interested in what Lukes (2005: 65-8) distinguishes 
as the moral context of power in contrast to practical and evaluative contexts. The reason for 
this is that Lukes, when treating the moral context, picks upon the notion of responsibility. 
This is interesting because it enables us to acknowledge that the reasons behind the 
problematic situation in P-Z is due to an intricate complexity of the nature of ASGM, in 
which it is difficult to define who is to blame for its consequences. Yet still, we can maintain 
this complexity and simultaneously say that certain actors, more powerful than others, have 
the capacity to change, or avoid changing, a structural problem which is caused by several 
conditions (67). Henceforth, there is indeed some actors that have more responsibility than 
others. These actors and their doings were, to some extent, identified in the previous chapters, 
especially APROPLASMIN, ARCOM, and ELIPE. Furthermore, by following Lukes’ 
theories, it is not only the actions and decisions of these actors that influence the situation, it 
is equally important (if not even more) what these actors do not do or refrain from doing. 
Lukes draws on Bachrach & Baratz to clarify this for us: 
 
A decision is ´a choice among alternative modes of action´; a nondecision is ´a decision that results in 
suppression or thwarting of a latent or manifest challenge to the values or interests of the decision-maker´(...) 
Thus, non-decision-making is ´a means by which demands for change in the existing allocation of benefits and 
privileges in the community can be suffocated before they are even voiced; or kept covert; or killed before they 
gain access to the relevant decision-making arena; or, failing all these things, maimed or destroyed in the 
decision-implementing stage of the policy process´ (Bachrach & Baratz 1970: 39, 44 in Lukes 2005: 22-3). 
 
If we consider this in the light of the exploitative working regime that processing plants and 
mining legislation enforce upon artisanal miners, and the fact that the latter hardly raise their 
voice regarding this, it is clear that there is some ¨suffocating¨ going on here. Likewise, as has 
been addressed several times: scientists’ non-decision to confront the political economy of 
ASGM is indeed a highly political choice with political consequences. Resembling this 
conceptualization and reiterating the problems as technical, it is also possible to conceive the 
Ecuadorian State’s decision to favour the largest companies (today as historically and 
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spatially across the Republic), their failure to empower artisanal miners or any efforts to 
incentivize alternative means of livelihood, as non-decisions. And lastly, it is also possible to 
link the contaminating praxis of processing plants to a non-decision of taking the health of 
downstream communities, including Peru, seriously at all. All of these non-decisions, of 
course, rest on different kinds of rationales and explanations, but the point is that this 
constitute the situation of ASGM in P-Z, a situation that is sustained and reproduced on an 
everyday basis. To use Voyles’ conceptualization of ¨wastelanding¨ (see thesis’ introduction), 
this situation renders the context of P-Z as pollutable, meaning that the place is considered to 
be worth sacrificing for the exploitation of natural resources. Illustrative of this process in the 
context of P-Z, as I touched upon in the introduction, is that some local people referred 
(humoristic or not) to the smell of cyanide upon arriving in El Pache, as the smell of home. 
Yet, Voyles’ point on wastelanding is not exclusive for P-Z, quite contrary, it is a common 
denominator for extractive contexts and applies as much to the contamination taking place in 
Navajo lands (Voyles 2015) as the Appalachian coalfields (Scott 2010) and many more. As 
Scott suggests, this is discernible in a ¨culture of extractivism¨ (2010: 6-20) where the 
environment (and marginalized people) is sacrificed in the search for profit. Ultimately, as 
pointed out in the previous chapter, this stems from the human separation from nature during 
the European ¨enlightenment¨, consolidating itself through the industrial revolution and 
Western colonization of the ¨third world¨, and finally, naturalizing itself through the 
hegemony of contemporary neo-liberalism. This is not to say that this process has not been 
contested, but the question of externalities (both cultural and environmental) has hardly been 
recognized at the same level as the logic of extractivism, at least not in P-Z. My point here is 
not as much directed to the balance of cost-benefits, but rather to the hegemonic effect of 
maintaining the problem as a technical issue within an extractive rationality. The effect is, of 
course, that alternative visions and alternative livelihoods are suppressed. 
 This takes us back to the issue regulation and interlegality, which I treat in the second 
part of this chapter. Here I wish to conceptualize the process of interlegality as the tension 
that sustains the dispute of regulation in P-Z. I largely follow de Theije et al (2014) and their 
use of interlegality as conceived by Simon Thomas (2009). While complementing this with 
theories from political ecology, in the end I seek to expand this view by critically addressing 
what I regard as a normative agenda to the approach of political ecology and the explorations 
of interlegality. Yet, before I do this, some reflection on the concept of power is needed. I 
should also be explicit about the fact that this last chapter, in contrast to previous ones, is 
more theoretically oriented and, as expected, more conclusive. 
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The semantics of power 
Considering the insight from Foucault on how regimes of truth, that are ¨produced only by 
virtue of multiple forms of constraints¨ (1980: 31) and how truth ¨induces regular effects of 
power¨ (ibid.), the link between knowledge (authoritative, objective, doxic) and power 
becomes clear. At least, we can say that truth is produced by someone, contested by others, 
and that the question of domination (objectification) is less a question of (objective) validity, 
but rather a question of the powerful, political alliances one version achieves to make (i.e. 
think of capitalism in relation to the saying: ¨time is money¨). I conceive this as the essence in 
Foucault’s early archeologic project into knowledge (1969; see also Gordon 1991: 46-8), that 
is, how knowledge and the production of truth is contingent upon its political circumstances. 
Accordingly, this insight can be applied to the history of mining in P-Z (chapter 1) or in 
relation to the actors’ epistemological foundations (chapter 4). Furthermore, we can see how 
this aligns with Lukes’ view below:  
  
…there are disagreements about where power lies, how far it extends and how its effects are brought about 
which it is plausible to see, not as disputes over the facts but over how we should characterize them, as contests 
about how we should think of power¨ (2005: 62) 
 
Although power seems like a difficult concept to define (as culture or society), several 
thinkers have thought and written extensively on thisi. In the following I briefly touch 
eclectically upon some of these, as my intention is not to do this exhaustively, and finish of 
with some reflections on how this can be conceived in relation to ASGM in P-Z. 
A conventional line of reasoning used to characterize power begins with Marx and 
Engels’ observations of the effects of the industrial revolution, that is, their ideas of class 
struggle and capitalist alienation. This is further elaborated by the works of Max Weber (e.g. 
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism) and Emilie Durkheim’s theories about 
social integration (e.g. The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life). This serves as a 
foundation for sociologic theory on power through exponents such as Anthony Giddens, 
Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu. In contrast to a static and enclosed conceptualization 
where power is an attribute of actor(s), or simply an act of coercion (Raik et al 2008: 731), the 
major insight of these authors is a relational and dynamic perspective on power. Additionally, 
they all stress the unconscious and invisible character of power. If we follow Giddens in his 
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theories of structure and agency: ¨power is regarded as generated in and through the 
reproduction of structures of domination ̈ (1981:4, cited in Barnard & Spencer 2002:446). 
Here we find a perspective in which power permeates individual action in the interface 
between choice (agency) and constraints (structure) (Cleaver 2012:36). 
Meanwhile, Bourdieu (1977) pursued an understanding of power through the concepts 
of habitus (72) and doxa (166). Here, the actors are likewise deeply entangled in unconscious 
structures of cognitive domination (e.g. the habitus of informal mining), as well as situated 
within established cosmological/political orders that appears objective (doxic). Yet, as we saw 
in the previous chapter, doxa as habitus may be contested (by other actors) and thus lose its 
unconscious dimension, which transforms them into a mobilization of bias instead. For 
Bourdieu, the dynamics of power is largely about the concept of capital (economic, symbolic 
and cultural) in which domination is achieved by converting and accumulating these kinds of 
capitals (1986). This is indeed a long treatise I will not embark on here, but Bourdieu makes a 
point towards emphasizing that economic capital is not necessarily hegemonic, but often 
underpinning accumulated symbolic and cultural capital and vice-versaii. I think we can 
discern this by recalling APROPLASMIN and their ability to mobilize the mining community 
in the previous chapter. Not only does APROPLASMIN profit from its economic capital 
(which would rather reflect the position of ELIPE), but it also draws on cultural capital (local 
integrity) and symbolic capital (representing the claims/interests of the mining community).   
Another prominent exponent for analysis on power relations, especially linked to 
Marxist inspired peasant studies and later on by his efforts towards theorizing power, is Eric 
Wolf. In my view, his insights resemble Bourdieu’s definition of habitus (see previous 
chapter) when Wolf defines his fourth modality of power as:  
Structural power. Power that not only operates within settings or domains but that also organizes and 
orchestrates the settings themselves, and that specifies the distribution and direction of energy flows. (Wolf 
1990:586-7, my summary)  
This definition echoes what Raik et al (2008) also term ¨structural¨ power. Yet these authors 
attempt to overcome the dualism of structure and agency by presenting a ¨realist view¨ on 
power. Even if we ignore the problematic connotations of the word ¨realist¨ as it generates 
associations towards positivism (especially in contrast to Foucault and before him Kant’s 
radical neglect of materialism as outlined in relation to the discussion of 
ontology/epistemology in the previous chapter),
 
the view on power as ¨real¨ where ¨human 
agents exercise power within preconditioned, structured social relations ̈ (Raik et al 2008: 
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732) hardly achieves its aim. It is partly acknowledged by the authors as they are not able to 
come up with any empirical evidence of this, but rather recur to a hypothetical illustration 
(736-7). Moreover, Raik et al’s definition of the realist view is above all, at least in my 
conception, a reiteration of the dualism they attempt to overcome. Their general point 
however, one in which we might agree, is that the outcome of the relationship between 
agency and structure is not a given and that this relationship is mutually produced (agents 
creating structures and vice-versa). Hence, we can somehow theoretically conclude with 
Lukes, building on John Lock’s attempts of defining power in the 17th century, saying that:  
…having power is being able to make or to receive any change, or to resist it. (…) It implies that power is a 
dispositional concept. It identifies a capacity: power is a potentiality, not an actuality – indeed a potentiality that 
may never be actualized (Lukes 2005: 69, my emphasis in italics) 
In relation to the previous chapter about knowledge we can accordingly say that knowledge is 
not necessarily power, that is; having large quantities of knowledge in relation to others is not 
the same as having correspondingly more power than others, but potentially it is. If we 
circumvent the acknowledgement that knowledge can be many different things, a familiar 
example would be the power/authority parents have on their children. Yet as most parents 
know very well, there are some very real (and frustrating perhaps) limits to this power.  
With Lukes’ view of power as a dispositional concept, we can maintain Murray Li’s 
interpretation of Foucault, her limitations on governmentality and the empirical situation of 
ASGM in P-Z where the actors draw on divergent regimes of truth. In particular, as Murray Li 
(2007) elaborates on ¨the conduct of conduct¨ in which a government (in her case Indonesian) 
¨attempt[s] to shape human conduct by calculated means¨ (5), these ¨calculated means¨ are not 
coercive or violent, but quite contrary, and echoing the work of INIGEMM, invitingly 
educational, slightly normative and/or formative for moral-public consensus. If we relate this 
to Bourdieu, it can be seen as an on-going attempt (i.e. the will to improve) to reconfigure the 
habitus of mining in P-Z and confront the presumptions among local miners, i.e. challenge 
their doxic experience of the morality of mining. Yet people speak up, as we recall from the 
previous chapter, and it is worth quoting Hanna Arendt on this point: 
Power corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in concert. Power is never the property of an 
individual; it belongs to a group and remains in existence only so long as the groups keep together. When we say 
of somebody that he is ´in power´ we actually refer to his being empowered by a certain number of people to act 
in their name. The moment the group, from which the power originated to begin with (potestas in populo, 
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without a people or group there is no power), disappears, ‘his voice’ also vanishes. (Arendt 1970: 44 cited in 
Lukes 2005: 32)  
Arendt’s words remind us of the foundations of modern democracies and democratic 
structures, yet there are some limitations to this, especially in terms of how these democracies 
(in the case of P-Z: the Ecuadorian government and APROPLASMIN) operate. If we 
furthermore add Foucault’s rejection of a distinction between ideology and science (McNay 
1992: 25) , i.e. objectivity as non-existent and truth as something being produced, we can 
conceive the relation between trustees and miners in analogy with that of parents and children 
(oppositional teenagers perhaps). At least it indicates that the recurrent mantra among 
researchers to educate local miners, ARCOM’s utterances to change mining culture, and 
miners being provoked by this approach, carries a paternalistic element with it. Hence, the 
governmental regulation of ASGM somehow resembles parents’ efforts to regulate their 
children – a challenging task indeed. 
Or is it the other way around all together? As we can recall from chapter one and 
SADCO’s industrialisation of mining, this company largely dictated the terms and conditions 
of their doings by drawing on its cooperative, economic power when negotiating with the 
Ecuadorian State, but it is also reasonable to suggest that its origin in the US, a nation heavily 
engaged in imperialist expansion throughout the world at that time, enhanced it status. 
Likewise, we have also seen how this praxis is replicated in the workings of ELIPE. Not only 
on a political level, by profiting on the current Correa administration that openly invites 
foreign, large-scale mining companies to proliferate in Ecuadoriii, but also down to the level 
of enforcing mining legislation (i.e. the empirical account in chapter 3). To finish off this 
thought experiment: if the State is the father/mother, are these companies (SADCO/ELIPE) 
the grandfather/mother or its siblings? In other words, are they authoritative in relation to the 
State or are they a sister/brother merely providing a good example for the bewildered and 
uncontrollable kids, i.e. small-scale and artisanal miners? And what about APROPLASMIN, 
what is their role and status in this imaginary kinship system? 
If we ask people like Don Lucho (chapter 1), El Toro (chapter 2), Claudio and Miguel 
or Danilo Castillo (chapter 4), their answers would probably differ in many regards, but, and I 
think it is possible to say this, they would probably agree that SADCO represented a 
paternalistic figure in relation to the Ecuadorian State (despite all the alternating 
governments), while ELIPE today increasingly represent a brother/sister relationship with the 
State (i.e. an alliance in search for mutual benefits). However this may be, this is quite 
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problematic for the local mining community and their sense of ownership to both place and 
tradition. Notwithstanding the internal hierarchy of the local mining community, it unites to 
oppose the rulings of its ¨father¨ (the State) and ¨older brother/uncle¨ (ELIPE). Accordingly, 
APROPLASMIN likewise plays the role of a big brother in relation to artisanal miners. Yet in 
contrast to ELIPE, APROPLASMIN draws upon its local integrity by mobilizing and giving 
voice to the mining community’s opposition. Still, as we have also seen, APROPLASMIN (as 
a big brother), is also prone to take advantage of its weaker siblings.  
And whilst I have made an argument of the exploitative character of the internal 
hierarchy of mining in P-Z, we should not underestimate the importance of unity and social 
cohesion as constituents for the functioning of a society. This resonates with the work of 
Durkheim, and although he may arguably have been too functionalist in his approach, he 
certainly had a point ¨concerning the nature and conditions of social solidarity in ever more 
complex and differentiated societies¨ (2014: viii, from Steven Lukes’ preface). Translated into 
the context of P-Z, and coupled with the above-mentioned non-decision of the Ecuadorian 
government to empower artisanal miners, this means that the latter unite with their 
community (including both powerful local miners and the general population outside the 
mining sector) in order to make a general impact and oppose all external interference. This is 
important for them, despite the fact that their mining and processing is not optimal, because 
what is at stake in relation to increased regulation and external mining companies, is 
ultimately their source of livelihood, their autonomy and their local identity. My critical 
objection is nevertheless, that some of the owners of processing plants, in an opportunistic 
fashion, take advantage of this collective support and that ELIPE profits on the fact that the 
regulative attention is mostly directed to artisanal use of mercury. 
Lukes finishes off his emblematic treatise of power with a quote that speaks about 
power meeting resistance, and whether it is somehow unclear if the quote is his own or that of 
Foucault or Spinoza, it actually pinpoints some of the dynamics of the political situation in 
regarding ASGM in P-Z quite eloquently: 
in spite of all that political skill has been able to achieve in this field, it has never been completely successful; 
men have always found that individuals were full of their own ideas, and that opinions varied as much as tastes. 
(Lukes 2005:151) 
This involves power as a disposition in political tools and how these partially fail or partially 
succeed to establish a normative order. More concretely and returning to the analytical scope 
of this thesis, we need to see this in relation to mining legislation, its enforcement in the field 
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and the responses it creates. One example that serves to conceptualize this, is a consideration 
on the specificities related to the governmental efforts towards mitigating the use of mercury 
in P-Z. Symptomatically or correspondingly (depending on the perspective applied), mercury 
and its use has been and continues to be, the major point of attention for research on ASGM 
in P-Z, as well as globally. I agree that this is a legitimate focus for study that needs to be 
scrutinized, yet here again, the research treats a symptom (the signifier) and not the cause. 
And, as this thesis have attempted to illustrate, the cause does not merely lie in ASGM as a 
form of poverty alleviation or in an assumed ignorance among local miners. Contrastingly, a 
part of the cause was, as underscored by my miners in P-Z, the lack of feasible alternatives 
(see chapter 4). Still, the use of mercury is sustained by two additional aspects. 
 First, mercury is intrinsic to the habitus of informal mining. Accordingly, this point 
aligns with the overall research on ASGM where mercury use is a consequence of its property 
to capture minerals and the ¨easiness¨ of applying this technique. As I have illustrated 
(especially in chapter 1), the use of mercury has a long history in P-Z. It comes into being 
with the colonial commodification of nature and the first testimonies of its use, and its 
malignant health consequences, stemming from early 17th century. It became, as I remarked in 
chapter two, a substance that improved the efficiency of transforming nature (the mountain) 
into a commodity (gold), and its legacy has been consolidated ever since. For artisanal miners 
it has maintained its facilitating status, which has reiterated the independent potential and 
character of the prototype of the artisanal miner (see chapter 4). Regarding more 
industrialized mining, the position of mercury was challenged by the emergence of cyanide as 
a better alternative from the early days of SADCO in the beginning of the 20th century. And 
despite the fact that cyanide, in contrast to mercury, can be detoxified with the use of 
microbial species (Ackil & Mudder 2003), it would be a utopia to think that cyanide is the 
path towards sustainable mining. Rather, the local praxis of handling cyanide resembles that 
of mercury, in fact, the discharge of tailings containing both substances have created a whole 
new set of pollutants, i.e. mercury-cyanide compositions that enables quicksilver to travel 
even further downstream towards Peru (see chapter 2).   
The second reason why mercury use is sustained in P-Z stems from the profitable 
business model applied by processing plant owners in which the fast and cheap use of 
mercury corresponds to impatient artisanal miners’ needs to quickly obtain their minerals. In 
these situations, the processing plants take advantage of the inefficiency of mercury (only 
capturing 30-40% of the gold contents) since artisanal miners leave the residues as part of the 
payment for processing their ore. These residues, as the attentive reader will recall, are re-
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processed in cyanide tanks that capture the rest of the gold and silver contents (see chapter 2). 
Whilst this can be called an entrepreneurial achievement by proprietors of processing plants 
that has invested both money and efforts in their infrastructure, the point here is that this 
scheme is actually supported by Ecuadorian mining legislation enforcing artisanal miners into 
this regime under the assumption that this praxis is a responsible and professional alternative 
to artisanal miners doing the processing themselves. Yet, as the problems with mercury 
continue, either through its use in processing plants or as a consequence of the prospect of a 
prohibition, i.e. covert mercury amalgamation in private homes (far from or near urban areas), 
this put the largest operators, who only recur to cyanide and flotation, in a favourable light 
which strengthens their alliance with the government. In other words, the attention and 
emphasis given to the controversial mercury use obscures the praxis of larger companies, that 
continuously aim to maximize their profits, which means pushing all environmental standards 
and fiscal regimes to its very end. Furthermore, it is naïve to think that this does not include 
illegal praxis under the saying that as long as no-one knows, no harm is done.iv 
 Local contestation of regulation seen in this perspective is, accordingly, a contestation 
of the power relations that prevail in P-Z, most visible in the local/external dichotomy. And 
although there is a general, governmental will to improve the ASGM sector, improvement 
means very different things to different actors. Additionally, as we have seen, the 
governmental will to improve is conditioned by current and previous Ecuadorian 
governments’ pro-mining rationality, where the aim essentially comes down to how much 
gold it is possible to extract from these mountains. Unsurprisingly, government regulators 
sympathize with the largest companies that share this aim, and have the economic muscles to 
see it through. In a context with thousands of informal miners with close affiliation to the 
place, this situation is deemed to create some friction. In this thesis, I have chosen to 
conceptualize this friction as a process of interlegality. What follows are some last words on 
this perspective. 
 
Towards a theory of interlegality in ASGM 
De Theije et al (2014: 129-30) argue that it is the lack of state authority in ASGM contexts 
that provoke ¨engaging legal systems¨, which are the strategic choices people apply by 
relating to a state of legal pluralism. Their use of the term ¨engaging¨ implies that these legal 
systems communicate, interact and influence each other (131), an observation that could be 
discerned through ARCOM’s inspections in chapter three. I certainly agree with these 
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authors’ appeal to understand this process in order to improve policies and mitigate conflicts 
(130), and that many problems ¨are actually rooted in the marginalization of the sector, itself 
arising from obstacles to legislation¨ (131). This last point emphasizes the historical formation 
of the artisanal miner prototype and the habitus of mining in P-Z as respectively a key symbol 
and an institution, born and raised at the margins of regulation. Yet, slightly contrasting de 
Theije et al, in the case of P-Z I question (perhaps a bit pessimistic) the government’s 
capability of working towards improving the sector even in a hypothetical scenario with 
increased regulative presence. This pessimism mainly derives, as outlined in chapter three and 
four, from the observation that the problems are rendered technical instead of political. 
Furthermore, it springs out of the observed inconsistencies in Ecuadorian mining legislation 
per se (chapter 2), and the contradictions between the government’s invitation to extractive 
corporations and their aim to criminalize ASGM under the cover of formalizing itv. 
 If we dwell some more on the writings of de Theije et al, which is currently the 
frontier of explorations into the processes of interlegality in ASGM contexts, we can recall 
(from the introduction of this thesis) their important distinction between what is regarded as 
illegal and illicit mining praxis (2014: 132). The former relates to praxis at odds with formal 
mining legislation, while the latter relates to praxis which is socially regarded as 
unacceptable. As we have seen in previous chapters, this resonates with the governmental 
efforts of regulation (i.e. regulation of illegalities) and the claims made by the miners in P-Z 
regarding what, in their minds, are the illicit praxis of ELIPE in alliance with the Ecuadorian 
State. The contradictions inherent to this (i.e. local miners’ unwillingness to accept the 
illegality of their praxis and the government’s unwillingness (non-decision) to accept the 
illicit element in their regulation scheme) sit at the heart of the legal pluralism in P-Z. De 
Theije et al illustrate how this articulates very differently in three ASGM contexts which are 
differently composed in relation to mining legislation and their respective socio-cultural 
grounds. Their case from Surinam (2014: 134-37) discusses a traditional community’s fight 
for formal land rights in the face of large-scale mining expansion, while their case from 
Colombia (137-40) discusses a situation of de jure legal pluralism where national law has, to 
some extent, recognized collective land rights of the Afro-Colombian communities, yet given 
the complexity of the field, the co-existence of different scales of mining still relies heavily on 
informal agreements between the stakeholders. Their case from Tapajós in Brazil (140-3) on 
the other hand, discusses problems emerging between the jurisdictional levels (federal vs. 
provincial) of mining legislation in contrast to the collision between formal and customary 
legal systems. In sum this accounts for a vast complexity of ASGM in a comparative 
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perspective and emphasizes the importance of studying the particularity of each case. Or, put 
differently, this suggests that the process of interlegality seen as the tension between top-
down and bottom-up legal systems, is qualitatively different from context to context.  
 A similar conclusion is also reached by Mette High in a Mongolian ASGM context: 
Although the formal distinctions between legal and illegal activities cannot simply be presumed to be relevant to 
people’s individual moral evaluations of present practices, laws articulate general distinctions that emerge from 
their dialectic with society. As noted by Pottage (2004), state laws do not exist above or beyond society, without 
any reference to or dialogue with the ways in which people go about their lives. Rather, state laws are cultural 
artefacts that tell us about legal as well as popular conceptions of the moral matrix of life. When current 
Mongolian legislation thus denies the legalization of individualized ninja mining, a particular Mongolian 
interpretation of how people ought to live slowly begins to appear. (2012: 16) 
This quote also emphasizes that formal laws are not a consistent benevolent normative order 
securing the rights and well-being of its citizens, but rather, in analogy with ASGM norms in 
P-Z, Mongolia and other places, a legal system invented and created through negotiations 
between (alternating) governmental concerns/interests, political opposition (inside/outside the 
parliament), international conventions (e.g. Minamata Convention and the ILO convention 
169vi), particular interest groups (e.g. global corporations, NGOs and local (indigenous) 
movements), and public opinion. Of course, formal laws are dependent (at least in the 
democratic sense) on a minimal amount of social integrity in order to have any normative 
effect. Yet, in the particular case of ASGM, there is presumably a wide discrepancy between 
national public opinion and local miners’ conceptualization on the meaning of miningvii. And 
while regulation must accordingly be targeted somewhere in the middle of this discrepancy, 
this thesis has shown some of the difficulties related to the act of enforcement. Not only must 
trustees (ARCOM, INIGEMM) avoid a paternalistic approach, but they must tolerate the fact 
that the informal element is part and parcel of ASGM and somehow maximize the application 
of a problematic mining legislation, while sustaining a general pro-mining attitude among all 
parts (miners in all scales and the Ecuadorian State in all its representations).  
The specificities of regulation and resistance in P-Z are hardly characteristic for all 
ASGM contexts throughout the world. Hence, it reiterates what Voyles (2015) pointed out in 
the introduction of this thesis: we need to complement the perspective on the signifier (i.e. 
pollution) with a critical view on the power structures that produce the conditions that make 
pollution take place exactly where it can be observed. In other words, the signifier may be 
more or less the same (ASGM sites undoubtedly struggle with different degrees of pollution 
and poverty), but the political, cultural configurations (from local to national and global 
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levels) and its dynamics are irreducibly particular to each case. Ergo, there is no escape from 
the particular analysis if we are to say something meaningful about the signifier.  
  In contrast to apolitical research that refrains from contextualizing mining operations 
in their political, socio-economic conditions, social scientists, especially the ones calling 
themselves political ecologists, have long ago acknowledged the message in 
Schattschneider’s quote below:  
All forms of political organization have a bias in favour of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the 
suppression of others, because organization is the mobilization of bias. Some issues are organized into politics 
while others are organized out.¨ (Schattschneider 1960: 71, in Lukes 2005: 20, emphasis in original) 
Besides echoing with the importance of scrutinizing the non-decisions of powerful actors, this 
quote also resonates with Murray Li’s analysis (see chapter 3) in which the exclusion of the 
political-economic dimension ¨both limits and shapes what improvement becomes¨ (2007: 8). 
The process of interlegality is accordingly a process of balancing the stakeholders’ sense of 
output in relation to their respective claims, which in the case of P-Z is fittingly observed, as 
portrayed by Murray Li, in a ¨permanent deferral¨ (15) of confronting the political-economic 
dimension. There are compromises, but few substantial improvements, because the deeper 
problems are simply not to be found through technical improvements. Quite contrary to 
researchers saying that education of miners will resolve these problems, the overarching 
problem is that the current situation where legislation in praxis favours the largest operators, 
and thus legitimizes and enhances the opposition of artisanal miners against increased 
regulation. Henceforth, this consolidates miner’s non-compliance and continued application 
of local norms at odds with formal mining legislation. Furthermore, the particular history of 
mining in P-Z gives credence to mining as an instrument of autonomy in relation to both 
central governments and foreign companies. After all, and following the local point of view, 
if it had not been for their ¨mobilization of bias¨, they would either have been partially 
swallowed by a large company (i.e. SADCO), forced to move somewhere else (as partially 
happened with the dismantling of SADCO and CIMA), or forced to engage in other activities 
(cf. coffee and cattle or the sugar cane production as witnessed in the early 19th century). 
   Accordingly, when I arrived to do fieldwork in P-Z, one of my first discussions about 
the ¨state of mining affairs¨ was with a local taxi driver. Although he was a taxi driver, he 
often recurred to mining to make a living and said that the situation with the State monopoly 
on dynamite and their plan to prohibit mercury was a source of widespread frustration in the 
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community. ¨They take you for a terrorist you know, if you are caught with some dynamite in 
your car¨, he said referring to the collaboration between ARCOM and the police to take action 
on the illegal use and storage of dynamite being smuggled in from Peru and Bolivia. The ban 
on mercury was likewise, totally unacceptable (illicit) according to this taxi driver, who 
sneered at the Correa administration as he finished off to say that: ¨the only thing we can hope 
for is that the people of Ecuador overthrow this government and replace it with someone who 
understands the conditions we currently endure here in Zaruma¨.  
  I have my doubts that this man has the sustainable solution for the environmental 
degradation of P-Z (who has?), but he represents a mining community that is deeply provoked 
by the attempts to regulate the sector. And although we can recognize that an implementation 
of increased regulation, at least in the beginning, is inevitably interpreted as provocative, this 
is utterly stressed due to local miners’ observation of the governments preference for large-
scale actors and by the fact that they are trapped inside an exploitative working regime in 
relation to the processing plants. Facing these circumstances, their confusion with the 
complexity and inconsistencies of mining legislation and the threats to criminalize their 
mining praxis, their response is to demonstrate publicly, while at the same time stick to do 
what they have always done, and in a worst-case-scenario, pay off ARCOM or whoever 
arrives telling them what to do. 
 Whereas the examples of artisanal miners like Claudio and Miguel and INIGEMM’s 
metallurgic engineer having a bad day at work (see previous chapter), constitute two 
extremities in a polarized conceptualization of ASGM (that hardly talk to each other), I have 
also elaborated upon the middle-positions of APROPLASMIN and ARCOM. In relation to 
legal pluralism, it is interesting to note how these institutions that are placed in the mediating 
middle-position must navigate between formal mining laws and the norms that guide local 
miners, that is, between (il)licit and (il)legal mining praxis. This resonates (once again) with 
de Theije et al saying that: ¨individuals and groups can make use of more than one law to 
rationalize and legitimate their claims, decisions and behaviours¨ (2014:132). We saw this in 
ARCOM’s inspections (chapter 3), where the contexts of enforcement were highly influential 
on the actions taken (or not taken) by ARCOM officials. Yet, by cataloguing their 
observations and building a confidential archive, they manage to ¨do two things at the same 
time¨, that is, adapt to non-compliance on field inspections and report on the irregularities, 
which at a later stage can be used to enforce sanctions and/or relieve them of the 
responsibility of not taking any immediate actions in the case of an accident. This is perhaps a 
necessary measure in order to avoid the strict implementation of the Mining Act, which we 
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recall (from chapter 2) in the words of an ARCOM official, as equivalent to closing down 
every single mine and processing plant in P-Z. Nonetheless, this regulative praxis certainly 
creates a space for creativity as well. Whether we call it creativity, entrepreneurial 
achievement, institutional bricolage (cf. Cleaver 2012), or opportunistic exploitation is less 
important. The point is that powerful local miners and owners of processing plants (regardless 
of their link to APROPLASMIN), attempt to maximize this space, and while the most 
successful are the largest operators that additionally receive a blessing from the government, 
middle-sized local miners in this middle-position profit substantially on this regulatory praxis. 
One could almost say that their success is dependent upon this regulation because their power 
(i.e. their active engagement into the potentiality of power) derives from their strategic 
position that forces artisanal miners to process their ore at processing plants, that despite 
being an exploitative regime, maintains local integrity (i.e. Bourdieu’s cultural capital) by 
providing local employment and input into the local economy. Last but not least, and on top 
of it all, these mine/plant owners, albeit in varying degrees, manage to mobilize the local 
community and defend the interests of artisanal miners and thus increase, in the words of 
Bourdieu, their symbolic capital.  
 
Implications for political ecology 
Lukes’ view on power as a disposition and a potentiality that may, quite literally, infuse all 
human relations, reflects a much applied perspective within political ecology. As political 
ecologists sing out quite loudly, this often articulates in asymmetrical power relations 
throughout the world in which the post-colonies have still to emancipate from their rulers that 
are no longer nation-states, but global corporations in a globalized worldviii. Yet, there is an 
Achilles’ heel to this perspective. I touched upon it towards the end of the last chapter, 
perhaps to the boredom of the reader, but I repeat it here once again to reiterate this 
observation in order to take very seriously what Astrid Ulloa, drawing on Arturo Escobar 
(2005b), says about the critiques of development: 
…critiques of development involve the need to consider poverty and capitalism as embedded development 
issues, and that processes of resistance to development should be analysed critically, and that local processes 
should not be romanticized. (Ulloa 2015: 324, my emphasis in italics) 
Although it may take other forms than straightforward romanticism, I consider this bias 
towards local people’s actions and mobilization against top-down implementations of 
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development programs (Murray Li 2007), mining capitalism (Kirsch 2014), or ASGM (De 
Theije 2014) as a problem underpinning the research agenda that characterizes political 
ecology. Of course, the reasons are many, and in the light of colonization, neo-liberalism and 
Western hegemonic practices, they reflect a legitimate critique that this thesis to a large extent 
is also part of. If we reduce this to a question of loyalty, i.e. where political ecologists should 
direct their critique at the face of all sorts of capitalist exploitation and destruction, I certainly 
unite against these actions. Nevertheless, this is problematic because, as I have shown, ¨… 
(gender relations) and inequalities between local people are blurred in the interest of 
collective political processes, without taking into account the differential effects of 
environmental and development policies (for men and women)¨ (Ulloa 2015: 329, my 
parenthesis’). This is of relevance even without taking the gender dimension into account.  
Inequalities, in the context of ASGM in P-Z, are blurred in three ways: First, in the 
process of enforcing regulations, the local community unites to mobilize resistance despite the 
internal hierarchy among miners. Second, as an effect of rendering the problems technical, 
trustees, both in the shape of law enforcers and the natural science that accompanies it, avoid 
confronting these asymmetrical power relations. Third, if social scientists (i.e. political 
ecologists) fail to observe and analyse this blurred dimension, the interpretation will obscure 
important complexity and reproduce an inaccurate narrative. In fact, it may reproduce an 
element of predictability to the political ecologist approach towards environmental 
degradation/resource extractivism, in which important local dynamics are ignored or 
presented imprecisely. 
 Accordingly, I think it is worthwhile to consider this when analysing interlegality as 
well. Instead of aiming to balance the dynamics of top-down and bottom-up legal systems by 
sympathizing with the latter, I argue for maintaining a focus on the tensions this create and 
analyse the complexity emerging from this. As Murray Li (2007: 26) emphasizes, by 
reiterating the projects of Foucault and Gramsci, we must expose ¨how power works¨ in local 
settings, including the exposure of ¨unsettling truths¨, which must be ¨scrutinized and 
contested¨ rather than being ignored for the benefit of creating a more coherent narrative. As 
mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, I consider this of pivotal importance for political 
ecologists in order to avoid the fallacy of creating new narratives that merely reflect 
ideology/epistemology inherent to political ecology, rather than the complexity of empirical 
observations.  
  In the tradition of political ecology and upon returning to what Robbins terms as the 
uncomfortable juxtaposition between a realist (positivist) and a social constructivist approach 
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in relation to claims of nature (Robbins 2012:97), this thesis, despite its emphasis on social 
theory, is likewise somehow stuck in this ambivalence. More concretely, I have criticized 
existing research on ASGM in P-Z for reducing the problems to a version of ¨a tragedy of the 
commons¨ (Hardin 1968), where small-scale and artisanal miners are to blame for the 
environmental degradation. At the same time, I have taken this research at face-value and let 
it inform this thesis on both mining processes and environmental consequences. While this 
take may appear as contradictory – especially in relation to my critical comments about the 
role apolitical research plays in rendering the problems technical – there is also an element of 
interdisciplinarity to this. Natural sciences, i.e. biology, toxicology, geology, have an 
important message to convey in the context of ASGM in P-Z, and the message is powerful, 
perhaps too powerful in the sense that it has come to dominate the approach and narratives 
about what is going on here. Consequently, my approach to this has been to critically explore 
and contextualize this research, confront it with Foucault’s insight on knowledge and power, 
to say something about the social dynamics and the effects this has in relation to regulation.  
Furthermore, besides Foucault, political ecologists (implicitly or explicitly) also relate 
to Heidegger and his notion of truth as something being “revealed” or an “unconcealment” 
(Weiner 2001:72-3). Heidegger’s view necessarily includes a(n) (un) conscious “masking” of 
reality by human activity and engagement that alienates humans from their own 
determinations (Descola 2013b). And while a political ecologist would normally follow Marx 
and the effects of capitalist alienation, a more philosophic inclined anthropologist (e.g. 
Wagner 1981) would venture into symbolism, intersubjectivity and the deep structures of 
intentionality. The two paths obviously share constitutive elements like the struggle with the 
nature-culture dichotomy and both seems to compromise with social constructivism at a 
certain level. The point however, is that the choice of which path to follow, whether grounded 
in materialism or intersubjectivity, has a profound influence on the process and the outcome 
of analysing social phenomena. Not only is this relevant for the choice of methods and 
analytical scope, but it generates specific meaning into the ways of conceiving the world and 
this apply as much to political ecologists as natural scientists, as the mining community in P-Z 
and the actors involved in regulating ASGM (cf. Law 2011). 
Hence, I argue that self-reflectivity should be an important ingredient in the political 
ecologist’s approach, not only as a humble stance amid other scientific or cultural 
explanations, but also to illustrate how one thinks while analysing a case such as this. Once 
this is achieved or while this is taken into account, however, I argue that the critical 
perspectives from political ecology are meaningful and necessary (cf. Robbins (2015) 
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characterization of political ecology as a ¨trickster science¨). 
  
Concluding remarks 
Unsurprisingly, power relations are highly influential to the regulation of ASGM in P-Z. One 
could almost say that power in all its intricacies and different shapes, dictates the state of 
affairs. Yet, as we have seen, power is not a tangible thing, but rather a disposition existing 
among people in their relations. This chapter has attempted to nuance and enlarge a 
conceptualization of power as an attribute of a person. While theory on power helps to expand 
an understanding of power and how it may work, I have also illustrated how this articulates in 
power relations in P-Z (i.e. the semantics). While recurrent narratives in resource governance 
analyses tend towards portraying local people being marginalized by corporations and the 
State, I have shown that this is only partially true in this case. Yes, it is possible to remain 
very critical about current Ecuadorian mining legislation, its enforcement in the field and the 
intimate links between the State and large companies (in this case ELIPE). Yet, as I have 
returned to emphasize several times, without an acknowledgement and a critical perspective 
on the internal hierarchy of the mining community, the analysis would be, quite frankly, 
wrong.  
 This argument is not only applicable to this analysis per se, but it echoes a tendency 
within political ecology, albeit in different degrees, to sympathize with local people as some 
sort of spinal reflex after reading and spending time in a scientific community with an explicit 
political orientation against neo-liberalism (or whatever we wish to call it). This is perhaps 
accentuated upon doing fieldwork amongst marginalized peoples. And I agree, ideologically I 
am totally in consensus, not only in relation to capitalism’s materialist workings, but also 
regarding the effects of its hegemonic world-view. Yet, and this is my point in relation to both 
political ecology and studies of interlegality, we must not let this critical perspective obscure 
the possibility, or as in this case, the empirical observation, that local people in particular 
places are far from innocent players in the game for power.  
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Notes																																																								i	A	random	search	on	Google	Scholar	obtains:	5,6	million	hits	on	society;	5,1	million	on	culture	and;	3,4	million	on	power.	Although	it	might	be	argued	that	this	tells	us	little	about	the	problems	of	defining	these	concepts,	it	does	indicate	an	extensive	use	of	them.	ii	Bourdieu’s	most	famous	analysis	of	this	is,	of	course,	Distinction	(1984),	his	treatise	on	the	judgement	of	taste	and	how	this	is	traceable	to	the	hierarchy	of	social	class.		iii	This	invitation	is	far	from	a	secret,	but	quite	contrary	part	of	Ecuador’s	strategy	to	profile	itself	as	a	nation	with	good	opportunities	for	mineral	extractivism.	See	introduction	of	this	thesis.	iv	Recently,	by	April	2016,	there	has	been	a	major	labor	strike	at	the	facilities	of	ELIPE	Ltd.	According	to	ARCOM	officials	and	other	sources	in	site,	the	company	had	avoided	fiscal	payments	for	a	prolonged	period,	avoided	paying	their	workers	for	since	January.	This	last	fact	had	eventually	led	to	a	collective	walk-out	by	the	workers.	Unsurprisingly	and	echoing	the	statements	made	by	SADCO	in	its	time,	the	cause	for	these	problems	according	to	the	company	itself,	is	due	to	a	decline	in	gold	content	in	extracted	material	and	the	lack	of	capacitated	personal	to	work	the	mine	(see:	http://www.dynastymining.com).	v	This	last	remark	is	essentially	because	of	my	scepticism	to	the	logics	of	corporate	social	responsibility	(CSR),	which	is	used	rhetorically	to	legitimate	all	extractivism	in	Ecuador,	and	an	approach	that	will	unquestionably	create	more	tensions	in	P-Z	(cf.	local	miners’	opposition	against	the	privileges	of	ELIPE).	More	generally,	my	scepticism	is	simply	due	to	the	fact	that	I	have	still	to	come	across	any	happy	processes	of	CSR,	nor	any	happy	endings	for	that	matter	(especially	if	we	are	to	take	all	externalities	(human	and	environmental)	into	account).				vi	The	ILO	convention	169	is	a	convention	on	the	rights	of	indigenous	and	tribal	people	from	1989	established	in	United	Nations’	International	Labour	Organization.	It	was	ratified	by	Ecuador	in	1998.	See:	http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/equality-and-discrimination/indigenous-and-tribal-peoples/lang--en/index.htm		vii	There	are	several	parallels	to	this.	Consider	for	instance	the	prohibition	on	smoking	in	public	spaces	which	has	proved	quite	efficient,	at	least	in	Nordic	countries,	and	the	implementation	of	this	law	in	its	beginning	–	i.e.	the	difference	between	smokers	and	non-smokers	regarding	their	conceptualization	of	the	prohibition.	Moreover,	in	the	context	of	Norway,	one	might	see	this	in	analogy	with	the	governmental	attempt	to	conserve	a	meagre	wolf	population,	which	farmers	consider	as	a	provoking	politics,	stemming	from	urban	environmentalism.	For	an	Ecuadorian	example,	the	original	writings	of	Simon	Thomas	(2009)	describes	how	indigenous	customary	laws	interact	with	formal	penal	legislation.	A	point	in	this	regard	would	be	that	indigenous	customary	law	on,	for	instance,	the	procedures	of	punishment	(cf.	corporal	punishment	and	social	exclusion),	may	contrast	very	much	with	popular	non-indigenous	moral	beliefs	in	relation	to	¨correct	punishment¨,	which	is	largely	shaped	by	Western	constructions	of	Law	and	Rights.		viii	See	for	instance:	Comaroff	&	Comaroff	(2008)	about	disorder	and	overlapping	laws	in	the	post-colonies;	Castree	(2015)	on	capitalism	and	the	Marxist	critique	of	political	ecology;	Bakker	(2015)	on	neoliberalization	of	nature;	Harvey	(2012,	2006)	on	neo-liberalism	and	its	effects;	and	Latorre	et	al	(2015)	following	Harvey	on	cases	of	¨accumulation	by	dispossession¨	in	Ecuador.	
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Epilogue 	
There is a phenomena occurring when one submerges into a topic or a problem for a long 
time. What happens is that the person writing or creating something about something, begins 
to interpret the surroundings, especially what one reads, hears and sees in news and popular 
culture, into his/hers work. I am unaware to what extent this is a documented psychological 
occurrence or simply a reaffirmation of Levi-Strauss’ semiotics saying that humans tend to 
think in analogies (1985), but I assume that this frequently happens to scholars writing up on 
their material. I say this, of course, because I simply can’t resist to invoke one of mine. In a 
strict sense, this may be one of those darlings that should be washed out of the final product, 
but I’ll give it a go here in the end anyway.  
In 1972/1973, Jimmy Cliff was the main contributor to the iconic sound track to the 
movie called ¨The Harder They Come¨. The film and soundtrack evolves around the theme of 
small-time hustling in Jamaica and the dream to one-day, break through out of poverty into 
wealth and respect. This much celebrated album comprises reggae music in its very beginning 
and the songs are a compilation of recordings between 1967 and 1972. I have the album in the 
shape of an LP and I listen to it occasionally. The last months however, the songs have 
somehow merged into my work with this material. And this is why: 
It first struck me because the title track ¨The Harder They Come¨ resonates with what 
many people in P-Z told me about ¨miners getting hard¨ (se hacen duros). As we have seen, at 
least to some extent throughout this thesis, the nature of mining involves very hard work both 
physically and mentally for the miners engaged in this. Today as in the past, miners cope with 
extreme working conditions that accordingly, has a ¨hardening¨ effect on their character in the 
long run. This also includes a clear masculine constituent in the nature of mining, a trait that 
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occasionally surfaced in utterance saying that ¨mining is for real men¨i. People told me that I 
had to understand this in order to correctly interpret the mining activity and its consequences. 
Concurringly, I believe that this ¨hardening of the self¨, besides representing an adaption to 
the tough working conditions, can be extrapolated to include miners’ marginal interest in the 
environmental/health consequences of their work. Bluntly put, if miners are willing to 
sacrifice their own health, they are also willing to sacrifice the environment. There are 
exceptions to this – some miners are indeed more concerned about both the environmental 
and human health consequences – but the dominant attitude that make miners endure their 
work is represented by a sturdy and tough masculine character. Yet, regarding the aspect of 
success, there is an act of balance to this, one which resonates with Jimmy Cliff singing: the 
harder they come, the harder they fall. The last part (the harder they fall) echoes with Claudio 
(chapter 4) saying that the gold will not appear if one has too strong ambitions in the search 
for it. Hence, if one is too hard and enduring, one is likely to fall.  
The second analogy from Jamaican shanty, township struggle is more brute. The lyrics 
of the whole song titled ¨You can get it if you really want¨ resonate all to clearly with the 
proverb written on a wall up-town Portovelo saying ¨Don’t be afraid of loosing, be afraid of 
not trying¨ (see chapter 3). But you must try, try and try, try and try…you succeed at last, 
hmm, yeah, sings Jimmy, in analogy with miners’ hope and investments into the mines. I 
elaborated briefly on this in chapter three, and here I simply underscore the same point: the 
continuity of mining in P-Z is, in itself, a testimony of the tenacious, collective force towards 
mining as a livelihood. Miners never give up, despite facing all sorts of problems, but, in the 
words of Kris Lane (as we recall from chapter 1): ¨…regardless of outside interests, Zaruma’s 
hard-core miners soldiered on¨ (2004: 79). I regard this collective force to be well alive in P-Z 
today, and as an important dimension to why governmental regulation has a serious problem 
towards becoming a governmentality in the Foucauldian sense. 
Finally, Jimmy Cliff sings a song titled ¨Sitting in Limbo¨. Let’s just quote him 
(besides, the song itself is just a mouse click away, for the curious reader): 
 
Sitting here in limbo 
But I know it won't be long 
Sitting here in limbo 
Like a bird without a song 
 
Well, they're 
Putting up resistance 
But I know that my faith 
Will lead me on 
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As we can recall from my use of Murray Li’s term ¨permanent deferral¨, the governmental 
will to improve ASGM in P-Z is notoriously and stubbornly about improving the 
technicalities of mining and its processing. The political-economic dimension that sustains the 
current configuration that, in turn, produce the controversial mining praxis, is notoriously 
ignored or circumvented by governmental representatives. Accordingly, the political economy 
resembles a taboo, or as suggested in chapter four: an elephant in the room that is never 
addressed. As we have seen, the reasons for this are several, but dominantly an effect of a 
national legal system that: 1) render the problems as technical issues, and 2) is well situated in 
the dogma of corporate social responsibility. This combination leads to a governmental 
preference towards for the largest mining companies in P-Z and accordingly, incentivizes 
exploitative entrepreneurialism and a development towards large-scale mining. Where does 
this leave thousands of artisanal miners? Correctly, in a state of limbo, ¨like a bird without a 
song¨. Hence, the analogy is that: They’re (the government in alliance with big companies) 
putting up resistance (to the habitus of informal mining), but I know that my faith (autonomy) 
will lead me on. Or from a governmental perspective: They’re (artisanal and small-scale 
miners) putting up resistance (to mining legislation and our will to improve), but I know that 
my faith (corporate social responsibility) will lead me on. 
 I started this thesis by asking How does current regulation impact and influence on 
ASGM in P-Z? After getting into the matter, I should perhaps turn the question on the head 
and say something about how ASGM in P-Z impacts and influence regulation? At least, the 
thesis has stressed that there is much complexity to the process of interlegality in a context of 
de facto legal pluralism. The inclination to turn the question upside down, however, comes 
from the observation that despite the governmental will to improve, control and regulate the 
conditions of mining, the result is equally that of a continued environmental degradation with 
few substantial improvements. This may be a negative conclusion, but it reflects an empirical 
reality that is hard to ignore. Yes, there has been a process of formalization, yes few, if any 
children currently engage in mining, yes there is an increased presence of both law enforcers 
and people telling what the miners should do, yes there are on-going plans to re-structure the 
sector (a pipeline and an industrial park), but what is actually the outcome? I agree that there 
are some good things to hang on to, especially regarding the eradication of child labor. But, 
given what has been presented in this thesis, I remain sceptical towards the manifestation of 
significant improvements, at least in the short term. The reader has heard my reasons for this 
several times by now, most thoroughly accentuated in chapter three and four where I 
illustrated the act of enforcing mining legislation and the responses it creates. The problem is 
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political and it involves, as always in cases of environmental degradation and resource 
governance, asymmetric power relations. Someone is making quite a lot of money on this, 
and even without opposing the accumulation of wealth as necessarily a bad thing, the costs 
are characteristically, paid by the environment and marginalized people. This is the inherent 
nature of corporate social responsibility. Yet, as I have shown, its more complex than this. 
ASGM do sustain a relatively large population in the highlands of El Oro province of which 
P-Z is the centrifugal centre. However, the majority of these miners engage in mining as a 
form of subsistence and while they are more flexible than larger companies in the sense that 
they engage in other work in parallel with mining, the sector as a whole is very vulnerable to 
fluctuations in gold prices.  
 In contrast to the dominant narrative presented by apolitical research on the 
controversial use of mercury, this thesis has made a point towards nuancing the political 
claims among the stakeholders. Epistemology and world-views are themselves politically 
imbued. They are ¨regimes of truth¨, epistemology in relation to knowledge and beliefs, 
world-views in relation to identity and ontology, with normative constituents that impinge on 
the divergent articulations of reality. This in turn, heavily influences the arenas of regulation 
and mining politics where these regimes interact. Accordingly, the question is not about a 
collision of objective and irreducible claims as presented by stakeholders, but that of 
ideology, identity and affiliation to the problem. In sum, this points to my introductory 
paraphrasing of Le Billion in which he emphasizes ¨the importance of situated perspectives¨ 
(2015: 604). 
 Regarding the path of future research on ASGM in P-Z, some possibilities were 
outlined in the limitations to this thesis (see introduction). Environmental economics, 
institutional theory and other strains of political ecology are promising points of departure 
towards a strengthening of the social scientist perspective to this case of resource governance. 
Likewise, perspectives on power and the dimension of decision-making could by invoked to 
inform and present new narratives coming out of this context. In essence, I argue that the field 
is in a deep need to be analysed by social scientists, regardless if it is from anthropology, 
sociology or political science. Accordingly, I think its fruitful to begin by recalling the 
question posed by the Spanish navigators, Jorge Juan and Antonio de Ulloa, in the 17th 
century: ¨Why should the ‘naturally indolent’ campesinos of the region slave away 
underground, they asked, when nature made subsistence so easy?¨ (Lane 2004: 75) We can 
skip the ¨natural indolent¨ part, but maintain the question because it addresses ¨the culture of 
extractivism¨ (Scott 2010), which is a key cause to answer why this context has been rendered 
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pollutable and subsequently, that the emerging problems have been rendered as technical 
issues.  
Finally, my critical approach to ASGM in P-Z is not an unanimously opposition 
towards mining all together. Rather, it reflects an ambivalence. I acknowledge mining as a 
form of subsistence, but my pessimism begins when this develops into a capitalist regime 
towards exploiting nature and people for profit that accumulates in a few hands. In this 
regard, I argue that we need to take a step out of the capitalist rationale that drives ASGM and 
consolidates in a seemingly coherent pro-mining attitude. After all, there are alternatives to 
mining, and the only way for them to emerge as viable alternatives is by nurturing them as 
alternative ideas. Other worlds are possible (cf. Escobar 2005a), and my suggestion is to 
begin by confronting the power relations that organize the sector, and to ask the miners and 
people of P-Z what kind of future they want for their children. 
 		
Notes																																																								i	Scott	depicts	an	analogy	to	this	when	referring	to	a	bumper	sticker	used	by	miners	in	the	Appalachian	coalfields.	The	sticker	says:	¨real	coal	miners	do	it	deep	in	the	dark¨	(2010:	217),	that	along	with	the	masculine	meaning,	also	carries	a	sexual	connotation.		
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